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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters. All three are linked by our desire to bet-
ter understand the determinants of labour migration; that is, the motivation for
a person to change his or her location of residence for a period of at least a year.1
While immigration receives much public discourse, the economic evidence on
how migrants self-select is still lacking. In particular, we have little evidence on
the relative importance of determinants. We focus on three areas that have re-
ceived substantially less attention in the migration literature: the importance of
relative versus absolute income motives for migration; the effect of wealth and
intertemporal choice on return migration; and the role of place attachment as
an obstacle to labour mobility. Common to all three chapters is an emphasis on
counterbalancing forces that tend to offset spatial income differentials in deter-
mining migration.
The first chapter examines the extent to which relative income – that is, one’s
position in the income distribution – matters in migration choice. Virtually all
studies of migration focus on absolute income. This is at odds with the mount-
ing evidence that suggests people care about their relative position in the income
distribution. We argue that, in order to test between the absolute income and
relative income theories of migration, one needs individual-level panel data on
before and after migration outcomes. Indeed, since one has to estimate coun-
terfactual migrant earnings of non-migrants, if migrants are selected on unob-
servables then cross-sectional estimates will systematically bias the predicted
migrant earnings of non-migrants. We estimate the relative importance of the
two main theories in explaining interstate migration in the U.S. using a panel of
individuals. Relative income is calculated with respect to those persons in the
same U.S. state. We find that, although migration leads to a substantial rise in
absolute income, the trigger for migration is low relative income and not low
absolute income.
In the second chapter we show analytically that, under some conditions, re-
turn migration is optimal. We build a model where consumers choose either
to never migrate, permanently migrate or, migrate and subsequently return. To
generate an incentive for return migration, the model assumes a nominal income
differential between the source and destination and a compensating differential
– which exerts a counterbalancing force to the income differential. Examples of
1This is consistent with the United Nation’s definition of a “long-term migrant” as “a person
who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a
year”. Alternative definitions of a “migrant” based on birthplace or citizenship exist but are only
useful to the extent they are informative of where a person used to live, which is tenuous. Indeed,
citizenship can change without moving and birthplace merely records residence at a single point
in time, birth, when the individual can do little to affect it!
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compensating differentials may include differences between the source and des-
tination in climate, place attachment, price levels, unemployment and average
consumption. We characterise the optimal migration decision space with respect
to the three key variables: initial wealth, the income differential and the compen-
sating differential between the source and destination. The marginal utility of
consumption is assumed to be location-dependent due to a non-separable non-
pecuniary preference for the source. Consequently, when the region with the
best economic opportunities is not the source region, there is a trade-off between
income maximisation on the one hand and the marginal utility of consumption
on the other. We find that, all else equal, those with low wealth are more likely to
migrate and, conditional on migration, those with higher wealth are more likely
to return migrate.
The third chapter seeks to estimate a key obstacle to migration: place attach-
ment. Place attachment refers to the emotional bonds a person feels towards the
place (or area) he or she resides. We estimate place attachment within a struc-
tural model of spatial job search where migration is a by-product of accepting a
job offer from another region. The chapter can broadly be split into two parts.
The first takes a standard job search model and adapts it to allow search in many
potential destinations. Acceptance of an offer from a destination necessarily in-
volves migration to that destination and its associated costs. We consider two
types of costs: a cost of migration that is related to distance-to-destination and
a non-pecuniary cost of leaving the current region. The latter is deemed to be
the negative of place attachment. In the second part, we estimate the structural
model for a sample of individual durations in a U.S. state. Our estimates sug-
gest that place attachment is steeply increasing in duration for our reduced-form
model; however, the opposite is true for our structural model. We also find that
for half the population, the dollar values of place attachment are prohibitively
large.
Thesis Supervisor: Silvana Tenreyro
Title: Professor of Economics
3
Acknowledgements
The writing of this thesis has been the most frustrating, challenging and unfor-
gettable experience of my life. I would never have made it this far without the
support of my supervisor, colleagues, family and friends.
First of all, I want to thank Silvana Tenreyro, my supervisor, who has tirelessly
guided and encouraged me over many years. During my time as an LSE un-
dergraduate, masters student and now a doctoral candidate, Silvana has been
the most supportive and patient mentor. She inspired me to work on whatever
interests me, only asking that it be something of economic importance. I hope
I have achieved this. Without doubt all three chapters have improved substan-
tially as a result of her numerous comments and suggestions. Above all I thank
Silvana for believing in me.
Along the way I have been helped by numerous faculty members, classmates and
friends at the LSE. I have especially benefited from the comments of Francesco
Caselli, Javier Ortega, Yona Rubinstein and Thomas Sampson. I thank all the
participants at both the LSE Macro-money seminars and the CEP Labour Mar-
ket Workshop for their insightful comments. Over the years I have made many
friends at LSE; in particular I thank Abhimanyu Gupta, Aki Ishihara, Bonsoo
Koo, Michael McMahon, Prakarsh Singh and Kitjawat Tacharoen for the stimu-
lating discussions and all the laughs. All remaining errors are my own.
The biggest thank you goes to my family for their love and support. My mum
5
and dad are my inspiration and I dedicate this thesis to them. Without doubt I
would not have contemplated a PhD and I would not have made it this far with-
out their incredible support. They encouraged me to do well at school and to
reach for the sky. Any success I have in life is down to them. I also thank my
siblings, Matthew and Natalie, and my nan for their infinite encouragement.
I consider myself very fortunate to have a fantastic group of friends outside LSE
who have kept me (relatively) sane. Special thanks go to Jordan Jeewood, An-
drew Joyce and Robert Willis who stayed up late, spent a weekend and resched-
uled work, respectively, in order to read the thesis before submission. I benefited
from their comments and their effort and support will not be forgotten. I also
thank Chris Brown, John Hearn, Hannah Holland, Alexis Kiteos, Chanry Liu
and Szymon Ordys, among many others. Their friendship and support mean a
lot to me.
Finally, I thank the Economic and Social Research Council for their generous fi-
nancial support, without which I almost certainly would not have followed a
PhD but could have been a lot richer.
6
For my mum and dad
7
Contents
1 Does Absolute or Relative Income Motivate Migration? 13
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2.1 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.3 The Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.3.1 Absolute and Relative Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.3.2 Relative Deprivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.4 Empirics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.4.1 The Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.4.2 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Appendix 1.A Sample and Variable Construction for the Empirical Anal-
ysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2 Wealth, Intertemporal Choice and Return Migration 107
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2.2.1 Location strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
2.2.2 Location decision rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
2.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Appendix 2.A Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
8
3 Place Attachment, Job Search and Migration: a Structural Estimation 130
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
3.2.1 The Migration Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
3.2.2 The Choice Between Destinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
3.2.3 The Reservation Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
3.2.4 The Conditional Migration Rate and Distribution of Dura-
tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.3 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
3.3.1 The Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
3.3.3 Empirical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
3.3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Appendix 3.A Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Appendix 3.B Fitting a Fre´chet distribution to the Empirical Income
Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Appendix 3.C Matlab Code for the Structural Estimation . . . . . . . 186
9
List of Figures
2.1 Conditional value functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
2.2 Optimal location decision rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.1 Density of a Fre´chet and Lognormal Distribution . . . . . . . . . . 145
3.2 Fitting a Lognormal to a Fre´chet: Maximum likelihood versus Kolmogorov-
Smirnov distance minimisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
3.3 Interval Hazard Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
3.4 Hazard rate for State Grew-up and Host Subgroups . . . . . . . . 159
3.5 Fitting a theoretical distribution to the empirical distribution of
wages and salaries in California and New York, 1990 . . . . . . . 185
3.6 Fitting a theoretical distribution to the empirical distribution of
personal income in California and New York, 1990 . . . . . . . . . 185
10
List of Tables
1.1 Descriptive Statistics: Means and Standard Deviations . . . . . . . 54
1.2 Distribution of Observations per Individual . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.3 Distribution of Observations per Spell for Movers: Pre- and Post-
Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
1.4 Distribution of the Number of Migrations per Individual . . . . . 57
1.5 Fixed Effects Estimates for Log Income, Relative Income and Rel-
ative Deprivation for First-time Migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
1.6 Fixed Effects Estimates for Log Income, Relative Income and Rel-
ative Deprivation for All Migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
1.7 Two Stage Least Squares Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
1.8 Pairwise Correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
1.9 Average Partial Effects for Migration Propensity . . . . . . . . . . 80
1.10 Average Partial Effects for Migration Propensity: Controlling for
Relative Deprivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
1.11 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.1 Reason for Migration, by migration type, 1999-2011 . . . . . . . . 135
3.2 Distribution of Duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
3.3 Distribution of the Number of Spells per Individual . . . . . . . . 157
3.4 Distribution of Duration in subsample that drops left-censored
spells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
3.5 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Reduced-form Model . . . 170
3.6 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Reduced-form Model for
subsample that drops left-censored spells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
11
3.7 Structural Maximum Likelihood Estimates for subsample that drops
left-censored spells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
12
Chapter 1
Does Absolute or Relative
Income Motivate Migration?
“People care greatly about their relative income, and they would be
willing to accept a significant fall in living standards if they could
move up compared with other people.”
- Richard Layard (2005, p.43) “Happiness: Lessons from a New Science”
1.1 Introduction
Until recently, economists were in almost universal agreement that happiness
(or well-being) increased monotonically with income.1 Economic agents were
therefore defined by making choices – including migration – to maximise ex-
pected income. In the context of migration choice this implies that the higher
the income gain from migrating, the more likely migration occurs. It is no sur-
prise then that almost all models of migration assume the incentive to migrate
comes from the expected income differential between the source and destina-
1The mechanism is that higher income implies higher consumption – for given prices – and,
in turn, greater happiness.
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tion.2,3 Chief among these is Borjas’ (1987, 1991) model of income differentials,
which remains the most popular theory of migration twenty-five years after it
was published.4
However, there is a possible turning of the tide. Recent survey evidence
shows that happiness and life satisfaction are determined by relative income (to
others in some comparison group) as well as absolute income, and that once a
threshold level of income – needed for the essentials in life – is exceeded, hap-
piness no longer increases with absolute income but relative income instead.5
One way to change relative income is through migration.6 If relative income is
important, then we may observe situations that run counter to the absolute in-
come hypothesis. For example, if migration results in a deterioration in relative
income, people may choose not to migrate even when there is a potentially large
absolute income gain from doing so. Conversely – as the opening quote from
Layard (2005) suggests – people may migrate to improve their income position
even when the absolute income gain from migration is zero – or possibly, even
negative (a case often seen for return migrants).
The migration literature has been slow to catch-on. One visionary, Oded
Stark, did theorise that migration may depend on so-called relative deprivation be-
fore Borjas’ (1987) paper was published.7 Stark (1991) assumes people care about
2Throughout this chapter we use ‘source’ to denote the pre-migration location (or area) of
residence and ‘destination’ refers to the post-migration location of residence. Therefore, migration
is the flow of people from the source to the destination.
3See, for example, the seminal works of Sjaastad (1962), Todaro (1969), Harris and Todaro
(1970) and Borjas (1987, 1991).
4We refer to “absolute income” interchangeably with “Borjas” to describe the mechanism pro-
posed by Borjas (1987, 1991).
5See, among others, Blanchflower and Oswald (2000), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Layard (2005)
and Luttmer (2005). The idea that individuals care about relative income is not new: over sixty
years ago Duesenberry (1949) argued that saving depends not on absolute income but on relative
income.
6For example, migration will improve relative income when migration increases absolute in-
come and the incomes of the comparison group are unchanged or, if migration involves no change
in absolute income but a change in the comparison group to one on lower incomes.
7Stark (1984, 1991, 2006) and Stark and Yitzhaki (1988). See also Mehlum (2002) for how migra-
tion is self-perpetuating (within and across generations) when relative deprivation is important.
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their relative position in the income distribution (of some comparison group) and
that high relative deprivation increases the propensity of outmigration. More
specifically, Stark (1991) measures relative deprivation for an individual as the
fraction of people with higher incomes than that individual multiplied by their
average excess income.8,9
There is little or no empirical evidence to suggest which of these independently-
researched theories is the more important and, theoretically authors have either
not attempted to or not succeeded in distinguishing them. The purpose of this
chapter is therefore to analyse migration when both relative and absolute in-
come motives exist and, ultimately, to use panel data on interstate migration in
the United States to ascertain their relative importance in migration decisions.
Why is it important? If – and it’s a big if – relative income is found to be im-
portant and even dominate absolute income considerations in migration choice,
it will have profound implications. In summary, almost all existing economic
models of migration will be wrong, population forecasts will need to be recal-
culated and migration policy rethought. Indeed, the two theories can diverge
in their predictions. Firstly, under Stark’s relative deprivation theory, migrants
from the source region tend to be low-skilled (the deprived); whereas if the gain
in income from migration is greater for the high-skilled, then Borjas’ absolute
income theory tends to predict that migrants from the source are high-skill (a
brain drain). In section 1.3, we show formally that this divergence is due to
the asymmetric nature of Stark’s relative deprivation measure – it assumes peo-
ple compare themselves only with those on higher incomes (and not lower in-
8We refer to “relative deprivation” interchangeably with “Stark” to refer to Stark’s mechanism.
9The term relative deprivation originates from the social psychology literature. It refers to the
feeling of being deprived when comparing oneself to the better-off in one’s ‘reference group’.
We feel this is a little unfortunate since deprivation typically conveys hardship and a lack of the
necessities in life. In contrast, by relative deprivation we mean the inverse of some measure of
relative income or, more precisely, one’s position in the income distribution. Despite its slightly
misleading language, we stick with the term relative deprivation because it was used by Stark (1991)
and, among others, it has been used in the study of income inequality and mortality (see, for
example, Deaton (2001)).
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comes) than themselves. Second, a common concern of high-income regions is
that opening their borders to migrants from low-income regions will lead to a
flood of immigrants. To take one example, when Romania and Bulgaria joined
the European Union in 2007 many of the existing members introduced transi-
tional restrictions on immigration from these two countries.10 If, however, the
relative deprivation theory is correct, then the fears of high-income states may be
overstated; indeed, if migrants switch their reference group (with which income
comparisons are made) to the high-income destination, then they will likely find
that their relative deprivation worsens, which might make them more likely to
return-migrate.11 Finally, and we think most importantly, policy makers are not
only concerned with aggregate outcomes but individual outcomes too. In fact,
every vote counts. If the relative deprivation story is correct, then a transfer of
income from the rich to the poor is one way to improve the lives of the poor and
stem their outmigration; if however the absolute income story is correct then
the only way to improve the situation of the poor is to increase the income of
everyone.
While at first glance relative deprivation and absolute income motives may
appear easy to disentangle – after all they seem to speak to different moments of
the income distribution – the point is rather more subtle. Indeed, in aggregate
data, both Borjas and Stark can predict the ‘same’ relationship between income
inequality and the skill of migrants. More specifically, when income inequality
is higher in the source than the destination, both theories predict that migrants
will be of low-skill – for any given average income differential. The theories,
of course, differ in their underlying mechanism. In Borjas (1987, 1991) income
10Seventeen (out of twenty-five) EU member states restricted the free movement of labour from
Romania and Bulgaria when they joined the EU in 2007. Previously, transitional restrictions –
which can last for up to seven years from the date of accession – were imposed on migrants from
the 2004 EU accession countries, with the notable exceptions of Cyprus and Malta.
11Here the issue is whether there is a relative income motive for migration and, conditional on
a relative income motive, whether one changes his or her reference group upon migration.
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inequality reflects the return-to-skill, where a more unequal income distribution
implies a higher return-to-skill. Therefore when income inequality is higher in
the source than the destination, the return-to-skill is higher in the source and, it
is the low-skilled that are more likely to migrate from the source (for any given
average income differential).12,13 This confounds Stark’s relative deprivation the-
ory, which also predicts that the low-skilled (and, hence, low relative income) are
more likely to migrate from the source.
In section 1.3 we argue that the two theories can only be distinguished using
individual-level panel data on before and after migration outcomes. The reason
is that, with cross-sectional data, by definition one only observes income at a
single point in time, and for migrants this is typically after migration.14 In such
a case, one has to estimate the pre-migration income of migrants. However, if
migrants are selected on unobservables, then the estimated earnings of migrants
will be systematically biased. In contrast, with panel data we can directly com-
pute relative income prior to migration. Naturally, we will still want to estimate
the counterfactual earnings of non-migrants, but with panel data to hand we can
control for unobserved skill heterogeneity. In other words, we need panel data
to identify the high- and low-skilled.
The empirical literature on the determinants of migration has almost entirely
neglected to test for a relative income motive. Furthermore, the few papers that
do are systematically biased because they fail to control for the selection of mi-
grants on unobservables. To fill the void and test between the two theories, we
use panel data on individual interstate migration in the United States from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We use the Current Population Survey
12The average income differential and the cost of migration affect the volume of migration but
not the selection-on-skill of migrants.
13These results require a certain degree of transferability of skills between the source and des-
tination (see Borjas (1987)).
14A survey can only document migration if it has already occurred, whereas income is typically
recorded at the time of the survey.
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(CPS) to estimate the distribution of income by state, from which we compute
relative deprivation for each individual-year in our PSID sample.
Since relative income is subjective, how researchers should measure it from
knowledge of the income distribution is open to debate. What is clear is that a
workable definition needs to be specific about two things. First, who constitutes
the group with which interpersonal comparisons are made? The evidence from
social psychology suggests that this reference group must be known to the indi-
vidual (that is, they know the income of the group members) and the person feels
that the income of the group members is a realistic expectation for himself. This
suggests geographical proximity and connectedness are important elements to
be considered. Naturally then, in the study of migration we will assume attach-
ment is to the people that reside within a geographical identifier, in our case a
U.S. state.15 That is, we assume the reference group for a person is the population
of the U.S. state that he or she resides in (or used to reside in).16
We will see that a pertinent question is whether, post-migration, a person
changes his or her reference group from the source to the destination; if so, then
we say reference substitution occurs. In Stark’s early papers (Stark, 1984, 1991,
Stark and Yitzhaki, 1988), the reference group was assumed to be the source ir-
respective of migration. From this viewpoint relative deprivation is a push fac-
tor since it is only the source income distribution that matters. Stark and Wang
(2000, 2005) were the first to acknowledge that individuals who care about rela-
tive income may in fact use migration in order to substitute their reference group
for another in the destination. From this viewpoint relative deprivation is both
15The geographical identifier for the reference group may well be much narrower than the state
level. Luttmer (2005) finds that an increase in the earnings of those in the same U.S. Public Use
Microdata Area (PUMA) – which in 1990 had an average population of roughly 150,000 – reduces
happiness.
16Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) find that, for U.S. states, an increase in the average income
in the person’s state reduces that person’s happiness; however, if that person’s income rises in line
with the state average then that person gains overall.
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a push and pull force for migration.17 Reference group substitution opens the
possibility that an individual may migrate to decrease relative deprivation (or
increase relative income) even if it involves no change in absolute income – or
possibly, even lowers income. We will consider the cases with and without ref-
erence group substitution.
The second thing that a definition of relative income must include is the func-
tional form for how one’s position in the income distribution equates to relative
income. Stark has proposed an ‘upward comparison’ view where an individual
compares his or her income with those people on higher incomes in the reference
group. More specifically, relative deprivation for person i is measured as the
product of the proportion of people with income higher than i and the mean ex-
cess income of these people (Stark, 1984, Stark and Yitzhaki, 1988). This is based
on evidence from social psychology that people look up and not down (see, for
example, Stouffer et al. (1949) and the references within Frey and Stutzer (2002)).
For completeness we also consider the symmetric case where individuals simply
compare their income to the average in the reference group.18
The empirical analysis in this chapter yields some novel results. First we
show that, using the sample of migrants, migration is associated with an in-
crease in absolute income and a reduction in relative deprivation. Therefore,
the extreme case that migrants move to lower their relative deprivation even
17Stark (2006) suggests that Borjas’ (1987) theory can be empirically distinguished from his own
relative deprivation theory because Borjas (1987) emphasises income inequality in the destination
whereas Stark’s theory pertains to income inequality in the source. However, this is not a good
distinction, particularly if migration induces reference group substitution.
18Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) study the determinants of happiness in the U.S. and find
evidence that individuals compare their income to the simple average income in the individual’s
state. More specifically, they also define relative income as the ratio of individual income to the
state average and they estimate its coefficient in a happiness regression to be positive and signif-
icant, even after controlling for absolute income. The authors do, however, caution that relative
income is not a complete explanation for the absence of increasing happiness in the U.S. over time.
The authors also experiment with other measures of relative income, comparing individual in-
come to quintile averages. They find tenuous evidence for the upward comparison view; more
specifically, the ratio of individual income to the top quintile performs better than the ratio with
any other quintile.
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when it involves a cut in absolute income is not supported in the data. However,
there is weak evidence that the observed percentage increase in relative income
post-migration is larger than would result purely from the observed percentage
increase in absolute income and no change in average income. By implication,
there is tentative evidence that migrants tend to target states where their position
in the income distribution improves holding absolute income constant.
Second, using the full sample of migrants and non-migrants, there is robust
evidence to support the relative deprivation hypothesis. We find that an increase
in relative deprivation increases the propensity to migrate from the source state.
Surprisingly, we find little or no evidence to support the absolute income the-
ory of migration that dominates the migration literature and the thinking of
policy makers. To be clear, although migrants tend to realise a rise in income
post-migration, our findings suggest that this is not the trigger for migration.
Rather our estimations suggest that – conditional on income and the estimated
income gain from migration – the trigger for migration is a rise in relative depri-
vation. These results hold after controlling for state-level compensating differen-
tials such as the price level, unemployment rate, and climate – as well as personal
characteristics such as age, education, marital status, number of children, home
ownership, and individual fixed effects.
Throughout the chapter we use the convention that migration – if it occurs –
is from the ‘source’ to the ‘destination’. Therefore, by definition, the source is the
pre-migration region and the destination is the post-migration region. Migrants,
outmigrants and immigrants all refer to people that have moved from the source
to the destination. Also, we use the term ‘positive selection’ to refer to the sit-
uation where migrants from the source have an average skill that exceeds the
average skill in the source. ‘Negative selection’ is used to describe the situation
where the average skill of migrants is below the average skill in the source.
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the re-
lated literature. In section 1.3 we formally identify the problems with distin-
guishing Borjas’ absolute income model from Stark’s relative deprivation model
of migration. Section 1.4 contains a description of the data, the empirical strategy
and the estimation results. Finally, section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Since a major contribution of this chapter is to highlight the current literature’s
failure to estimate the effect of relative income on migration, it seems appropriate
to dedicate a whole section to reviewing the related literature. Our work is re-
lated to four distinct literatures. In decreasing order of importance (for our work)
they are: (1) a handful of papers that claim to jointly estimate the importance of
relative and absolute income motives for migration; (2) papers that proclaim to
test empirically the selection predictions of Borjas’ model; (3) papers that show
relative income affects utility and can help to explain a number of (not migration
related) economic puzzles and, (4) papers that show migrants respond to abso-
lute income differentials (without controlling for relative income considerations).
We take each of these in turn.
Stark and Taylor (1989, 1991) find that, after controlling for the expected ab-
solute income gain, relatively deprived Mexican households were more likely to
migrate to the United States. However, in section 1.3 we show that if migrants
are positively selected on unobservables, then their result is biased in favour
of the finding that relative deprivation matters. The problem is that they use
cross-sectional data, which precludes controlling for selection on unobservables
when they estimate counterfactual income of migrants and non-migrants from
the earnings of non-migrants and migrants, respectively. Quinn (2006) studies
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the effect of relative deprivation (and not just in terms of income but wealth too)
on the migration of Mexican households. However, this suffers from the same
problem as Stark and Taylor (1989, 1991) because it is cross-sectional.
In a working paper, Basarir (2012) uses panel data on internal migration in
Indonesia to study absolute and relative motives for migration.19 The empirical
analysis uses the final two waves of data, 2000 and 2007, of the Indonesian Fam-
ily Life Survey. The author estimates the effect of absolute and relative measures
of expenditure, income and assets on the propensity to migrate. He finds that
men are more likely to migrate if they expect to improve their expenditure rank,
even if it involves a loss in absolute expenditure. The future ranking of income
and assets is statistically insignificant. The author finds that initial absolute ex-
penditure is negatively related to the propensity to migrate; whereas the effects
of initial income and assets are insignificant. There is no evidence to suggest that
a low initial rank increases migration propensity holding absolute measures con-
stant. Basarir (2012) is similar to our work in both its aims and its use of panel
data; however, there are some key differences. The dependent variable in Basarir
(2012) is a dummy variable for whether the individual moved out of the source
sub-district for a period of more than six months between 2000 and 2007, so there
is no precise information on the timing of migration, nor can the author identify
return migrants. In contrast, our PSID data follows individuals annually (or bi-
ennially) and so we can pin-point the timing of migration and ascertain whether
the individual is returning to a state he or she previously resided. In particu-
lar, we can relate the migration decision to the socio-economic characteristics of
the individual at the time of migration. Also, Basarir (2012) uses actual future
values of expenditure, income and assets to proxy for the expected gain from
migration. Such an approach introduces endogeneity concerns. Instead, using
our long-running PSID panel dataset, we estimate the contemporaneous coun-
19We only became aware of Basarir (2012) after completion of this chapter.
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terfactual (migrant) income of non-migrants, whilst controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity. Still, Basarir (2012) can be considered complementary to our work
since it studies migration within a developing country, Indonesia, whereas our
data is for the U.S..
A number of papers have sought to test Borjas’ selection theory. Unfortu-
nately, none of these are a test between Stark’s and Borjas’ theory. Moreover,
where evidence has been found in favour of Borjas’ theory (and, on the whole,
the evidence is mixed) it equally can serve as evidence for the relative income
story.20 Early work on this looked at variation in the earnings of U.S. immi-
grants with the same observable skills and related this to income inequality in
their source countries.21 Borjas (1987) uses U.S. Census data from 1970 and 1980
and compares the earnings of U.S. immigrants from 41 countries with income in-
equality (measured as the ratio of the top 10 percent to the bottom 20 percent) in
the source. He finds weak evidence in support of his selection theory: income in-
equality in the source has a small negative impact on immigrant quality.22 Ramos
(1992) finds that U.S. immigrants from Puerto Rico are on average less educated
than Puerto Ricans who remained in Puerto Rico. Further, those U.S. immigrants
who subsequently returned to Puerto Rico were more educated than the pool of
migrants that did not return. Since the return-to-skill in Puerto Rico was higher
than that on the U.S. mainland, this result is consistent with Borjas’ selection the-
ory. Nonetheless, we argue that the findings of Ramos (1992) are also consistent
20The vast majority of papers that seek to test Borjas’ selection predictions study Mexico-to-
U.S. migration. Since income inequality is higher in Mexico than the U.S., Borjas’ model predicts
negative selection of migrants. Of course, low-skilled migrants also tend to be relatively deprived.
21See Borjas (1994, pp. 1690) for a summary. Later we will argue that, to test between the relative
and absolute income stories, it is necessary to use individual-level data. Since many of these
studies use country-level migration data, this confounds absolute and relative income motives for
migration.
22The negative effect of source income inequality on U.S. immigrant quality vanishes when
income per capita in the source is controlled for. Borjas suggests this is due to the high negative
correlation between income inequality and income per capita across countries. Using the change
in the percentage of GNP that is spent by government in the source as a proxy for the change in
income inequality over time, Borjas finds that this measure is positively correlated with the change
in immigrant quality, which is consistent with his selection theory.
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with the relative deprivation theory since the less educated tend to be the more
relatively deprived.
The more recent evidence on Borjas’ selection theory is mixed. Liebig and
Sousa-Poza (2004) look at the intention to migrate using data from the 1995 Inter-
national Social Survey Programme for a cross-section of 23 countries.23 Again,
their dataset is cross-sectional so they cannot control for selection-on-unobservables.
Nonetheless, the survey asks whether the respondent is willing to move to an-
other country to better work or living conditions. They correlate this with mea-
sures of income inequality (including the Gini coefficient) in the source country,
while controlling for other individual socio-demographic characteristics. They
find that higher income inequality in the source is correlated with a higher ag-
gregate propensity to migrate even after controlling for the level of income. Stark
(2006) interprets this finding of Liebig and Sousa-Poza as evidence in favour of
relative deprivation and shows algebraically that his measure of relative depri-
vation is positively related to the Gini coefficient. Interestingly, however, Liebig
and Sousa-Poza (2004) find that the positive effect of education on migration is
much larger than the negative effect of income inequality and so conclude that
migrants are typically positively selected (on education) irrespective of income
inequality. In other words, higher income inequality reduces the positive selec-
tion of migrants, but it remains positive. This is not what Borjas (1987) or Stark
predicts; it is however consistent with Borjas (1991) in which he extends his ear-
lier (1987) theory to allow for selection on observables (such as education) as
well as selection on unobservables. Indeed, Borjas (1991) shows that – assum-
ing observable education is uncorrelated with the unobservables – it is possible
to have positive selection on education and negative selection on unobservables
23The authors argue that, by studying the intention to migrate, they reduce the difficulties with
identifying selection that occur when using host country data on migrants from different source
countries. In particular, the skills of immigrants are likely to be highly distorted by (skill-biased)
immigration policy and migration networks. In our empirical analysis, immigration policy is not
an issue since we study interstate migration.
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(or vice versa). This would occur if the return to education is higher in the des-
tination than the source and yet, income inequality within the group of persons
with the same observed education is higher in the source than the destination.
Whilst theoretically possible, we would expect (and hope) that education and
unobserved ability are positively correlated. Therefore, Liebig and Sousa-Poza
(2004) (who make no mention of relative deprivation) suggest it is evidence in
favour of Chiswick (1999), which can be viewed as an extension of Borjas (1987)
to a situation where time-equivalent migration costs are decreasing with ability
and predicts positive selection of migrants.24
More specifically, Chiswick (1999) hypothesizes that migration costs have
a shorter time-equivalent for high-ability (and therefore high-income) workers
compared to low-ability (and low-income) workers.25 Consequently, migrants
are positively selected from the source skill distribution. In contrast, Borjas (1987)
assumes the time-equivalent moving cost is identical for all skill types (that is,
the cost of migration is proportional to the source wage). In summary, Chiswick
(1999) predicts that, although Borjas’ mechanism is still valid, it is not enough
to overturn the positive selection; hence Borjas’ mechanism (that higher source
income inequality implies negative selection from the source) merely leads to
‘less favourable selectivity’ but, importantly it is still positive.26 Chiquiar and
Hanson (2005) use the 1990 and 2000 Mexican and U.S. Censuses and find that,
24More recent theoretical contributions include Clark et al. (2007) who extend the Borjas model
to account for non-pecuniary benefits and various costs of migration but do not consider relative
income (or relative deprivation) motives.
25This can be achieved in a number of ways. Chiswick (1999) first assumes that out-of-pocket
costs are independent of individual ability such that time-equivalent migration costs are lower for
higher ability workers (that is, the same cost is scaled by a higher wage for higher ability workers).
Alternatively, as Chiswick (1999) says, if high-ability workers are more efficient at moving then
they have lower absolute out-of-pocket migration costs and, additionally, may spend less time
on migration thereby reducing foregone earnings (therefore, forgone earnings are not a constant
proportion of earnings across abilities).
26There is some evidence that after some initial downgrading of earnings for new immigrants,
eventually the earnings of the foreign-born outperform those of natives, even after controlling for
observable characteristics such as education (see Chiswick (1978, 1986a,b) for the U.S. and Bloom
and Gunderson (1991) for Canada). This suggests positive selection of migrants, although Borjas
(1985) questions the overtaking for the U.S..
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rather than Mexican migrants being selected from the left tail of the (more un-
equal) skill distribution in Mexico (as Borjas’ theory would suggest), they tend
to come from the middle. The authors propose that this is consistent with Borjas’
theory if the costs of migration fall with education, as hypothesised by Chiswick
(1999). In recent work, Ambrosini and Peri (2011) find support for Borjas’ theory
from individual-level panel data on Mexico-U.S. migration. They control for se-
lection on observables and unobservables and find that on average there is neg-
ative selection of U.S. immigrants from Mexico. This is consistent with Borjas’
story because income inequality is higher in Mexico than the U.S.. Importantly,
they find that almost all of the negative selection is on unobservable character-
istics, which they claim is why cross-sectional studies of Mexico-U.S. migration
(such as Chiquiar and Hanson (2005)) do not find negative selection. In terms
of how this differs from our work, the authors do not consider relative income
(or relative deprivation) as an explanatory variable for migration and, therefore,
cannot distinguish between Borjas and Stark. Indeed, given that income is more
unequal in Mexico than the U.S., evidence of negative selection is consistent with
both Borjas and Stark’s story – the low-skilled tend to be the relatively deprived..
The notion that relative income – in addition to absolute income – may drive
migration choice is persuasive given the recent evidence that subjective well-
being (or happiness) is increasing in relative income as well as absolute income.
There exist a number of country-level surveys that ask people to rate how happy
they feel on a scale, for example, from 1 to 10. In a series of papers Richard East-
erlin found that, whilst rich people are happier than poor people within the same
country, across countries those in rich countries were on average no happier than
those in poor countries (Easterlin, 1974, 1995, 2001).27 This became known as the
Easterlin paradox. Further, while at any point in time the rich are markedly
happier than the poor within a country, over time as per capita incomes have
27A notable exception is the very poor countries who are less happy.
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increased there has been no discernible change in happiness (see, for example,
Frey and Stutzer (2002) and Layard (2005)). A common explanation advanced
by Easterlin and others is that happiness depends on relative income; that is, a
person compares his income to the incomes of those in the same country or lo-
cality. Moreover, above a threshold income needed to buy the essentials in life,
happiness seems to be determined solely by relative income.28
Luttmer (2005) uses the U.S. National Survey of Families and Households to
study the relationship between individual well-being (measured by self-reported
happiness) and average income in the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) that
the individual inhabits. Luttmer finds that, controlling for own household in-
come, an increase in PUMA average earnings reduces reported happiness. Im-
portantly, the result holds after controlling for individual fixed effects. Also,
while the coefficient estimate on own household income is positive and larger
(in absolute value) than the coefficient estimate on PUMA average earnings, they
are not statistically different from each other; hence, Luttmer cannot reject the
hypothesis that only relative income matters.
However, the relative income hypothesis has been heavily disputed by Deaton
(2008) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2008). They find that rich countries are hap-
pier than poor countries and, the ratio is roughly the same as that between rich
people and poor people within the same country. Moreover, Stevenson and
Wolfers (2008) find no evidence of a satiation point for happiness as income
grows – only absolute income matters. In response, Layard et al. (2010) argue
that Deaton (2008) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) are mainly cross-sectional
in nature and so it is unclear whether income is proxying for unobservables. Fo-
cussing on developed countries, Layard et al. (2010) find that – within-countries
28The idea that relative income – and, in particular, relative deprivation – matters for well-being
has been met with increasing acceptance in social psychology. The term relative deprivation was
first coined by Stouffer et al. (1949) to explain why army personnel satisfaction increased with
army rank.
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and over time – there is a positive link between relative income and happiness.
In the U.S., average happiness has not risen since the 1950s and this is at a time
when average income has increased dramatically. Stevenson and Wolfers (2008)
admit that this is something of a puzzle. Easterlin et al. (2010) look at a large
sample of both developed and developing countries and find that over time hap-
piness does not increase with a country’s income.
A very much related literature is that which uses external habits (that is,
keeping-up or catching-up with the Joneses) to explain a broad range of anoma-
lies in economics (Clark et al., 2008), including mortality (Wilkinson, 1996). The-
oretically, relative income can also provide an explanation for the phenomenon
that is return migration (Stark, 1991). Return migration – the process of returning
to a region once resident in – represents a large percentage of two-way migration
flows (see, for example, Eldridge (1965) for U.S. interstate migration). A lower
average income in the source than the host region may provide an incentive to
return to the source if individuals care about their position in the income distri-
bution.
Finally and more generally, this chapter is related to the large empirical litera-
ture on the determinants of migration. A vast number of papers (far too many to
mention) have found that absolute income differentials influence migration (see
Greenwood (1975, 1985) for surveys on the determinants of internal migration).
These papers do not control for relative income. In our empirical analysis we will
want to control for those variables that explain migration and are potentially cor-
related with individual income and average income in a region. Potential con-
founding factors are regional compensating differentials that act as a counterbal-
ancing force to the income differential between the source and destination. Ex-
amples of compensating differentials mentioned in the literature are differentials
in the unemployment rate (Todaro, 1969, Harris and Todaro, 1970); prices (Djajic,
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1989, Dustmann, 1995, 2003, Stark et al., 1997, Dustmann and Weiss, 2007); and
climate (Graves, 1980) between the source and destination. In our estimations
of the propensity for interstate migration, we control for these at the state level.
In addition, we control for a number of personal characteristics that have been
found to influence migration.
1.2.1 Discussion
There is a related and interesting side order. Given the large, persistent differ-
ences in per capita income that exist across countries and regions, a migration
theory based on income maximisation alone would seem to predict much larger
migration flows than we actually observe. To reconcile this, the advocates of
income maximisation have offered three explanations. The first is that interna-
tional migration is highly regulated and so there are people that want to move
but do not meet the criteria for legal entry. Whilst certainly part of the story, it is
clearly not a full explanation because there are many counterexamples. Indeed,
where migration is unregulated (such as within the European Union and region-
ally), big differences in per capita incomes exist yet only a small portion of the
population migrate.29 Second, the absolute income camp would argue that un-
employment (or the probability of finding a job) is the counter-balancing force
(Todaro, 1969, Harris and Todaro, 1970).30 However, there is little evidence to
support the Harris-Todaro prediction of compensating unemployment differen-
29Eurostat figures for 2010 show that just 3.2 percent of European Union residents were born in
a different member state to the one they currently reside in.
30Todaro (1969) presents a model of rural-urban migration in less-developed countries based
on the expected wage differential – that is, the product of the urban-rural earnings differential and
the probability of being employed. In Todaro (1969), increased rural-to-urban migration reduces
the expected urban wage because it reduces the probability of employment. Accounting for the
probability of unemployment can simultaneously explain two phenomena: persistent wage dif-
ferentials across regions (unemployment is the clearing mechanism in the presence of urban wage
rigidities) and yet continued migration to urban areas facing unemployment. Although Todaro’s
model is targeted at explaining rural-urban migration in LDCs, it has relevance for regional and
international migration. Furthermore, Todaro’s mechanism moves towards a general equilibrium
framework since migration affects the probability of employment.
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tials for wage differentials, at least among the less educated (see, for example,
Fields (1982) for Colombia and Schultz (1982) for Venezuela). The implication is
that expected income differentials across regions exist. Indeed, as Raimon (1962)
finds, the U.S. states with above average earnings tend to have above average
employment increases. Third – and we think the most convincing response –
is that the costs of migration (monetary and psychic) are very high. Since the
monetary (one-off) costs of moving would have to be implausibly high, it ap-
pears non-pecuniary (or psychic) costs are large. It is, however, not satisfactory
to have no theory to explain (endogenise) these non-pecuniary costs. There are a
couple of candidates; place attachment is the obvious one but another is relative
income (or relative deprivation).
1.3 The Issue
In this section, we will show that – under some conditions – all three theories
(absolute income, relative income and relative deprivation) predict the same ag-
gregate relationship between (1) income inequality and the selection of migrants
and, (2) income inequality and the outmigration rate from the source. To be clear,
there is no general result here; we simply show that under some conditions the
three theories lead to the same predictions. Indeed, a simple counterexample is
all we need to refute the claims of those that purport empirical evidence on mi-
grant selection to prove or disprove any one theory. To show this we take Borjas’
(1987) absolute income model of migration and extend it to include a relative
income and a relative deprivation motive for migration.31
We make three assumptions: (A1) the distribution of skill (or ability) in the
source is Normally distributed; (A2) the ordinal ranking of individuals in the
31Borjas (1987) formalises the Roy (1951) model of self-selection into different occupations and
applies it to migration.
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source does not change if moved to the destination (that is, if we moved the
whole population of the source to the destination, the ordinal ranking of these
individuals in the destination income distribution is unchanged from that in the
source income distribution); (A3) migration is modelled as a one-shot decision
(static model), there are no strategic interactions between individuals and no
feedback effects of migration on income.32 Regarding assumption A3, it will
help to think of our model as an experiment where we consider simultaneously
moving everyone in the source to the destination and we ask who in the source
is likely to agree to this. The simultaneous movement of everyone allows us to
ignore general equilibrium effects of migration.33 One could get different results
from changing one or more of these assumptions. We make such stark assump-
tions for the sake of clarity and exposition, but these assumptions are relaxed
later in the empirical analysis.
In what follows we use a subscript 0 to denote the source and a subscript 1 to
denote the destination. Log income in the source is assumed to be
log y0 = µ0 + ηe, (1.1)
where µ0 is average income in the source, e is skill (or ability) and, η ≥ 0 is
the return to skill in the source. We assume skill is unobservable; however, we
know that skill in the source population is independent, standard Normally dis-
tributed: e ∼ N (0, 1). Let Y0 denote the random variable for income in the
source, it is Log-normally distributed: Y0 ∼ Log-N (µ0, η2).
32Borjas (1987) assumes (A1) and (A3); among others, Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) assumes (A2).
These assumptions are more restrictive than we actually need; for example, the (ordinal) ranking
of skills in the destination and source need not be identical – our results would go through if the
correlation between the income distribution of the source and destination is sufficiently high (see
Borjas (1987)). These assumptions are not used in the empirical analysis of Section 1.4.
33If interaction or feedback effects of migration occur, then the migration decision of a person
will depend on the migration choice of others. For example, immigration will increase labour sup-
ply in the destination and this may lower the wage. Also, migration will change the distribution
of income for those left behind and this may affect their decision to migrate if individual utility
depends on the incomes of others (see Stark (1984)).
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If all those in the source migrate to the destination, log earnings in the desti-
nation is assumed to be
log y1 = µ1 + e, (1.2)
where µ1 is average income that migrants receive in the destination if all per-
sons from the source migrate to the destination. Notice we have normalised
the return to skill in the destination to unity so that η is now the return to skill
in the source relative to that in the destination.34 The relative return to skill in
the source, η, is implicitly the outcome of differences in endowments and re-
distributional policy between the source and destination. The random variable
for income (of the source population) in the destination is Log-normally dis-
tributed: Y1 ∼ Log-N (µ1, 1). For expositional purposes, in what follows we
will assume that average income is higher in the destination than the source:
E(Y1) > E(Y0), ∀η and µ1 > µ0.35
A definition of relative income and relative deprivation needs to be specific
about who constitutes the ‘reference group’ to which income comparisons are
made. We assume the reference group is the population of the source; however,
whether we use their source incomes or their (potential) destination incomes will
depend on whether we assume ‘reference substitution’ occurs post-migration.
For a non-migrant, his or her reference is assumed to be the source income distri-
bution; for a migrant his or her reference remains the source income distribution
except when we assume reference substitution takes place, in which case the
34We have used our assumption of constant rank here; that is, the distribution of skills in the
source is the same as that in the destination. This assumption rules out movement within the
skill distribution upon migration – the ordinality (or ranking) of skills is the same in both regions.
Borjas’ (1987) paper allows for variable correlation (ρ) between the skill distribution of the two
regions. Borjas characterises selection conditional on ρ as well as the relative return to skill η. Our
model is the special case of Borjas where ρ = 1, which is reasonable for U.S. interstate migration
since the transferability of skills across states is high.
35E(Y1) = exp(µ1 + 0.5) and E(Y0) = exp(µ0 + 0.5η2). Therefore, for E(Y1) > E(Y0)we require
µ1 − µ0 > 0.5(η2 − 1).
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reference switches to the destination income distribution. Let FYj(y) denote the
(Log-normal) cumulative distribution function of income in reference j. Then,
for an individual with income y and reference j, we define his or her absolute
income (AI(y)), relative income (RI(y, j)) and relative deprivation (RD(y, j)) as
AI(y) ≡ y; (1.3)
RI(y, j) ≡ y
E(Yj)
; (1.4)
RD(y, j) ≡
∫ ∞
y
(x− y)dFYj(x) (1.5)
= [1− FYj(y)][E(Yj|Yj > y)− y] (1.6)
=
∫ ∞
y
[1− FYj(x)]dx. (1.7)
That is, relative income (RI(y, j)) is the ratio of individual income to average in-
come in the reference group. The symmetric nature of relative income means
that a greater sense of happiness (unhappiness) is felt when income is further
above (below) the mean. Our measure of relative deprivation in equation (1.5)
is identical to that proposed by Stark (1991). Relative deprivation of a person
with income y and reference j, RD(y, j), is the sum of the excess income above
y over all those people in j with higher incomes than y. Equation (1.6) follows
directly from expanding the integral in (1.5). It says that RD(y, j) equals the pro-
portion of people in j with higher incomes than y weighted by their mean excess
income over y.36 Equation (1.7) results from integration by parts of equation (1.5)
(Yitzhaki, 1979).37 Note a difference between relative deprivation and relative in-
come as we have defined it above is that relative deprivation is not symmetric:
everyone is deprived apart from the top person who feels nothing. This will af-
fect the results.38 In the remainder of this section, we first solve the model with a
36∫ ∞
y (x− y)dFYj (x) =
∫ ∞
y xdFYj (x)− y
∫ ∞
y dFYj (x) = E(Yj|Yj > y)[1− FYj (y)]− y[1− FYj (y)].
37∫ ∞
y (x− y)dFYj (x) = (x− y)FYj (x)
∣∣∣∣∞
y
− ∫ ∞y FYj (x)dx = ∫ ∞y [1− FYj (x)]dx.
38Although in Stark’s measurement of relative deprivation only those with higher incomes are
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utility function that nests the absolute income and relative income motives. The
model with relative deprivation is deferred to subsection 1.3.2.
1.3.1 Absolute and Relative Income
Assume individual utility depends on both absolute income and relative income.
Specifically, the indirect utility of a person with income y is assumed to be
U(y, j) =
y[
E(Yj)
]δ ,
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the weight attached to relative income in utility. Clearly, if
δ = 0 then U(y, j) = AI(y) and, if δ = 1 then U(y, j) = RI(y, j).
First consider the case where post-migration the reference remains the source
income distribution (that is, no reference substitution takes place). Then migra-
tion is optimal if
y1
[E(Y0)]
δ
>
y0 + C
[E(Y0)]
δ
,
where C ≥ 0 is the cost of migration. After taking logs we have
log y1 > log y0 + log
(
1+
C
y0
)
,
which does not depend on δ. We follow Borjas (1987) and assume the time-
equivalent cost of migration pi ≡ Cy0 is constant. This implies that the cost of
migration is proportional to income in the source. Then the condition for migra-
included in the calculation, those on lower incomes affect the calculation via their effect on the
weights.
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tion is approximately39
(1− η)e > − (µ1 − µ0 − pi) , (1.8)
and the probability of migration is
Pr(Migrate) = 1−Φ(zNRS);
where zNRS =
− (µ1 − µ0 − pi)
|1− η| , (1.9)
where Φ denotes the distribution function of the standard Normal and the su-
perscript NRS stands for No Reference Substitution. The selection of migrants
from the source income distribution is given by the average income in the source
conditional on migration
E(log y0|Migrate) = µ0 + ηE
(
e
∣∣∣∣∣ (1− η)e|1− η| > zNRS
)
= µ0 +
[
η|1− η|
(1− η)
φ(zNRS)
1−Φ(zNRS)
]
. (1.10)
The term in square brackets is the selection bias of migrants; the sign (or direc-
tion) of selection bias hinges on the return to skill (η). If the return to skill is
higher in the source (η > 1), then E(log y0|Migrate) < µ0, which implies mi-
grants are negatively selected from the source income (or skill) distribution. Re-
call that negative selection of migrants means that on average migrants are of
lower skill (and income) than the average in the source population. Conversely,
if η < 1 then migrants are positively selected from the source; that is, on average
migrants have a higher skill than the average in the source population. This is
exactly the prediction of Borjas (1987), which is not surprising since setting δ = 0
is Borjas’ model. Importantly we have shown that this holds for any δ ∈ [0, 1]; in-
39log(1+ x) ≈ x for small x.
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deed, assuming no reference substitution, the relative and absolute income mod-
els give identical predictions for both the outmigration rate in equation (1.9) and
the selection effect in equation (1.10). The intuition is simple. When no reference
group substitution takes place, the only way to improve relative income is to in-
crease absolute income. Hence, for any δ ∈ [0, 1], the individual will migrate if
the income differential – net of the migration cost – is positive.
For future reference we note an additional important insight from equation
(1.9). Assume the time-equivalent cost of migration pi is sufficiently small that
pi < µ1− µ0. Hence, zNRS < 0 and the average person will migrate. Then, under
negative selection (η > 1) and holding average income constant, an increase in
income inequality in the source lowers the outmigration rate since
∂[1−Φ(zNRS)]
∂η
∣∣∣∣∣
η>1
= −φ(zNRS) z
NRS
(1− η)
∣∣∣∣∣
η>1
< 0.
Conversely, under positive selection (η < 1), an increase in income inequality in
the source increases outmigration. Of course, this result holds for all δ. The in-
tuition is that a mean-preserving increase in spread (higher η) encourages those
above the mean income in the source to stay and those below the mean to mi-
grate. When η > 1, those below the mean chose to migrate before the increase
in spread so they clearly continue to do so after. In contrast, when η > 1, those
above the mean who previously had a very small gain from migration now find
it beneficial to stay in the source. This raises an important point, how can a the-
ory based on pure absolute income differentials predict an aggregate relationship
between income inequality and migration? The gain from migration is linear in
skill40; however, the binary migration decision generates a non-linearity between
individual skill (and, hence, income) and individual migration.41
40From equation (1.8), the gain from migration is µ1 − µ0 + (1− η)e− pi, which is linear in the
skill level (e).
41A simple application of Jensen’s inequality implies that, when the underlying individual re-
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We now show that the above results hold irrespective of whether reference
group substitution occurs post-migration. Assuming reference group substitu-
tion, migration is optimal if
y1
[E(Y1)]
δ
>
y0 + C
[E(Y0)]
δ
.
After taking logs and again assuming pi ≡ Cy0 is constant, the condition for mi-
gration is approximately
(1− η)e > −
(
µ1 − µ0 − pi − δ log
[
E(Y1)
E(Y0)
])
,
and the probability of migration is
Pr(Migrate) = 1−Φ(zRS);
where zRS =
−
(
µ1 − µ0 − pi − δ log
[
E(Y1)
E(Y0)
])
|1− η| , (1.11)
where the superscript RS denotes Reference Substitution. The average income
in the source conditional on migration is
E(log y0|Migrate) = µ0 + η|1− η|
(1− η)
φ(zRS)
1−Φ(zRS) . (1.12)
Once again, from equation (1.12) we see that migrants are negatively selected
when η > 1 and positively selected when η < 1. Therefore, the selection predic-
tions of Borjas (1987) equally apply to a model of pure relative income (δ = 1) as
they do for a model of absolute income (δ = 0), irrespective of whether reference
group substitution takes place. Indeed, δ only enters equation (1.12) through the
inverse Mills ratio φ(z
RS)
1−Φ(zRS) , which is always positive so δ does not affect the sign
of selection bias. The intuition is simple. Consider the case of a higher return
lationship between income and migration is non-linear, in the aggregate both average income and
income inequality affect migration.
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to skill in the source than the destination: η > 1. Under δ = 0 there is negative
selection because – compared to the destination – in the source low-skill indi-
viduals incur a higher markdown in income for their low skill. Under δ = 1
there is negative selection because – compared to the destination – in the source
low-income individuals are further away from the mean.
There is another useful insight. From equation (1.11), the outmigration rate
is decreasing in δ; that is, there is lower outmigration under the relative income
motive (δ = 1) than the absolute income motive (δ = 0).42 Intuitively, the reason
why there is more migration under δ = 0 is because the mean income is higher
in the destination and under δ = 0 individuals care about this mean (holding the
return to skills constant), whereas under δ = 1 individuals do not care about the
mean but only how far they are from the mean. In our model, lower outmigra-
tion necessarily implies greater selection bias of migrants. Finally, the relation-
ship between income inequality and outmigration derived earlier for the case of
no reference substitution typically also holds under reference substitution. That
is, assuming zRS < 0, under negative selection (η > 1) an increase in income
inequality in the source lowers the outmigration rate.43 Conversely, under pos-
itive selection (η < 1), an increase in income inequality in the source increases
outmigration.
1.3.2 Relative Deprivation
Now assume the indirect utility of an individual with income y and reference j
is given by the negative of relative deprivation: U(y, j) = −RD(y, j). Consider
42 ∂[1−Φ(zRS)]
∂δ = −φ(zRS) log
[
E(Y1)
E(Y0)
]
< 0, which is negative because we assumed E(Y1) >
E(Y0).
43 ∂[1−Φ(zRS)]
∂η
∣∣∣∣∣
η>1
= −φ(zRS)
(
zRS
(1−η) −
δη
|1−η|
) ∣∣∣∣∣
η>1
, which is negative for reasonable parameter
values.
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Stark’s measure of relative deprivation in equation (1.7), which we reproduce
here for ease of viewing
RD(y, j) =
∫ ∞
y
[
1− FYj(x)
]
dx ≥ 0. (1.7)
Accordingly, everyone is relatively deprived except those with the highest in-
come, who feel nothing. It is easy to show that the first derivative of relative
deprivation (RD(y, j)) with respect to y is non-positive and its second derivative
is positive.44 Therefore, relative deprivation falls as income rises but at a de-
creasing rate. Based on this – and assuming migration increases income – Stark
argues that the propensity to migrate is highest for the lower-tail of the income
distribution since they have the most to gain from a unit increase in income. Con-
sequently, Stark predicts that migrants are negatively selected from the source;
that is, migrants have – on average – lower income (and lower skill) than the
source average. This is always the case – Stark’s work does not predict positive
selection. To take one pertinent example, a person on the highest income has
no incentive to migrate, his or her relative deprivation is zero and life cannot
get better than this. Further, Stark predicts that a rise in income inequality will
increase outmigration.
Stark’s predictions on selection and the aggregate relationship between in-
come inequality and the outmigration rate should be contrasted with those that
we derived for Borjas’ absolute income model and the relative income model.
There are two clear differences. First, when η < 1 Borjas (and the relative income
model) predicts positive selection, whereas Stark never predicts positive selec-
tion. Second, when η > 1, Borjas (and the relative income model) predict that
an increase in income inequality in the source decreases the outmigration rate,
44 ∂RD(y,j)
∂y = −
[
1− FYj (y)
]
≤ 0 and ∂2RD(y,j)
∂y2 = fYj (y) > 0, where fYj (y) is the density function
corresponding to the distribution function FYj (y).
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whereas Stark predicts the opposite. The reason for the difference is that Stark’s
measure of relative deprivation is asymmetric: when people compare themselves
they look up at those people on higher incomes; they do not look down at those
on lower incomes.
There is something missing from our above representation of Stark’s theory
in the sense that no mention was made of the incomes on offer in the destination.
We now consider what happens when we account for the income distribution in
the destination, separately for the cases of no reference substitution and reference
substitution.
First, assume no reference substitution takes place post-migration. Then an
individual will optimally migrate if there is an absolute income gain – net of
migration costs – to be made. Whilst it is true that the most deprived have the
most to gain from a unit increase in income, one needs to take account of how the
income offered in the destination varies by skill. If average income is higher in
the destination but income inequality is higher too, then the low skilled will gain
less (or lose more) from migration. Therefore, at least when looking at migration
from the source to a particular destination, it is not necessarily true that migrants
are negatively selected when one accounts for the distribution of incomes in the
destination. Empirically, when estimating the effect of relative deprivation on
the propensity to migrate, it is crucial that one controls for the absolute income
gain from migration.
Now consider what happens when reference substitution takes place post-
migration. To do this one needs to know what a person with income y in the
source earns in the destination post-migration. This mapping is possible be-
cause of our assumption that rank is preserved under migration. To this end,
define p ≡ FYj(y) as the rank (or percentile) of an individual with income y
in the income distribution of the reference j. Since income is monotonically in-
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creasing in skill level e, it is also true that p = Φ(e). For ease of exposition, let
log yj = µj + σje such that Yj ∼ Log-N (µj, σ2j ). From equation (1.7), the relative
deprivation of an individual with income y in reference j can be written as
RD(y, j) =
∫ ∞
y
[
1− FYj(x)
]
dx
=
∫ ∞
y
[
1−Φ
(
log x− µj
σj
)]
dx
= σj
∫ ∞
e
[1−Φ(z)] exp(σjz + µj)dz
= σj
∫ ∞
Φ−1(p)
[1−Φ(z)] exp(σjz + µj)dz
≡ RD(p, j),
where the third equality uses the change of variables z = log x−µjσj . To see the effect
on relative deprivation of switching reference j (to the destination income distri-
bution) holding rank p constant, we compute the partial derivative of RD(y, j)
with respect to the scale (or variance of log income) parameter σj. Clearly,
∂RD(p,j)
∂σj
≥
0. That is, switching reference to a more unequal income distribution increases
relative deprivation for everyone.45 Therefore, conditional on reference substitu-
tion and our assumptions, the relative deprivation theory predicts zero migration
to a destination with a more unequal income distribution than the source. Con-
versely, moving to a destination with a more equal income distribution leads to
a reduction in relative deprivation. To determine the selection bias of migrants,
we would like to know how this reduction in deprivation varies by rank p. The
cross-partial derivative of RD(p, j) with respect to σj and p is
∂2RD(p, j)
∂p∂σj
= −
[
σjΦ−1(p) + 1
]
(1− p) exp (σjΦ−1(p) + µj)
φ(Φ−1(p))
< 0.
45The exceptions are those people with the highest skill (or, equivalently, highest income), they
are indifferent, which is why the inequalities are weak. The result that relative deprivation is in-
creasing in the variance of the income distribution is sensitive to the nature of the mean-preserving
spread. See the appendix of Deaton (2001) for a counterexample where a mean-preserving spread
is achieved by hollowing out the distribution.
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The cross-partial implies that, when the destination is more equal than the source,
the low skill (low rank) have a bigger incentive to migrate compared to the high-
skill (high rank) individuals. When the costs of migration are factored in, this
would imply negative selection of migrants. Recall that this is exactly what Bor-
jas’ absolute income model (and the relative income model) predicts.
Furthermore, conditional on non-zero migration, the relative deprivation hy-
pothesis predicts that an increase in source inequality increases outmigration.
Recall that, in contrast, we showed that Borjas predicts – conditional on nega-
tive selection and that the average person migrates – there is a negative relationship
between source income inequality and the volume of outmigration. This diver-
gence is due to the asymmetric nature of the relative deprivation measure. How-
ever, if instead the average person chooses not to migrate – which is the most
likely scenario – then Borjas predicts a positive relationship between source in-
come inequality and outmigration. Therefore, in aggregate data the absolute and
relative deprivation hypotheses tend to yield the same predictions.
In summary we have shown that, under some conditions, the three theo-
ries (absolute income, relative income and relative deprivation) lead to the same
predictions for the aggregate relationship between income inequality and selec-
tion, and income inequality and the outmigration rate. The confounding is made
worse by aggregation. At the individual-level, variation in the three measures
and individual migration can be used to jointly estimate the relative importance
of the three theories. There are two types of useful variation. The first is variation
in the three measures across individuals in the source. Indeed, across individu-
als the values for absolute income, relative income and relative deprivation are
not perfectly correlated when the individuals belong to different source refer-
ence groups (say, different U.S. states). For example, two people with the same
income will not have the same relative income or relative deprivation if they
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belong to different reference groups (and these reference groups have different
values for mean income and income inequality). However, this variation is of
little or no use in distinguishing the absolute income model from the relative in-
come model when no reference group substitution occurs – a rise in income is
the only way to improve relative income when no reference substitution occurs.
The second is variation in the three measures between the destination and the
source. Upon migration to the destination individuals receive a new income, a
new relative income and a new relative deprivation. As the opening quote to this
chapter by Layard (2005) suggests, evidence that individuals migrate to improve
relative income (or lower deprivation) even when doing so involves taking a cut
in absolute income would represent clear evidence against the absolute income
hypothesis and in favour of relative income (or deprivation) and reference sub-
stitution post-migration.
Unfortunately, individual-level panel data on international migration does
not exist; hence, the empirical literature on testing Borjas and Stark’s theories is
dominated by cross-sectional studies.46 With cross-sectional data, one either has
pre-migration outcomes or post-migration outcomes, but by definition not both.
Typically – as is the case with the U.S. Census and the Current Population Survey
– cross-sectional datasets record post-migration (or end-of-period) outcomes.47
This leads to an endogeneity problem because the migration choice effects post-
46For confidentiality reasons, no statistical agency would ever release the personal information
(names) needed to link the pre and post international migration records of migrants. Abramitzky
et al. (2011) manage to link – by name of the person – the 1900 U.S. Census with the 1865 Nor-
wegian Census but, of course, these people are long dead so confidentiality is no longer an issue.
The best that international studies can do is to categorise individuals with similar observable char-
acteristics into cohorts and link the cohorts across surveys (see, for example, Ambrosini and Peri
(2011)). Some studies have inferred outmigration from sample attrition but this is guesswork. In
general countries make either very little or no effort to record outmigration.
47This is naturally the case because one only realises migration after migration takes place and
most socio-economic variables are recorded at the time of the survey. For example, the U.S. Census
long-form questionnaire asks respondents where they lived five years earlier, which along with
the current region of residence identifies migrants and non-migrants over a five-year period. All
other questions – for example on income and employment status – refer to the year immediately
preceding the Census and, hence, better reflect end-of-period outcomes.
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migration outcomes. Any variable that is either directly or indirectly chosen by
an individual after migration is potentially determined endogenously – includ-
ing income, employment status and education, among many others. Typically
only age, race and gender may be considered exogenous to the migration deci-
sion.
There is, of course, an even bigger problem with cross-sectional data; that is,
one cannot control for unobserved heterogeneity (for example, innate ability and
intrinsic motivation). With no information on income prior to migration, one
needs to estimate the (counterfactual) non-migrant earnings of migrants. This
is done by estimating an earnings equation using only the subsample of non-
migrants, and then using the coefficient estimates on the regressors to predict
counterfactual earnings for migrants. Since migrants are self-selected, one needs
to control for the selection bias that arises from estimating an earnings equa-
tion using only the subsample of non-migrants. Failure to account for selection
will bias the predicted counterfactual earnings. Indeed, we know the majority
of earnings variation is due to unobservables (Autor et al., 2008). If migrants
are selected-on-unobservables, and these unobservables have a direct effect on
earnings, then the counterfactual income estimates will be biased.
Consider Stark and Taylor’s (1989, 1991) cross-sectional finding that, after
controlling for the expected absolute income gain, relatively deprived Mexican
households were more likely to migrate to the United States.48 The authors esti-
mate counterfactual earnings of migrants and non-migrants using the observed
earnings of non-migrants and migrants, respectively. In doing so, they correct
for selection-on-observables into the sample of migrants and non-migrants using
Heckman’s procedure. Using the estimated counterfactual earnings of migrants,
they compute relative deprivation for each household in their Mexican village’s
48Stark and Taylor (1989, 1991) argue that the reference group of the Mexico-to-U.S. migrants
does not change post-migration because at least some household members stay in their Mexican
village and the migrants remit (they also do not stay in the U.S. for long).
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income distribution and include this as the variable of interest in a probit or logit
model for the probability of migration. The problem is that, if migrants are posi-
tively selected on unobservables49, then the selection equation fails to fully capture
the negative selection of non-migrants and the estimated coefficients in the non-
migrant earnings equation are biased downward. In turn, the predicted non-
migrant earnings of migrants are underestimated because they are constructed
from the attenuated coefficient estimates of the non-migrant earnings equation.
This systematically shifts down the estimated position of migrants in the source
income distribution, which biases the result in favour of Stark-Taylor’s finding
that relative deprivation increases the probability of outmigration. This potential
bias is pertinent for two reasons. First, we know that unobservables account for
most wage variation (Autor et al., 2008). Second, it is precisely when the oppo-
site of Stark’s relative deprivation theory occurs (that is, positive selection) that
systematically biases the result in favour of Stark-Taylor’s finding of negative
selection.
If individual-level panel data on before and after migration outcomes were
available then there would be no problem. One could directly observe income
– and, hence, be able to compute relative income – prior to migration. Further-
more, when predicting the counterfactual (migrant) earnings of non-migrants,
one can control for unobserved heterogeneity. This leads us to the next section,
which uses a panel dataset on interstate migration in the U.S. to estimate the
relative importance of the absolute and relative income theories.
1.4 Empirics
In this section we estimate the relative importance of absolute income, relative in-
come and relative deprivation in determining interstate migration in the United
49Or observables omitted from the selection equation.
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States.50
1.4.1 The Data
The data is from two main sources, the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) 1968-2009, and the March Current Population Survey
1968-2009. The PSID is a panel survey that since 1968 has continuously followed
4,802 original families living in the United States.51 The sample size has grown
substantially over time as individuals have split-off to form new households and
the additional household members have been added to the sample. The survey
is annual from 1968 to 1997, and biennial since 1997. Crucially for our purposes,
the PSID records the U.S. state of residence at the time of the survey. From this
we construct an indicator variable for (in-sample) interstate migration. We as-
sume it is infeasible to migrate interstate more than once within a two-year time
span and, hence, we can continuously track an individual’s migratory behaviour
whilst in the PSID. This is consistent with the United Nation’s definition of mi-
gration based on length of stay, which requires a change in the place of primary
residence for a period of at least a year.52 In a small number of cases, due to miss-
ing values and non-response the gap between records exceeds two years. Since it
is crucial that we know the timing of migration, we code the migration decision
as missing immediately prior to a gap in records of more than two years.
Our measure of individual income in the PSID is pre-tax total labour in-
come, which is the sum of wages, bonuses and the amount of business income
50It is worth noting that even if panel data existed on international migration, studying regional
(interstate) migration would still have a couple of advantages over international migration. First,
international migration is heavily influenced by government immigration policy, which is a major
influence on the selection of migrants. Second, studying regional migration circumvents problems
with non-comparability of, for example, reported education of international migrants and natives.
51The PSID is the world’s longest-running panel survey. In some cases, individuals and their
family unit have been followed for 42 years, which allows for an analysis of migration over the
life-cycle.
52People moving for a period of less than one year are termed visitors, not migrants. Nonethe-
less, the results do not significantly change if we drop the biennial observations.
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attributable to labour.53 We choose to use total labour income rather than the
wages and salaries series because the latter excludes the earnings of the self-
employed.54 Income refers to that in the year prior to the survey so we lag in-
come one year for the annual survey years and two years for the biennial survey
years. We express income in constant 1999 dollars using the U.S. CPI-U index. In
addition to income, the PSID records an array of individual socio-economic char-
acteristics. In particular we will make use of age, years of schooling, whether the
individual has a college degree, marital status, number of children, employment
status and home ownership.55 Our estimations use the sampling weights sup-
plied by the PSID.56
Our working PSID sample consists of those individual-year observations that
satisfy all of the following criteria: (1) the individual is the household head; (2)
the individual is of working age (16-64); (3) the individual is in the labour force
at the time of the PSID survey; and (4) the individual is non-institutionalised
and not in the armed forces (and living off base). The motivation for the sam-
ple selection criteria is the following. First, we restrict the analysis to heads of
households since we feel that – of all family members – the head is most likely
to make migration decisions. In reality migration is likely to be a joint decision
between the head and “wife” (if present) but including both would be double-
counting. Naturally a better model would treat the family as the decision maker
and optimise subject to the bargaining weights of each family member and their
personal circumstances; however, this is beyond the scope of the chapter. More-
53This is not ideal, we would prefer income to be measured after-tax and inclusive of benefits.
We made no attempt to calculate after-tax income since the PSID does not record the necessary
data to do so.
54As a robustness check, we also present the results for when the self-employed are excluded
from our sample and our findings are not significantly altered.
55We will control for individual fixed effects, hence time-invariant explanatory variables such
as gender and race are redundant.
56Of the original PSID families, 1,872 were low-income families from the Survey of Economic
Opportunity (SEO). The sampling weights account for their over-selection. Also, the sampling
weights are time-varying to adjust for sample attrition.
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over, the PSID records far more information about the head than any other family
member. Second, we want to include only those in the labour force since the mi-
gration theories that we wish to test speak about income and using migration
as a means to improve income or relative income. Therefore, these theories will
only be appropriate for those individuals that are either working or looking for
work. Finally, we drop those in institutions since the migration of these groups
– if it occurs while institutionalised – is typically for involuntary reasons. In par-
ticular, those in the armed forces (living on or off base) are often moved as part
of their job. The appendix contains the source and construction of each PSID
variable used in the empirical analysis.
We assume that the reference group for an individual is the whole population
of the U.S. state of residence. That is, people compare themselves to all those
resident in the same state at the same time.57 Although this definition implies
reference group substitution, we can roughly infer what happens to relative in-
come and relative deprivation in the absence of reference substitution by simply
looking at the change in absolute income.
The March Current Population Survey (CPS) is used to compute the income
distribution for each state-year.58 The CPS is an annual, large and representa-
tive cross-sectional sample of the U.S population. Nonetheless, we apply the
sampling weights supplied by the CPS. The CPS income series we use is total
(pre-tax) income from wages and salaries.59 We lag income to account for the
fact that income refers to that in the year prior to the survey. Income is expressed
in constant 1999 dollars using the CPI-U. We restrict the sample to individuals
57In reality the reference group may be much narrower than the state. The publicly-available
PSID files only record the U.S. state that the household resides and not the county or ZIP. Narrower
geographical identifiers are available on application and this seems a promising area for future
research. State identifiers, however, have one advantage in the sense that we are interested in a
study of migration and not commuting.
58We accessed the March CPS through the University of Minnesota’s IPUMS-CPS.
59The alternative is to use the CPS total personal income series; however, this includes asset
income not due to labour which is a substantial deviation from our PSID labour income series.
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of working age (16-64) that report being in the labour force and, have a strictly
positive CPS sampling weight. Pre-1976 the CPS grouped some of the smaller
states together. We drop the observations where the state cannot be uniquely
identified. This leaves us with 19 states 1968-1971 and 13 states 1972-1975. From
1976 we have data on all 50 states plus the District of Columbia.
From the CPS distribution of income in each state-year we compute relative
income and relative deprivation for each PSID individual-year observation. Rel-
ative income is measured as the ratio of PSID individual income to the CPS av-
erage (mean) income in the state-year reference. Relative deprivation for each
PSID individual-year observation is constructed using the expression in equation
(1.6). We compute this in Stata by taking the following steps. First we append
our PSID observations to our CPS dataset. We assign the PSID observations a
(approximately) zero CPS weight.60 Separately for each state-year, we compute
the empirical cumulative distribution function for income (FYj ) using the CPS
weights. Tied income values (of which there are many) receive the same cumu-
lative value. Second, we estimate the sample analogue of E(Yj|Yj > y), which
is the sample mean income of all those individuals in state-year reference j with
higher income than y. We then have all we need to calculate relative deprivation
for each PSID observation.
Finally, we will want to control for possible state-level compensating differen-
tials, including the state price level, unemployment rate and climatic conditions.
It is important that we control for state-level consumer prices in our regressions
because they are positively correlated with average state income. Moreover, if
state price levels matter for migration choice, then this is consistent with the ab-
solute income motive, where of course it is real income adjusted for state-level
prices that matters. Unfortunately, official estimates of state-level prices do not
60This way the PSID observations are treated as part of the income distribution, which means
Stata’s ‘cumul’ command locates their position in the empirical income distribution, yet their (close
to) zero weight ensures they have a negligible effect on the income distribution.
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exist. We construct state-level price indexes using the estimates of state-level
prices in Aten (2007) for the year 2000. To get a state-level time-series, we apply
the CPI-U inflation for the main metropolitan area in the state (or simple average
of the metropolitan area CPI-Us when more than one was available per state). If
no metropolitan area CPI-U is available for a state then we use the CPI-U for the
region that the state belongs to. We normalise state level prices such that, in each
year, the average price level across all states is one.61
Estimates of the annual average unemployment rate by U.S. state are ob-
tained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). From 1976 onwards the BLS
publishes official annual average model-based estimates for the state unemploy-
ment rate.62 This covers the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. In order
to backcast these estimates to 1968, we use two sources. First, the BLS provided
us with annual average CPS-based estimates from 1970 to 1975 for 29 states (the
larger ones). The less populous states have very small samples – too small for
reliable estimation. These CPS estimates are not directly comparable to the offi-
cial model-based estimates from 1976 onwards. Second, prior to the early 1970s,
states produced estimates independently using their own methodology. These
estimates for the years 1963-73 and 1973-77 are reported in the “Manpower Re-
port of the President” for all 50 states plus the District of Columbia. These es-
timates are neither comparable to the official BLS data from 1976 nor the CPS-
based estimates from 1970-1975. Importantly, the “Manpower” time series 1973-
77 overlaps the official BLS series; hence, we backcast the official BLS time series
for each state by applying the ratio of the two time series in the overlapping year
61Note that, in additional to our previous theoretical arguments for the need to use individual-
level data to distinguish between the three theories, there are additional empirical reasons too.
First, in aggregate data the correlation between income inequality and average income is strong –
in the U.S. poor states tend to be more unequal, which confounds the sum of relative deprivation
over individuals and average income. Second, prices tend to be higher in richer regions (the Penn
effect).
62We downloaded the data from the BLS Local Area Unemployment (LAU) Statistics website:
www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm.
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and apply the ratio backwards. Where possible, we switch to the CPS-based es-
timates for the 1970-75 period, again by applying the ratio of the series to that of
the “Manpower” series in the overlapping years.
Our data on climatic conditions for U.S. states is from the National Climatic
Data Center (NCDC) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). The climatological variables are temperature (in ◦F), precipitation (in
inches), heating and cooling degree days. The raw data consists of monthly time
series from 1895 to 2010 for the 48 conterminous states. The District of Columbia
is not separately identified therefore we simply assign it the values for Mary-
land. Heating and cooling degree days are indicators of the demand for heating
and cooling, respectively, where heating days are those days where the average
temperature is below 65◦F and cooling days are days where the average temper-
ature is above 65◦F. For example, if the day average temperature is 75◦F then that
day is given a value of 10 cooling degree days. The monthly figures are monthly
averages (for precipitation and temperature) and sums (for heating and cooling
degree days). We compute six annual climatic measures: (1) average temper-
ature; (2) max-min temperature (that is, the difference in the average tempera-
ture between the months with the highest and lowest temperature); (3) average
monthly precipitation; (4) max-min precipitation (that is, the difference in the
average monthly precipitation levels between the months with the highest and
lowest precipitation); (5) heating degree days; and (6) cooling degree days. We
calculate (moving) past 30-year averages to remove year-to-year variations.63 For
example, average cooling degree days in 1990 is computed by taking the average
of the 30 values of yearly-summed cooling degree days from 1961 to 1990.
63The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) recommends the use of 30-year climate av-
erages.
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1.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 displays summary statistics for all the variables used in the analysis.
The statistics are unweighted means and standard deviations. The columns split
the sample into those observations where an individual migrates interstate (that
is, ‘Movers’) and those observations where an individual does not move inter-
state (that is, ‘Stayers’). To be clear, the reported statistics refer to the year im-
mediately preceding the migration decision. Just over three percent of the total
117,019 individual-year observations are when an individual moves interstate.
The sample used to construct the summary statistics is that for which we ob-
serve all the variables used in the analysis. By using a subset of the variables one
can increase the sample size to a maximum of 128,231 observations – of which
3,851 are ‘Movers’.64 From the ‘Total’ column we see that the mean income in
our PSID sample is 29,927 dollars in 1999 prices.65 The mean relative income in
our sample is 1.14, which implies state mean income is on average 14 percent
higher in our unweighted PSID sample than the CPS weighted sample.66 Now
compare the columns for stayers and movers. The mean earnings of movers is
438 dollars less than that for stayers. Similarly, mean relative income is lower
and mean relative deprivation is higher for movers. Movers are more likely to
be unemployed and less likely to own their own home. Continuing down the ta-
ble we see that movers are on average 7 years younger than stayers, more likely
to hold a college degree, less likely to be married, and tend to have fewer chil-
64The variables that are constructed using CPS data (relative income and relative deprivation)
have fewer observations since, as already mentioned, pre-1976 the smaller U.S. states are not indi-
vidually recorded in the CPS. Also, the climatic conditions variables are not available for Alaska
and Hawaii.
65The median income is 24,165 dollars.
66Recall that relative income for a PSID individual is the ratio of his or her income to the CPS
mean income in his or her state. Therefore, the mean of relative income does not have to equal one
because the denominator is not from the PSID sample. Further, PSID labour income is a broader
measure of labour income than that of the CPS wages and salaries series. Also, the summary
statistics presented in Table 1.1 do not use the PSID sampling weights whereas state mean income
is calculated using the CPS sampling weights. The mean income in the CPS is $27,543 in 1999
prices.
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dren than stayers. This is consistent with the vast empirical literature that finds
migrants tend to be young, educated, and single with few or no dependants.67
The remaining rows of the table summarise the aggregate conditions in the state
of residence immediately prior to the migration decision. There is no difference
between the average price level in the mover and stayer subsamples. On aver-
age movers leave states with a slightly lower unemployment rate than stayers
reside in. There is little discernible difference in climatic conditions between the
mover and stayer subsamples, although one may say that movers tend to leave
states where the climate requires more heating days. Finally, movers tend to
leave states with more borders and less land area than stayers reside, although
the differences are tiny.
Table 1.2 displays the frequency distribution for the number of observations
per individual in our sample. The second column (‘Stayers’) shows the frequency
distribution for the subsample of individuals that (in-sample) do not move inter-
state; the third column (‘Movers’) shows the corresponding distribution for those
individuals that move interstate at least once in-sample. In total there are 14,332
individuals in our sample and 2,222 of these are in-sample movers. A number of
these movers move multiple times which explains why the number of moves in
Table 1.1 is higher than the number of movers. To control for unobserved indi-
vidual heterogeneity we need at least two observations per individual. Around
15 percent of individuals are only observed once – these will be dropped in the
fixed effects estimations.68,69 The average number of observations per individ-
ual is 9, and for the subsamples of stayers and movers the average is 8 and 14
67See, for example, Greenwood (1975) for a survey of U.S. interstate migration.
68To check whether this introduces selection bias we compared the means of the explanatory
variables in the full sample with the corresponding means from the sample that drops those ob-
servations where an individual is only observed once. We found no significant difference.
69Note that the sample selection rules were implemented after we determined who was an in-
sample mover, which explains why 45 movers are only observed once after our sample selection
criteria have been met.
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TABLE 1.1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
Variable Stayers Movers Total
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Income 29,940 33,861 29,502 28,217 29,927 33,705
Relative income 1.14 1.21 1.11 1.03 1.14 1.20
Relative deprivation 10,955 7,656 11,819 8,001 10,981 7,668
Unemployed (d) 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.33 0.08 0.27
Own home (d) 0.53 0.50 0.26 0.44 0.52 0.50
Age 39.5 12.5 32.7 11.0 39.3 12.5
College degree (d) 0.15 0.35 0.24 0.43 0.15 0.36
Married (d) 0.55 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.55 0.50
Children # 1.08 1.35 0.75 1.13 1.07 1.35
State-level variables:
Price level 1.03 0.10 1.03 0.10 1.03 0.10
Unemployment rate 6.39 1.98 6.23 1.92 6.38 1.98
Temp. average (◦F) 55.2 7.34 54.7 7.27 55.2 7.34
Temp. max-min (◦F) 43.0 7.93 43.7 8.07 43.0 7.94
Precip. month average (”) 3.24 0.96 3.16 1.00 3.24 0.96
Precip. max-min (”) 5.31 1.25 5.24 1.31 5.31 1.25
Heating deg. days 4,365 1,878 4,523 1,891 4,370 1,879
Cooling deg. days 1,271 796 1,246 805 1,270 797
Borders # 4.33 1.53 4.45 1.57 4.34 1.53
Land area (km2/1000) 191 167 187 160 191 167
Observations 113,493 3,526 117,019
Notes: The reported statistics are unweighted means and standard deviations in our
pooled sample. The sample is PSID household heads that are non-institutionalised, of
working age, and in the labour force. ‘Movers’ refer to individual-year observations in
the year immediately preceding interstate migration; all other observations are ‘Stayers’.
Income refers to individual pre-tax labour income in 1999 U.S. dollars. Relative income is
the ratio of individual income to average income in the state of residence. Relative depri-
vation for an individual is the fraction of people with higher incomes than that individual
multiplied by their average excess income. (d) indicates that the variable is a dummy
that takes the value one if the variable label applies to the individual and zero other-
wise (hence, the mean is simply the fraction of observations with this characteristic). The
state-level variables refer to the conditions in the state that the individual is resident in
the year preceding migration. The price level is normalised such that the average across
all states is one in each year.
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TABLE 1.2
DISTRIBUTION OF OBSERVATIONS PER INDIVIDUAL
Observations Frequency Percent Cumulative
per individual Stayers Movers Total percent
1 2,083 45 2,128 14.8 14.8
2 1,394 138 1,532 10.7 25.5
3 1,804 155 1,959 13.7 39.2
4 742 137 879 6.1 45.3
5 610 126 736 5.1 50.5
6 594 89 683 4.8 55.2
7 454 93 547 3.8 59.1
8 389 91 480 3.3 62.4
9 359 75 434 3.0 65.4
10 322 85 407 2.8 68.3
11 262 80 342 2.4 70.7
12 253 64 317 2.2 72.9
13 243 67 310 2.2 75.0
14 227 64 291 2.0 77.1
15 178 69 247 1.7 78.8
16 215 57 272 1.9 80.7
17 184 56 240 1.7 82.4
18 167 52 219 1.5 83.9
19 166 46 212 1.5 85.4
20 148 66 214 1.5 86.9
21 143 53 196 1.4 88.2
22 127 48 175 1.2 89.5
23 117 41 158 1.1 90.6
24 111 45 156 1.1 91.6
25 126 36 162 1.1 92.8
26 96 51 147 1.0 93.8
27 87 37 124 0.9 94.7
28 142 35 177 1.2 95.9
29 66 40 106 0.7 96.6
30 62 32 94 0.7 97.3
31 65 34 99 0.7 98.0
32 38 36 74 0.5 98.5
33 44 30 74 0.5 99.0
34 47 15 62 0.4 99.4
35 45 34 79 0.6 100
Total 12,110 2,222 14,332 100
Notes: The table displays the frequency distribution for the total num-
ber of times (or surveys) an individual is observed after our sample
selection criteria are met. ‘Stayers’ and ‘Movers’ refer to individu-
als who did and did not undertake (in-sample) interstate migration,
respectively.
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TABLE 1.3
DISTRIBUTION OF OBSERVATIONS PER SPELL FOR
MOVERS: PRE- AND POST-MIGRATION
Observations Frequency of spells Percent Cumulative
in spell Pre/post move Total percent
Pre Post
1 609 1,268 1,877 32.2 32.2
2 361 577 938 16.1 48.2
3 218 355 573 9.8 58.0
4 136 266 402 6.9 64.9
5 109 194 303 5.2 70.1
6 101 150 251 4.3 74.4
7 71 144 215 3.7 78.1
8 43 98 141 2.4 80.5
9 66 99 165 2.8 83.3
10 46 83 129 2.2 85.6
11 31 59 90 1.5 87.1
12 25 55 80 1.4 88.5
13 23 58 81 1.4 89.9
14 20 59 79 1.4 91.2
15 20 50 70 1.2 92.4
16 15 42 57 1.0 93.4
17 16 31 47 0.8 94.2
18 12 35 47 0.8 95.0
19 7 31 38 0.7 95.6
20 4 22 26 0.4 96.1
21 3 19 22 0.4 96.5
22 5 23 28 0.5 97.0
23 6 24 30 0.5 97.5
24 7 24 31 0.5 98.0
25 2 17 19 0.3 98.3
26 5 20 25 0.4 98.7
27 2 14 16 0.3 99.0
28 0 10 10 0.2 99.2
29 3 9 12 0.2 99.4
30 2 12 14 0.2 99.6
31 0 9 9 0.2 99.8
32 1 3 4 0.1 99.9
33 1 3 4 0.1 99.9
34 1 3 4 0.1 100
Total 1,971 3,866 5,837 100
Notes: The table displays the frequency distribution for the to-
tal number of times an (in-sample) interstate mover is observed
continuously in the same US state (or spell). Columns 2 and 3
split these spells into those that occur pre- and post-interstate
migration, respectively.
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observations, respectively.
For movers, we can further divide their observations into those that occur
pre- and post-migration. To do this, we define a ‘spell’ as the length of time
during which an individual continuously resides in the same U.S. state. Movers
– by definition – have more than one spell. Table 1.3 presents the frequency
distribution for the number of observations per spell for movers, divided into
pre- and post-migration spells.70 Almost a third of all spells for movers have just
one observation. This is partly driven by the fact that a number of individuals
move multiple times and, hence, have three or more spells. The average number
of observations per spell for movers is 4.6 pre-migration and 5.5 post-migration.
TABLE 1.4
DISTRIBUTION OF THE NUMBER OF MIGRATIONS PER
INDIVIDUAL
Migrations All migrations Return migrations
per individual Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
0 12,110 84.5 13,147 91.7
1 1,172 8.2 893 6.2
2 611 4.3 193 1.3
3 208 1.5 64 0.4
4 109 0.8 24 0.2
5 64 0.4 7 0.0
6 37 0.3 4 0.0
7 16 0.1
8 2 0.0
9 1 0.0
10 1 0.0
11 1 0.0
Total 14,332 100 14,332 100
Notes: The table displays the frequency distribution for the num-
ber of (in-sample) interstate migrations per individual in our
sample. ‘Return migrations’ refer to those migrations where an
individual returns either to his or her state of birth or to a state
he or she has (in-sample) previously resided in.
Table 1.4 displays the frequency distribution for the number of migrations
70The number of pre-migration spells is 1,971, which is 251 less than the number of movers
in Table 1.2 because these 251 only have post-migration observations once our sample selection
criteria are met.
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per individual in our sample. The frequency in the second column is for all
migrations. We see that about 84.5 percent never migrate. Of the 15.5 percent
that migrate, 47 percent migrate more than once. The fourth column contains
the frequency of return migrations – that is, where an individual returns either
to his or her state of birth or to a state he or she has previously resided in. The
numbers of return migrants are huge: 8.3 percent of all individuals return to a
state they have previously resided in, which is over half of all migrants. Further,
25 percent of return migrants return more than once. In terms of the total number
of migrations (the product of the first and second columns), 39 percent are where
an individual is returning.
In the forthcoming estimations we will look separately at the subsample of
returning migrants to see whether the results are driven by this group. One may
think that the motives of returning migrants are different from migrants who
are leaving a state for the first time. If migrants leave a low-income state for a
high-income state then – given the persistence in average earnings – one may
expect the reverse to be true for those migrants who subsequently return. If so –
and holding individual income constant – returning migrants will improve their
relative income and relative deprivation. Also, migrants who intend to subse-
quently return may be less likely to substitute their reference group towards the
host state upon migration from the source.
1.4.3 Results
We divide the results into three subsections. First, we simply use the subsample
of migrants to document what happens to their observed income, relative income
and relative deprivation around the time of migration. We make no suggestion of
causality here – we merely present correlations. Second, we consistently estimate
the counterfactual migrant earnings of non-migrants, correcting for the selection
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of migrants and endogeneity. Third, we estimate various models for the prob-
ability of interstate migration, whilst controlling for the estimated income gain
from migration. Fourth and finally, we conduct a number of robustness checks.
On the Outcomes of Migrants
For migrants, we observe their absolute income, relative income and relative de-
privation both before and after migration. Therefore, a useful first step in as-
sessing the merit of the migration theories is simply to ‘describe’ the change in
income, relative income and relative deprivation around the time of migration
for those individuals that actually migrate. This is the subject of this subsection.
Under the absolute income, relative income and relative deprivation theories
of migration one would expect to see an improvement in income, relative income
and relative deprivation at the time of migration, respectively. If we were to find
that migrants take a pay cut after migration, then this would lead us to doubt
the absolute income hypothesis. Such a finding would also constitute evidence
against relative income and relative deprivation under an assumption of no ref-
erence substitution, since a fall in income whilst holding the reference income
distribution constant necessarily reduces relative income and increases relative
deprivation. Alternatively, if we were to find that relative income and relative
deprivation do not improve post-migration, then this would be strong evidence
against reference group substitution.71
To be clear, here we merely present a regression ‘line of best fit’ between ei-
ther income, relative income or relative deprivation, and migration choice, whilst
controlling for other covariates. In other words, it is not a structural equation
and, hence, we make no claim of causality – it is in no way a test of the migration
71It should be clear that such a finding would not by itself lead us to reject the relative income
and relative deprivation hypotheses, since they could still hold under no reference substitution.
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theories. Nonetheless, it is a useful descriptive exercise to simply document the
regression slope (or correlation) between migration choice and our income-based
well-being measures. We will address causality in the next subsection.
To study this, we further restrict our sample to those individuals that have
at least one observation either side of (in-sample) migration. The value for the
(natural) logarithm of the outcome of interest – either income, relative income
or relative deprivation – for individual i at time t is assumed to be given by the
unobserved effects model
log(outcomeit) = γ1Mit + γ2YSMit + γ3YSM2it + γ4Rit + γ5RGit
+ x′itβ+ fi + ε it; i = 1, ..., N; t = 1, ..., Ti; (1.13)
where outcomeit is either income, relative income or relative deprivation; Mit (or
migration count) is the cumulative sum of (in-sample) migrations (for example,
during an individual’s third spell Mit takes the value two); YSMit is years-since-
migration (which is zero in the year of migration); Rit (or returned count) is the
cumulative sum of times the individual has returned to a state that he or she has
previously resided in; RGit (or returned-to-grewup count) is the cumulative sum of
times the individual has returned to the state he or she grew-up in; xit is a vector
of individual time-varying socio-economic characteristics; fi is an unobserved
individual fixed effect; and ε it is an idiosyncratic disturbance. The control vector
xit consists of age, age squared, a dummy variable indicating whether individual
i has a college degree at time t, and a full set of year dummies.72 We include a
quadratic in years-since-migration (YSMit) to allow for a post-migration assimi-
72Therefore, we have assumed a simple Mincer human capital earnings function (Mincer, 1974).
We use the same log-linear specification for relative income since its variation it mostly due to the
variation in income. The (natural) log-linear functional form is also useful for interpreting the
coefficient estimates – in particular, a change in the level of relative deprivation is difficult to
interpret, whereas a change in the (natural) log is easily interpreted as the approximate percentage
change in relative deprivation. We only include a dummy for college degree rather than a full set
of categorical education dummies because we control for individual fixed effects.
60
lation effect on earnings. For example, it may be that migrants incur some down-
grading immediately after migration due to imperfect transferability of skills (or
simply the disruption of moving causes a loss of earnings), but over time this
downgrading effect is eliminated through assimilation. Therefore, the total ef-
fect of migration on the outcome variable – and assuming no return – after YSM
years-since-migration is: γ1 + γ2YSM + γ3YSM2. The immediate marginal ef-
fect of return migration is γ1 + γ4 if the individual returns to a state other than
the state he grew-up, and γ1 + γ4 + γ5 if the individual returns to the state he
grew-up.
It is well-known that the unobserved individual fixed effect fi (which in-
cludes innate ability and motivation) is correlated with the regressors. Therefore,
we will use fixed effects estimation. Also, although we have placed the migration
indicators (Mit, Rit, RGit) on the right-hand-side of equation (1.13), this is not our
premise for the direction of causality. On the contrary, later we will argue that
causality runs the other way; that is, from income, relative income and relative
deprivation to migration.73 Again, we merely present correlations.
Before taking the logarithm, we need to do something with the zeros for in-
come, relative income and relative deprivation. There is little lost in recoding
relative deprivation from zero to one. Regarding income, one approach is to re-
code zeros to ones (and, hence, relative income is 1/mean). As expected, this
gives a poor fit for both the income and relative income regression – intuitively,
we expect migration to be associated with a smaller percent change in income for
an employed person than an unemployed person. Therefore, based on goodness-
of-fit measures we choose to drop all observations with income of 1,000 dollars
or less.
73Indeed, the migration theories imply that the post-migration indicator fails the strict exogene-
ity assumption required for causal inference from the fixed effects estimates of (1.13). For example,
under the absolute income hypothesis, past adverse shocks to individual income should make that
individual more likely to migrate in the future, implying E(εit|Mi1, ..., MiTi , fi) 6= 0, t = 1, 2, ..., Ti.
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Table 1.5 displays the coefficient estimates from fixed effects estimation of
equation (1.13) for when the sample is restricted to the first in-sample migration;
that is, we drop those observations that occur after a second (in-sample) migra-
tion. Therefore, Mit is simply a post-migration dummy that takes the value one
post-migration and zero otherwise. The first column shows the estimates when
log absolute income is the dependent variable. The coefficient estimate on the
post-migration dummy is positive and significant; more specifically, on average
migration is associated with a rise in absolute income of about 8 percent.74,75 Of
course this result only applies to the self-selected group of migrants (later we
will look at the outcomes of non-migrants as well as migrants). There is also ten-
uous evidence of an assimilation effect on earnings since the coefficient on years-
since-migration is positive and significant at the five percent level. In restricting
the sample to (in-sample) first-time migrants, it is impossible for an individual
to return to a state she previously resided in unless she enters the sample in a
state other than the state she grew-up and returns to that state. Therefore, since
all returns are to the state one grew-up, Rit and RGit are perfectly collinear and
we drop Rit. The net effect of returning to the state the individual grew-up in
is to reduce income by about 3 percent. The remaining estimates in the first col-
umn are as expected – income is an increasing and concave function of age. The
coefficient estimate on the college degree dummy is positive but statistically in-
significant, which is perhaps not unsurprising given we include fixed effects.
The second column of Table 1.5 contains the estimates for the log of relative
income as the outcome variable. The coefficient on the post-migration dummy
is significant and implies that migration coincides with an increase in relative
74The exact percentage change in income from migration is equal to 100 ∗ [exp(γ1)− 1] in the
first year – assuming no return.
75The corresponding regression without sampling weights yields a coefficient estimate on the
post-migration dummy of .063, which is statistically significant at the one percent level. We specu-
late that, since the unweighted data oversample the poor (from the SEO sample), it is high-income
migrants who experience the largest percentage increase in their income post-migration.
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TABLE 1.5
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATES FOR LOG INCOME, RELATIVE INCOME AND
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION FOR FIRST-TIME MIGRANTS
log Dependent variable:
Absolute income Relative income Rel. deprivation
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Post-migration dummy 0.077*** 0.022 0.089*** 0.022 –0.161*** 0.046
YSM 0.010** 0.005 0.010** 0.005 –0.026*** 0.010
YSM2/100 –0.000 0.018 –0.007 0.018 0.062* 0.033
Returned-to-grewup –0.109** 0.051 –0.098* 0.051 0.141* 0.082
Age 0.105*** 0.009 0.097*** 0.008 –0.129*** 0.016
Age2/100 –0.125*** 0.010 –0.122*** 0.010 0.172*** 0.018
College degree 0.048 0.030 0.049 0.030 –0.234*** 0.066
R-sq within 0.20 0.18 0.17
Number of observations 16,996
Number of groups 1,910
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent. Standard errors
are robust and clustered at the individual level. The dependent variable is indicated by
the column heading. The sample is those individuals who (in-sample) migrate interstate
for the first time – that is, observations from second and higher migrations by the same
individual are dropped. Further, only observations with income in excess of 1,000 dollars
(in 1999 prices) are included. Post-migration dummy takes the value one after migration
and zero before. YSM is years-since-migration. Returned-to-grewup is a dummy that takes
the value one if the individual has returned to the state he grew-up and zero otherwise.
College degree takes the value one if the individual has a college degree and zero otherwise.
A full set of year dummies are included but not reported. The fixed effects estimation
uses the individual longitudinal sampling weights supplied by the PSID.
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income of about 9.3 percent.76 A test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient
estimates on the post-migration dummy from the absolute income and relative
income regressions are equal is rejected at the three percent level.77 Therefore,
since the percentage rise in relative income is 1.3 percent larger than the per-
centage rise in absolute income, it must be that migrants tend to choose destina-
tion states with a lower mean income (about 1.3 percent lower) than their source
states. This is suggestive – albeit tentative – that relative income as well as abso-
lute income considerations may matter for migration choice. However, econom-
ically the 1.3 percent additional boost to relative income is small compared to
the 8 percent rise in absolute income. Again there is evidence of a delayed effect
coming through the coefficient estimate on years-since-migration, however this
seems to be entirely driven by variation in absolute income. The net effect on
relative income associated with returning to the state one grew-up is to reduce
relative income by about one percent. Therefore, the fall in relative income from
return migration is two percent less than the fall in absolute income from re-
turning (in the first column). This difference is statistically significant at the five
percent level, which supports the commonly-held view that return migration is
more prevalent to areas of lower average income.
The third column of Table 1.5 displays the estimates when the log of rela-
tive deprivation is the outcome variable. The coefficient estimate on the post-
migration dummy indicates that migration is associated with an initial fall in
relative deprivation of about 15 percent, which is statistically significant.78 Also,
the coefficient estimates on the quadratic in years-since-migration are significant
76The corresponding unweighted regression yields a coefficient estimate on the post-migration
dummy of .066, which is significant at the one percent level.
77To test this in Stata, we first survey set the data to account for the PSID sampling weights and
clustering at the individual level. Then in turn we group-demean all variables, run OLS separately
– and store the results – for the group-demeaned absolute and relative income equations and,
finally, calling the ‘suest’ command to test for equality in the cross-equation coefficients on the
post-migration dummy.
78The estimate of γ1 in the corresponding unweighted regression is -.11, which is significant at
the one percent level.
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and suggest that the relative deprivation of migrants further declines (but at a
decreasing rate) as time passes. The effect is large. For example, five years af-
ter migration relative deprivation in total falls by around 24 percent compared
to its pre-migration value. Returning to the state the individual grew-up in is
associated with a 2 percent fall in relative deprivation.
As an additional check for the absolute income hypothesis, we estimate equa-
tion (1.13) for when the dependent variable is the state price level. Recall that we
have normalised our state price level variable such that in any given year the
state average is one. We would like to know whether migrants choose destina-
tion states that have lower prices than their pre-migration (source) state. If true,
it would represent additional evidence in support of the absolute income theory.
The control vector xit only includes a full set of year dummies for this regression.
The fixed effects coefficient estimates (not reported) suggest that there is no evi-
dence to support the claim that migrants choose a destination state with a lower
price level than the source state. The coefficient estimate on the post-migration
dummy is -.0023 with a standard error of .0049. There is no evidence of a delayed
effect operating through the coefficient estimates on the quadratic in years-since-
migration. There is, however, weak evidence that returning migrants face lower
prices upon return – the coefficient estimate on the return migration dummy is
negative and significant at the 8 percent level.
We now turn our attention to the full sample of migrants; that is, we include
the individual-year observations from multiple migrations by the same individ-
ual – and do not simply use the first in-sample migration. Table 1.6 displays the
fixed effects estimates. Recall the explanatory variable of interest Mit (or migra-
tion count) in equation (1.13) is equal to the number of past in-sample migrations.
Compared to the earlier estimates in Table 1.5, we notice a couple of differences.
Most importantly, the coefficient estimate on Mit from the absolute income model
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TABLE 1.6
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATES FOR LOG INCOME, RELATIVE INCOME AND
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION FOR ALL MIGRANTS
log Dependent variable:
Absolute income Relative income Rel. deprivation
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Migration count 0.110*** 0.016 0.109*** 0.016 –0.188*** 0.032
YSM 0.014*** 0.004 0.014*** 0.004 –0.025*** 0.007
YSM2/100 –0.007 0.015 –0.012 0.014 0.044 0.027
Returned count –0.147*** 0.033 –0.139*** 0.034 0.270*** 0.063
Returned-to-grewup count –0.012 0.038 –0.016 0.038 –0.025 0.070
Age 0.108*** 0.007 0.101*** 0.006 –0.137*** 0.012
Age2/100 –0.130*** 0.008 –0.128*** 0.007 0.183*** 0.014
College degree 0.022 0.024 0.018 0.024 –0.259*** 0.053
R-sq within 0.22 0.19 0.17
Number of observations 25,180
Number of groups 1,954
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent. Standard errors
are robust and clustered at the individual level. The dependent variable is indicated by
the column heading. The sample is all individual-year observations of in-sample inter-
state migrants. Further, only observations with income in excess of 1,000 dollars (in 1999
prices) are included. Migration count is the cumulative sum of (in-sample) migrations for
an individual. Returned count is the cumulative sum of return migrations to a state the
individual has previously resided in. YSM is years-since-migration. Returned-to-grewup
count is the cumulative sum of return migrations to the state the individual grew-up. Col-
lege degree takes the value one if the individual has a college degree and zero otherwise.
A full set of year dummies are included but not reported. The fixed effects estimation
uses the individual longitudinal sampling weights supplied by the PSID.
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(column one) and relative income model (column two) are not statistically differ-
ent. That is, the rise in relative income associated with migration is entirely due
to the rise in absolute income. We also note that the magnitude of this coefficient
is greater than that in Table 1.5. This suggests there is no evidence of decreasing
returns to multiple migrations by the same individual. This is useful to know
because, if there was decreasing returns to migration then one may have argued
that the first (in-sample) migration has a special status over any other subsequent
migration.
A possible explanation for why we find no evidence of a greater improve-
ment in relative income in the full sample of migrations is the following. From
Table 1.5 we saw that returning migrants tend to return to states with a lower
average income. Given the substantial persistence in state average income, it
is likely that returning migrants initially left a low income source for a high in-
come host (and possibly did not change their reference group). Therefore, the
initial migration observations of eventual return migrants may contaminate the
coefficient estimate on the migration count variable in Table 1.6.
In summary, we have found tentative evidence that is consistent with all three
theories (absolute income, relative income and relative deprivation) as well as
both reference and no reference substitution. However, the evidence that rela-
tive income increases by more than absolute income around the time of migra-
tion is at best statistically weak and any pure relative effect is small economically.
Nonetheless, this does not imply that the relative income hypothesis fails, it can
still hold under the assumption of no reference substitution. However, the anal-
ysis so far is rather unsatisfactory for the following reasons. First, we want to
say something about causality rather than mere correlations; more specifically,
we want to measure the causal effect of each income-based well-being measure
on migration propensity. Second, we want to estimate the relative importance
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(or the partial effects) of the three theories for migration choice, which requires
controlling for all three stories simultaneously. Indeed, in the above analysis it
is unclear whether the improvement in relative deprivation around the time of
migration is solely due to the increase in absolute income or, whether it is due
to a change in the reference income distribution. Third, the fact that stayers – by
definition – choose not to migrate is useful information that we want to exploit.
On Estimating Counterfactual Migrant Earnings
The migration theories dictate – by definition – that causality runs from either
income, relative income or relative deprivation to migration, and not the other
way around – that is, not from migration to income, relative income or relative
deprivation. In deciding whether to migrate, individuals compare their expected
well-being from moving with that from staying. Clearly we need to account for
the opportunities that exist in the potential destination states. For example, it
may be that those on higher incomes in the source have even better opportunities
available in the destination states. If so, then failure to account for this will bias
the effect of income on migration upwards. Therefore, a necessary first step in
estimating migration propensity is to estimate expected income conditional on
migration, which is the objective of this subsection.
Naturally, we only observe migrant earnings for those individuals who mi-
grate and, albeit, after migration has taken place. The (counterfactual) migrant
earnings of non-migrants must be estimated. To predict the migrant earnings of
non-migrants from a particular source state, we will use the observed earnings
of actual migrants from that source state. In this way, we are assuming that it
is migrants from the same source – rather than natives in the destination – that
are the best yardstick for what non-migrants could have earned if counterfactu-
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ally they had migrated.79 Recall that we defined the source state as the state of
residence pre-migration. Therefore, for migrants, their source state gets updated
such that, when considering a second migration, their source is the destination
of their last migration. In other words, when considering migration, the source
is always the current state of residence.
The numbers of in-sample migrants from any one source state are far too
small to disaggregate them by the 50 potential destination states; hence, we sim-
ply combine all migrants from the same source. Therefore, our focus is on ex-
plaining the decision whether to migrate and, not the joint decision of whether
to migrate and which destination to choose. The estimation proceeds in two
stages: (1) in this subsection we consistently estimate counterfactual income for
non-migrants and, (2) in the next subsection we use these counterfactual income
estimates as an additional explanatory variable in a probit/logit model for the
probability of migration.80
The first stage is to predict counterfactual earnings of non-migrants using the
earnings of migrants from the same source. To be clear, we estimate (or predict)
contemporaneous migrant earnings for every individual-year observation in our
sample. The reason is because, even once an individual has migrated, he or she
can of course migrate again, and we want to estimate the income he or she would
get if they were to do so from the updated source. The point is that migration and
79The empirical evidence that migrants and natives are imperfect substitutes (the so-called
downgrading of migrants) supports our approach (see, for example, Ottaviano and Peri (2005,
2006, 2007) for evidence of imperfect substitutability between international immigrants and na-
tives in the U.S.).
80Since we lump all destination states together, we cannot estimate migrant relative income and
migrant relative deprivation for non-migrants because these measures are inherently destination-
specific. An alternative procedure would be to estimate migrant earnings of non-migrants using
the observed earnings of those (natives) in each potential destination. Then one could estimate
destination-specific migrant relative income and migrant relative deprivation using the observed
destination-specific income distribution. The dependent variable of the second stage estimation
will then be the location choice among 51 states (where non-migrants choose their current state),
which could be estimated using the conditional logit for example. Among other things, one would
want to control for the distances between destinations which is well-known to be a substantial
deterrent to migration. This is beyond the scope of this chapter but represents a promising area
for future research.
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non-migration are mutually exclusive events; therefore, even when we observe
migrant earnings for an individual, it is necessarily at a different time to any
period in which he or she chose not to migrate.
We assume that the migrant log earnings of individual i at time t is given by
the following linear form
log ymit = x
′
itβ
m + f mi + ξ
m
it ; i = 1, ..., N; t = 1, ..., Ti (1.14)
where the superscript m indicates conditionality on migration from the source;
ymit is income; xit is a vector of observable explanatory variables; β
m is the pa-
rameter vector of interest; f mi is an unobserved individual fixed effect; and ξ
m
it is
an unobserved idiosyncratic error with E(ξmit ) = 0. Let Mit ∈ {0, 1} be a post-
migration indicator that takes the value one if individual i migrated prior to time
t and zero otherwise. We observe ymit if Mit = 1 and not otherwise. Estimation
of equation (1.14) is carried out separately for each source state (all 50 U.S. states
plus the District of Columbia) using the subsample of migrants from that source.
The question is, under what conditions will our estimate of βm be consistent (for
the whole source population) when we condition on Mit = 1?
A sufficient condition for consistency of pooled OLS (or random effects) on
(1.14) is the conditional mean-independence of the unobserved term: E( f mi +
ξmit |xit, Mit) = E( f mi ); for all i, t. This may not hold for one or more of the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) correlation between the individual fixed effect f mi and xit; (2)
correlation between ξmit and xit; (3) correlation between the post-migration (or se-
lection) indicator Mit and f mi ; and (4) correlation between Mit and ξ
m
it . Points (1)
and (2) result in bias due to endogeneity, whereas (3) and (4) result in bias due
to selection.81 It is well-known that f mi is correlated with xit (that is, point (1) is
81Of all these potential biases, only (2) and (4) can be corrected for in cross-sectional data (fol-
lowing Heckman’s procedure and a set of instruments x˜it such that E[xit|x˜it] 6= 0 and E[ξmit |x˜it] =
0).
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true). For example, unobserved innate ability has a direct effect on earnings (and
hence contained in f mi ) and is correlated with education (contained in xit).
Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) derive an expression for the conditional
expectation E( f mi + ξ
m
it |xit, Mit) (that is, the bias) and then include this as an ad-
ditional explanatory variable in equation (1.14) to correct for the bias.82 The se-
lection process is assumed to be
M?it = z
′
itγt + ai + uit; Mit = 1[M
?
it > 0]; (1.15)
where M?it is the latent propensity to migrate; zit is a vector of instruments that
both explain selection and are strictly exogenous to the unobserved idiosyncratic
disturbance in the income equation: E(ξmit |zi1, ..., ziTi , fi) = 0; ai is a fixed effect
and, uit is an unobserved idiosyncratic disturbance. Then, under some fairly
weak assumptions83, Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) show that (using only the
subsample of migrant earnings) consistent estimates of βm result from running
pooled Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) on
log ymit = x
′
itβ
m + z′ib + gλˆit + errorit; i = 1, ..., N; t = 1, ..., Ti; (1.16)
where λˆit is the Inverse Mills Ratio from a probit estimation – for each t – on
equation (1.15); and zi ≡ T−1i ∑t zit is the within-individual time mean of the
regressors in the selection equation. It only remains for us to specify xit and
zit. The vector xit consists of experience, experience squared, a college degree
dummy, unemployment status, state-level average income, price level, unem-
82Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) extends Wooldridge (1995) to correct for correlation be-
tween the idiosyncratic error ξmit and the regressors xi. See Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina
(2007) for a survey of correction procedures for panel data estimation in the presence of unob-
served fixed effects and selection.
83The three key assumptions are: (1) Mundlak’s (1978) specification that f mi = z
′
ib + ci and
ai = z′id + vi where zi ≡ T−1i ∑t zit; (2) uit in the selection equation is Normally distributed; and
(3) a valid set of instruments zit exist.
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TABLE 1.7
TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES
AL AZ AR CA CO CT DE DC FL
Experience .12*** .17 .11*** .045*** .033 .038 .15** .074** .049*
Experience-sq –.0023** –.0027 –.0027*** –.0012*** –.0013 –.0016 –.0033 –.0017** –.00098
Degree .24 –1.8 .95 .15 –2 .77 1.2*** –1 .25
Lambda –17848206 .28 –.16 –.04 .063 –.16 0 .55 .042
Age bar –.04 .18 –.12* –.026 .21 .19 –.24 .051 –.12
Age-sq bar .00073 –.0029 .0017** .00048 –.0021 –.002 .0024 –.00033 .0014
Married bar 1.1* 1 .44* .95*** 1.2** .53 1.9*** .66** .42*
State price bar 3.3 1.6 –.45 1.1 .73 1.4 0 .21 2.6***
No. of obs 244 261 427 1,917 454 192 42 548 737
GA ID IL IN IA KS KY LA ME
Experience .076*** .017 .059 .12 .077** .086 .059 .17** .0066
Experience-sq –.0012** –.00026 –.0013* –.0042 –.0024*** –.0028 –.0025** –.0039** –.0013
Degree .89 –1.6 –3.3 8.1 –1.1* 3.3 –2.8 –2.6 –.011
Lambda .072 0 –.28 –.088 .047 .54 –1.2* .36 –158240238*
Age bar .0083 –1.3 .37 –.57 –.17 –.48 .14 –.025 –.049
Age-sq bar –.00031 .02 –.0042 .0073 .0025* .0066 –.00096 .00049 .00089
Married bar .71*** .51 1.3* –.79 .78*** 1.6 .29 .93* –.91
State price bar 2.1** –15 4.1 –9.7 1.1 –2.1 –2 5.3 –9.4***
No. of obs 472 55 1,115 680 385 238 262 393 105
MD MA MI MN MS MO MT NE NV
Experience .046** .06** .12* .067 .11*** .054 .29*** .13 –.074
Experience-sq –.0009** –.0019*** –.0016* –.0013 –.0014* –.00076 –.0019*** –.0019 .00061
Degree .2 –1.1 –2.8 .64 .7 –1.3 0 3.9 .25
Lambda .017 –.0034 –.087 .22* .043 –.15 .64** –21644098 –3139809***
Age bar .078 .1 –.0056 .16 .068 .12 –.78** –.6 .17
Age-sq bar –.0009 –.0014 –.00054 –.0019 –.0012* –.0013 .0062** .0067 –.0016
Married bar .84*** .66 .82 .49 .56* 1.1*** –.54** –.15 .98
State price bar .024 3.1 1.5 2.7** –1.6 1.3 0 –3.9 .12
No. of obs 665 375 582 347 365 771 35 266 167
NH NJ NM NY NC ND OH OK OR
Experience –.023 –.0026 .026 .071*** .086 14 .032 .045 –.013
Experience-sq –.0015 .00021 –.0033 –.0015** –.0017 –.21 –.0017*** –.00069 .0011
Degree 1.7*** –.32 –1.8 .24 4.1 11 –3.5 –4.5* –.69
Lambda 0 .055 .4 –.1 –.048 0 –.34 327803896 –.23
Age bar .13 .11 –.19 .027 –.023 15 .14 .73 .28
Age-sq bar –.00092 –.0013 .0039 –.00031 .00024 –.27 –.0013 –.0087 –.004
Married bar 1.3 .88*** .82 .66** .82 0 1.5 4.1** .86***
State price bar –4.9 2.9** .39 2.3* 2.5 0 –.95 –.95 –.087
No. of obs 84 605 126 1,088 608 23 1,040 205 175
PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VT VA
Experience .069*** –.32*** –.00026 .14 .15*** .068** .13* 0 .057*
Experience-sq –.0016*** .0063*** .0005 –.0023* –.0033*** –.0014*** –.0017 .15 –.0022***
Degree –1.1 .62** 5.3 .41 –.82 –.6 –.15 0 –2.3
Lambda .048 0 –.43 0 .29 –.061 .0022 –.2 –.26
Age bar .15* 1.6*** .087 .0046 –.072 .046 –.091 0 .049
Age-sq bar –.0017* –.019*** –.00092 –.00055 .00076 –.00053 .0003 .074 –.00031
Married bar .35* –2.3*** .25 –.2 .68 .68*** 1.2*** 0 1**
State price bar 1.9* –2.1* .5 .74 –1.3 1.7** 2.8 0 .41
No. of obs 636 53 376 126 407 1,267 212 4 825
WA WV WI WY AK HI
Experience .12** –.075*** .077 .25 .25* .2
Experience-sq –.0026* .00073 –.0017 –.0022 –.0046* –.0031
Degree .36 2.8 2.1* 0 –.9 –1.7
Lambda –.051 0 14112328 0 36173494 0
Age bar –.083 .099*** –.04 0 –.3 .28
Age-sq bar .0011 –.0025 .00038 –.002 .0034 –.0042
Married bar .62*** 1.9*** .61* –.43 .39 1.3
State price bar .65 –56*** –.53 0 –.67 –9.9
No. of obs 288 35 221 17 166 91
Notes: Significance levels: * p < .1, ** p < .05, and *** p < .01. Standard errors (not reported)
are bootstrapped. The dependent variable is log individual income. The sample includes only the
post-migration observations of interstate migrants from the source state (USPS code) given in the
column heading.
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ployment rate and a full set of year dummies. In zit we include age, age squared,
marital status, number of children, a full set of year dummies, and state-level
variables for average income, the price level, unemployment rate, climatic con-
ditions, number of bordering states and land area. Our choice of variables was
chosen to meet two criteria: (1) zit includes all those variables in xit that are
strictly exogenous to the idiosyncratic error in the income equation and, (2) zit
needs to be of strictly higher rank than xit.84 In particular, we feel that the college
degree dummy and unemployment status are unlikely to be strictly exogenous
and therefore these are omitted from zit.
The coefficient estimates from pooled 2SLS on equation (1.16) are displayed
in Table 1.7. Each column presents the estimates for a particular source state (the
column headings are the USPS state abbreviations). A number of the coefficient
estimates on the within-individual time means of the instruments are statisti-
cally significant, implying evidence of fixed effects. There is little evidence for
(contemporaneous) selection on the unobserved idiosyncratic error since the co-
efficient estimate on λˆit is mostly insignificant.
On the Propensity to Migrate
In this subsection we jointly estimate the effects of individual income, relative
income and relative deprivation on the individual propensity to migrate from the
source state (where the source state is defined as the state the individual resides
in prior to migration). We will control for the predicted counterfactual migrant
income that we estimated in the previous section. The dependent variable is the
end-of-year binary migration decision.
It is important to remember that individual income enters directly into the
84The higher the difference in rank the better to reduce collinearity between the selection bias
term and xit in equation (1.16).
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calculation for relative income and relative deprivation. Therefore, we would
expect the three measures to be correlated. To identify their separate effects on
migration they must, of course, be imperfectly correlated and the lower the cor-
relation the higher the precision of the estimates. Table 1.8 presents the pairwise
correlation coefficients between the three measures (as well as the state price
level, state mean income and the state unemployment rate) in our pooled sam-
ple. First, we see that individual income and relative income are almost per-
fectly correlated, this is despite variation in the reference both across individuals
(individuals living in different states) and within-individuals across-time (from
migration). This implies that there is little variation in state mean income both
across states and time and, what little variation exists is dwarfed by the varia-
tion in individual income. This collinearity will make it difficult to identify the
separate effects from individual and relative income. Therefore, in the upcom-
ing regressions we will control for individual income and state average income
– the effect of relative income can be inferred from these two components. Here-
after we use ‘average income’ to refer to mean income in an individual’s state of
residence. Second, and this is important, from Table 1.8 we see that relative de-
privation is far from perfectly correlated with individual income. The negative
sign of the correlation coefficient is to be expected since higher income lowers rel-
ative deprivation, holding the reference income distribution constant. It is this
moderate (rather than strong) correlation that will allow us to distinguish the
relative deprivation motive from absolute and relative income motives. As ex-
pected, the aggregate (state-level) variables – the price level, average income and
the unemployment rate – are weakly correlated with the individual-level vari-
ables (individual income, relative income and relative deprivation). Among the
state-level variables, the price level is positively correlated with average income,
but it is far from perfectly correlated.
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TABLE 1.8
PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS
Individual Relative Relative Price Average Unemployment
income income deprivation level income rate
Individual income 1
Relative income 0.979*** 1
Relative deprivation –0.543*** –0.599*** 1
Price level 0.108*** 0.045*** 0.057*** 1
Average income 0.122*** –0.012* 0.260*** 0.489*** 1
Unemployment rate –0.001 0.043*** –0.118*** 0.138*** –0.326*** 1
Notes: Significance levels: * 5 percent, ** 1 percent, and *** 0.1 percent. The table displays the pair-
wise correlation coefficients for selected variables in our dataset. The sample is all PSID individual-
year observations of household heads that are in the labour force, non-institutionalised and of
working age. The PSID sampling weights are applied.
The structural model for the propensity to migrate is assumed to be
m∗it = ψ1 log yit + ψ2 log y
m
it + ψ3 log Yit + ψ4 log RDit + θ
′zit + αi + νit;
mit = 1[m?it > 0]; i = 1, ..., N; t = 1, ..., Ti; (1.17)
where m∗it is the latent propensity to migrate for individual i at the end-of-year
t; yit is individual income in year t; ymit is counterfactual migrant income in year
t; Yit is average income in individual i’s state of residence in year t; RDit is rela-
tive deprivation; zit is a vector of controls; αi is an unobserved individual fixed
effect; νit is an independent disturbance; mit is the observed binary migration
decision that takes the value one if individual i migrates at the end-of-year t and
zero otherwise; and 1[.] is the indicator function.85 The control vector zit includes
personal characteristics, state-level variables and a full set of year dummies. The
85We enter individual income in logs since we expect income to have a multiplicative effect on
migration propensity; that is, a percentage change (rather than a level change) in income is likely
to have a similarly-sized effect on migration propensity, irrespective of the income level. In other
words, we would expect a 1,000 dollar increase in income to have a bigger effect on the migration
decision of a low-income person than a high-income person. We enter average state income in logs
so that we can infer the effect of relative income by a simple comparison of the marginal effects
of individual income and average income. We choose to enter relative deprivation in logs since,
although relative deprivation is far less skewed than income, taking its log helps with interpreta-
tion and, if we were to enter it in levels then it may be seen as capturing a level-effect on migration
propensity due to income.
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personal characteristics we control for are age, age squared, a dummy for college
degree, marital status, number of children, and whether the individual is unem-
ployed or not at the time of the survey. The state-level variables we control for
are the price level, the unemployment rate, climatic conditions, number of bor-
dering states and land area. The parameters of primary interest are {ψ1,ψ3,ψ4},
which represent the causal effect of individual income, average income and rel-
ative deprivation on migration propensity, respectively. The question is, under
what conditions can we consistently estimate these parameters?
Causal inference relies on the regressors being exogenous; that is, statisti-
cally independent of the error term αi + νit (or as if the regressors were randomly
assigned to people). The error term represents all omitted variables that deter-
mine migration choice. For the (non-linear) panel random and fixed effects mod-
els that we will estimate, the parameter estimates are consistent only under the
assumption that the regressors are strictly exogenous (see Wooldridge (2002)).
Strict exogeneity requires the regressors to be uncorrelated with past, current
and future values of the error term. The problem is that income (and hence rel-
ative income and relative deprivation) is highly likely to be endogenous – that
is, there is feedback from migration choice to future income (and, hence, from
the error term to future income). Indeed, migrants would surely hope that mi-
gration has a positive effect on future income and the decision to migrate is in
large part in anticipation that migration will lead to higher income. There may be
other reasons why migration choice will affect income. Endogeneity is therefore
a problem that arises from not being able to observe all the factors that determine
migration choice. If we could control for all those variables that influence migra-
tion – including expected income conditional on migration – then there would
be no endogeneity concern because these variables will not be omitted from the
model. Indeed, the estimates are consistent under arbitrary dependence among
the regressors.
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We take a number of steps towards consistent estimation. First, the regres-
sors are determined prior to the end-of-year migration decision; hence the re-
gressors are predetermined – that is, the unobserved disturbance is uncorrelated
with current and past values of the regressors, but may still be correlated with
future values.86 Second, we control for individual fixed effects, time effects and
a large vector of observable time-varying variables that have been suggested to
influence migration. Therefore, our estimates are consistent under arbitrary de-
pendence between the regressors and any unobserved time-invariant individ-
ual heterogeneity. The remaining source of endogeneity bias is if the regressors
are correlated with past values of the unobserved idiosyncratic (time-varying)
disturbance. We have already suggested that a ‘shock’ to migration choice is
likely to affect future income. Third and to reduce these ‘shocks’, we control for
predicted counterfactual migrant income that we estimated in the previous sec-
tion.87 Finally we present a series of robustness checks, including Wooldridge’s
(1997) estimator for the consistent estimation of non-linear fixed effects panel
data models without strict exogeneity.
Table 1.9 displays estimates for the average partial effects from a probit model
of equation (1.17), without controlling for relative deprivation (RDit). The aver-
age partial effect for a regressor tells us the change in the probability of migra-
tion for a one unit change in that regressor – for the typical individual in our
sample.88 Adjacent to the point estimate for the partial effect, the table reports
the corresponding standard error, which are bootstrapped, robust and clustered
86For example, if we observe that individual i resides in California in 1989, New York in 1990
and New York in 1991, then mi1989 = 1 and mi1990 = 0. Personal characteristics (for example,
college degree, marital status, unemployment status) refer to their values at the time of the PSID
survey within year t, whilst income refers to earnings in year t. There is no way that the individual
can retrospectively change the values of the regressors in response to their migration choice.
87Clearly we would not want to control for actual future income post-migration (which we
observe for migrants) because then it would be unclear what – if any – economic meaning we
could derive from this – the individual can never know for sure what his future income will be,
individuals may make ‘mistakes’ when estimating their post-migration earnings.
88In computing the average partial effects, we set the individual-specific intercepts to zero –
which is the mean of the random effects.
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at the individual level.89
The first column of Table 1.9 controls for individual income, estimated mi-
grant income, average income and personal circumstances – whether unemployed,
age, age squared, whether college degree, whether married and number of chil-
dren. The partial effects are random effects estimates, that is, they assume the in-
dividual unobserved effect αi is uncorrelated with the regressors. The estimated
partial effect for individual income is insignificant (and has the wrong sign). A
priori, we would expect the partial effect of individual income to be negative
– under both the absolute and relative income hypotheses and holding average
income constant, an increase in absolute income (and, hence, relative income
too) reduces migration propensity. The effect of (counterfactual) migrant income
is also insignificant. In contrast, average income is positive and significant – a
one percent rise in average income increases the probability of migration by 1.2
percent, holding individual income constant. We also see that those who are un-
employed at the time of the survey are more likely to migrate; more specifically,
an unemployed person is .55 percent more likely to migrate than an employed
person. The estimates on the remaining controls are as expected. The probabil-
ity of migration is higher for people that are younger, with a college degree and
fewer children. The partial effect of being married is not statistically different
from zero. The estimated partial effect for age accounts for a quadratic in age.
We argued in section 1.3 that the random effects assumption – which is im-
plicit in the cross-sectional studies that dominate the related literature – is un-
likely to hold. The estimates in the second column of Table 1.9 display esti-
mates of the average partial effects from a probit fixed effects estimation us-
ing Mundlak’s (1978) correction procedure (see Mundlak (1978) and Wooldridge
(2002)).90 Mundlak (1978) assumes that the individual fixed effect, αi, can be
89Bootstrapping should adjust the standard errors for the fact that counterfactual migrant earn-
ings are estimated.
90The standard fixed effects methods for linear regression models (either differencing or group-
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written as a linear function of the within-individual time mean of the regressors
and a disturbance term that is uncorrelated with the regressors. That is, αi =
a1 log yi + a2 log ymi + a3 log Yi + a
′
4zi + ci where the subscript i for the regressor
indicates the time mean for individual i, for example z1i ≡ T−1i ∑Tit=1 z1it, and ci is
a disturbance that is uncorrelated with the regressors (log yit, log ymi , log Yit, zit).
To estimate the model we simply run random effects estimation on the trans-
formed model that appends the within-individual time mean of the regressors to
the set of regressors.91
The fixed effects estimates in column two of Table 1.9 are very different from
the random effects estimates in column one. The partial effect on income is now
negative and significant, which conforms to prior expectations. A one percent
increase in individual income decreases the probability of migration by .034 per-
cent, which is small. The partial effect of average income is positive and even
higher than the estimate in column one – a one percent increase in average in-
come increases the probability of migration by 1.6 percent, holding individual
income constant. Migrant earnings remains insignificant. The partial effect of
a college degree in column two is lower than that in column one, which is not
surprising given that a college degree is likely correlated with unobserved innate
ability. The partial effect of marriage is now negative and significant.
If the random effects assumption that the fixed effect αi is uncorrelated with
the regressors is correct, then the coefficient estimates on the within-individual
time means of the regressors should not be significantly different from zero. The
vast majority of the individual time means of the regressors (not reported) are
demeaning) will not eliminate the fixed effect αi for the probit model. Further, directly estimat-
ing the group-specific intercepts using Maximum Likelihood estimation leads to inconsistent esti-
mates of the group intercepts – and consequently the slope coefficients too – since Ti is fixed and
small (this is the ‘incidental parameters problem’, see Greene (2008)).
91In theory, zi should include the individual time means of the year dummies since, for our
unbalanced panel, the time means of the year dummies vary across individuals. However, doing
so leads to convergence problems of the maximum likelihood solver; hence, the regression only
includes a full set of year dummies and not their individual time means.
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TABLE 1.9
AVERAGE PARTIAL EFFECTS FOR MIGRATION PROPENSITY
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
Migration dummy Random Fixed Compensating
effects effects aggregates
A.P.E. S.E. A.P.E. S.E. A.P.E. S.E.
log Individual income 1.4e-4 1.3e-4 –3.4e-4** 1.5e-4 –3.0e-4* 1.6e-4
log Migrant income –1.6e-4 1.4e-4 –2.8e-4 1.7e-4 –6.8e-4*** 2.1e-4
log Average income 1.2e-2*** 2.6e-3 1.6e-2*** 3.7e-3 6.8e-3 5.1e-3
Unemployed (d) 5.5e-3*** 1.0e-3 5.9e-3*** 1.1e-3 5.2e-3*** 1.2e-3
Age –9.7e-4*** 6.2e-5 –1.0e-3*** 8.7e-5 –7.8e-4*** 9.5e-5
College degree (d) 8.5e-3*** 9.2e-4 2.4e-3** 1.2e-3 2.2e-3* 1.3e-3
Married (d) –4.8e-4 6.6e-4 –2.7e-3*** 9.6e-4 –2.7e-3*** 1.0e-3
Children –2.5e-3*** 2.9e-4 –1.5e-3*** 3.5e-4 –1.4e-3*** 3.6e-4
Price level 3.3e-2*** 7.6e-3
Unemployment rate 5.3e-4** 2.6e-4
Temperature, ave. 1.7e-3*** 3.9e-4
Temp, max-min 2.7e-4 2.7e-4
Pecipitation, ave. –4.5e-3*** 1.4e-3
Precip, max-min –1.2e-3 8.2e-4
Heating deg. days 3.6e-6* 1.9e-6
Cooling deg. days –1.2e-6 3.0e-6
Borders 6.6e-4 4.4e-4
Land area –2.9e-8*** 7.4e-9
Fixed effects NO YES YES
LogL –14,089 –14,036 –13,845
Number of obs 117,192 117,192 117,019
Number of groups 13,862 13,862 13,851
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent. The table displays estimated
average partial effects (A.P.E.) from a probit model for the probability of migration. Standard errors
(S.E.) are bootstrapped, robust and clustered at the individual level. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable that takes the value one if the individual migrates interstate at the end of the year,
and zero otherwise. The suffix (d) denotes a discrete change in a dummy variable from zero to
one. The reported partial effects for age, temperature average and precipitation average account for a
quadratic in these variables. The models in columns two and three control for the within-individual
time averages (or fixed effects) of the regressors – following Mundlak (1978) – although these are
not reported. A full set of year dummies are also included but not reported.
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individually significantly different from zero. Moreover, a likelihood ratio test
between the nested models in columns one and two overwhelmingly rejects the
null hypothesis that the coefficients on the within-individual time means are
jointly insignificant. The likelihood ratio test statistic of 104 is far larger than
the critical value at the one percent level, 21.67.92 This suggests the fixed effects
model is the appropriate one. Therefore, this is evidence in support of our ear-
lier critique of cross-sectional studies; that is, unobservables (innate ability, mo-
tivation, willingness to move) play an important role in determining migration
propensity and are correlated with the regressors.
There is at least one obvious concern with the estimates in column two. If
the absolute income hypothesis has at least some relevance, then the (negative)
partial effect of individual income should be greater in absolute value than the
(positive) partial effect of average income – and if the pure relative income hy-
pothesis is correct then the partial effects on income and average income should
be equal in absolute value, which is overwhelmingly rejected. Clearly we need
to control for confounding state-level variables.
The estimates in column three of Table 1.9 control for various state-level vari-
ables. These are the state price level, unemployment rate, climatic conditions
(including a quadratic in average temperature and precipitation), number of bor-
dering states (a proxy for distance) and land area. Importantly, these state-level
controls render the partial effect of average income on migration choice insignif-
icant. The partial effect on individual income remains negative and significant.
Estimated migrant income is now significant but negative, which is the opposite
of what we would expect. The state price level has a positive and statistically
significant effect on the probability of migration. Recall that the price level is nor-
malised such that the average across states is one. Therefore, residing in a state
92The critical value of 21.67 is from the chi-squared distribution with 9 degrees of freedom.
Recall that age is entered as a quadratic so there are 9 within-individual time means.
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with a price level one percent higher than the average increases the probability of
migration by .033 percent compared to residing in a state with the average price
level. Therefore, the partial effect of the price level is comparable in magnitude
to that of individual income, which is what we would expect. Nonetheless, the
effect is small. Considering the remaining covariates, we see that the unemploy-
ment rate in the state of residence has a positive effect on migration propensity.
For the typical person a rise in average temperature increases the probability of
migration, whilst an increase in precipitation lowers migration propensity. Heat-
ing degree days – an indicator of the demand for heating – has a positive effect
on the probability of migration. The number of bordering states does not have a
significant effect; state land area reduces the probability of migration.
Table 1.10 contains the estimated average partial effects when we control for
relative deprivation. Holding individual income and average income constant,
it is possible to change relative deprivation. In section 3.2 we saw that a mean-
preserving spread of the income distribution can achieve this. Consider the es-
timates in column one, which does not control for average income. We see that
relative deprivation increases migration propensity – a one percent increase in
relative deprivation increases the probability of migration by about .18 percent.
This is economically significant given that only three percent of our observations
are when an individual migrates. The partial effects of individual income and
estimated migrant income are statistically insignificant.
The second column controls for relative deprivation and average income.
Both have a positive and significant effect on migration propensity, as predicted
by the relative income and relative deprivation hypotheses, respectively. The
coefficients on individual income and migrant income remain insignificant. In
the final column we control for the various state-level variables. As before, this
renders the effect of average income insignificant. However, the effect of relative
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TABLE 1.10
AVERAGE PARTIAL EFFECTS FOR MIGRATION PROPENSITY:
CONTROLLING FOR RELATIVE DEPRIVATION
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
Migration dummy Relative RD + Average Compensating
deprivation income aggregates
A.P.E. S.E. A.P.E. S.E. A.P.E. S.E.
log Individual income –5.8e-5 1.6e-4 –1.0e-4 1.6e-4 –5.5e-5 1.7e-4
log Migrant income –2.7e-4 1.7e-4 –2.8e-4 1.8e-4 –6.8e-4*** 2.1e-4
log Average income 1.3e-2*** 3.8e-3 3.8e-3 5.2e-3
log Relative deprivation 1.8e-3*** 4.0e-4 1.5e-3*** 4.0e-4 1.6e-3*** 4.2e-4
Unemployed (d) 5.8e-3*** 1.1e-3 5.8e-3*** 1.2e-3 5.1e-3*** 1.2e-3
Age –9.6e-4*** 8.1e-5 –9.9e-4*** 8.8e-5 –7.7e-4*** 9.6e-5
College degree (d) 3.0e-3** 1.2e-3 2.9e-3** 1.2e-3 2.6e-3** 1.3e-3
Married (d) –2.5e-3*** 9.7e-4 –2.5e-3*** 9.7e-4 –2.6e-3** 1.0e-3
Children –1.4e-3*** 3.5e-4 –1.4e-3*** 3.6e-4 –1.4e-3*** 3.7e-4
Price level 3.4e-2*** 7.6e-3
Unemployment rate 5.0e-4* 2.6e-4
Temperature, ave. 1.7e-3*** 3.9e-4
Temp, max-min 2.8e-4 2.7e-4
Pecipitation, ave. –4.4e-3*** 1.4e-3
Precip, max-min –1.2e-3 8.2e-4
Heating deg. days 3.4e-6* 1.9e-6
Cooling deg. days –1.3e-6 3.0e-6
Borders 6.3e-4 4.4e-4
Land area –2.9e-8*** 7.4e-9
Fixed effects YES YES YES
LogL –14,031 –14,021 –13,831
Number of obs 117,192 117,192 117,019
Number of groups 13,862 13,862 13,851
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent. The table displays average
partial effects (A.P.E.) from a Mundlak (1978) fixed effects probit model. Standard errors (S.E.) are
bootstrapped, robust and clustered at the individual level. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable that takes the value one if the individual migrates interstate at the end of the year, and
zero otherwise. The suffix (d) denotes a discrete change in a dummy variable from zero to one. The
reported partial effects for age, temperature average and precipitation average account for a quadratic
in these variables. All models include the individual-specific time averages for each regressor as
well as a full set of year dummies, but these are not reported.
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deprivation is still positive and highly significant.
Robustness checks
Table 1.11 displays the results from various robustness checks. The columns
contain the average partial effects and corresponding standard errors for the two
regressors of primary interest: individual income and relative deprivation. The
baseline model is that in the third column of table 1.10 and – for ease of compar-
ison – we reproduce these estimates in the first row of table 1.11. The remaining
rows indicate a variant of the baseline model. Unless specified otherwise, all
estimations include the same controls as the baseline model.
The estimations in rows (2)–(4) add extra controls to the baseline model. As in
the baseline model, the figures are probit fixed-effects estimates using Mundlak’s
(1978) specification for the unobserved fixed effect. The second row controls for
whether the individual owns his or her own home. One may think that home
ownership has a direct effect on migration propensity since it increases the cost
of moving and, those that own their home tend not to be relatively deprived.
From the table we see that – compared to the baseline model – the partial effect
of relative deprivation is weakened slightly but it is still positive and significant.
A one percent rise in relative deprivation increases the probability of migration
by .11 percent for the typical individual. Home ownership has a strong negative
effect on migration propensity.
The estimates in the third row control for a full set of state dummies, which
take the value one if the individual is resident in that state and zero otherwise. If
there are state-level time-invariant factors that affect the attractiveness of a state
(such as amenities), then the state dummies will capture these. From the table
we see that this has no discernible effect on the estimates. A likelihood ratio test
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TABLE 1.11
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Dependent variable: Individual Relative
Migration dummy income deprivation
Specification: A.P.E. S.E. A.P.E. S.E. LogL N
(1) Baseline –5.5e-5 1.7e-4 1.6e-3*** 4.2e-4 –13,831 117,019
Variable addition:
(2) Control for whether –7.6e-5 1.8e-4 1.1e-3** 4.3e-4 –13,638 117,019
own home
(3) State fixed effects –4.2e-5 1.8e-4 1.6e-3*** 4.3e-4 –13,748 117,019
(4) Control for quartic 9.2e-4 2.3e-3 7.5e-3*** 2.7e-3 –13,790 117,019
in log income and RD
(5) Enter everything in –4.1e-8** 1.6e-8 2.8e-7*** 7.4e-8 –13,807 117,019
levels, not logs
Sample selection:
(6) Drop biennial obs. 2.6e-4 2.0e-4 1.6e-3*** 4.3e-4 –10,989 98,621
(7) Movers –6.1e-4 1.3e-3 1.1e-2*** 2.9e-3 –9,690 27,411
(8) Non-returning movers –6.9e-3*** 1.7e-3 1.0e-2** 4.1e-3 –4,058 12,852
(9) Keep if income –2.4e-3*** 7.4e-4 4.9e-4 5.3e-4 –13,057 110,061
>$1,000
(10) Keep if income –3.7e-8** 1.6e-8 3.6e-7*** 8.8e-8 –13,036 110,061
>$1,000 and enter
everything in levels
(11) Keep if income 1.2e-2*** 3.4e-3 1.9e-2*** 3.9e-3 –13,020 110,061
>$1,000 and control
for quartic
(12) Keep if income 1.6e-4 1.8e-4 2.7e-3*** 6.2e-4 –13,482 114,543
<$100,000
(13) Keep the 25 most 2.8e-5 2.1e-4 1.9e-3*** 5.1e-4 –11,123 97,827
populous US states
(14) Drop self-employed –4.1e-5 2.1e-4 2.3e-3*** 5.2e-4 –12,853 104,986
Endogeneity tests:
(15) Conditional FE logit –1.2e-7 4.4e-7 3.3e-6*** 1.0e-6 –6,469 25,718
(16) Wooldridge (1997) –2.6e-2 2.7e-2 3.2e-1*** 7.7e-2 82,908
transform + GMM
Notes: Significance levels: * 10 percent, ** 5 percent, and *** 1 percent. The table displays average
partial effects (A.P.E.) and corresponding standard errors (S.E.) for individual income and relative
deprivation. Standard errors are bootstrapped, robust and clustered at the individual level. The
dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the individual migrates inter-
state at the end of the year, and zero otherwise. Unless specified otherwise, all estimations include
the same controls as the baseline model in table 1.10, column 3. The final two columns report the
log likelihood and the number of observations (N). In row (15) the partial effect at the means is
reported instead of the A.P.E., and row (16) reports the coefficient estimates and not the partial
effect.
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firmly rejects the null hypothesis that the state fixed effects are jointly zero.
The estimation in the fourth row controls for a fourth-order polynomial in
log individual income and log relative deprivation. One may think that average
income and relative deprivation are capturing non-linearities in the effect of in-
dividual income on migration propensity. The estimates suggest this is not the
case.
In the fifth row we control for the levels of individual income, estimated mi-
grant income, average income and relative deprivation instead of their loga-
rithms. The partial effect of relative deprivation is positive and highly signifi-
cant. There is also evidence that absolute income matters too since the effect of
individual income is negative and significant at the five percent level.
In rows (6)–(14) we estimate the baseline model for selected subsamples to see
whether the results are driven by certain observations. In row six we drop all the
biennial observations. Recall, since 1997 the PSID has surveyed sample members
once every two years. This is problematic because the PSID asks respondents for
their labour income in the year prior to the survey. Our estimates suggest that
dropping the biennial observations does not affect the estimated partial effect of
relative deprivation.
The estimates in row seven use only the observations of individuals who in-
sample migrate interstate one or more times. If relative deprivation truly does
affect migration propensity then it should hold for the self-selected group of mi-
grants. Our estimates suggest this is the case and, moreover, the effect is eco-
nomically stronger for movers than for the full sample. A one percent increase in
relative deprivation increases the probability of migration by 1.1 percent, which
is substantial.
A possible concern is that the results may be driven by returning migrants
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since it is typically thought that migrants return from high-income host states.
Row eight of table 1.11 presents estimates for when the sample is restricted to
in-sample interstate migrants who (in-sample) never return to either a state they
have previously resided in or to the state they grew-up. The partial effect of rel-
ative deprivation remains positive and significant at the five percent level. One
notable difference is that the effect of individual income is now statistically sig-
nificant and negative – as predicted by the absolute income theory. This would
seem to imply that whilst non-return migration is driven by bad income shocks,
return migration is not.
An interesting question is whether the unemployed are driving the results.
In row nine we restrict the sample to those observations where an individual
reports earnings in excess of 1,000 dollars (in 1999 prices). This renders the par-
tial effect of relative deprivation statistically insignificant, although the point es-
timate is positive. The effect of individual income is negative and significant.
Clearly the idea that relative deprivation matters for migration choice is less con-
vincing if its empirical relevance relies on the unemployed. It appears that the
functional form assumption may be important. More specifically, whilst we ex-
pect the logarithm of income to better capture the effect of income on migration
for the employed – and not the unemployed for whom a small increase in income
equates to a large percentage increase – differently we expect the logarithm of
relative deprivation to do a good job at capturing its effect for those with high
relative deprivation – and not the high earners. For a high earner, relative de-
privation is low and an additional small fall in the level of relative deprivation
equates to a large percentage decrease.
To assess this, row ten again restricts the sample to those earning over 1,000
dollars but this time enters everything in levels and not logarithms. The effect
of relative deprivation is positive and significant. In row eleven we control for
87
a fourth-order polynomial in log income and log relative deprivation – again for
the sample with income greater than a thousand dollars. The partial effect of rel-
ative deprivation is strongly positive and statistically significant – a one percent
increase in relative deprivation increases the probability of migration by almost
two percent. This point estimate is the highest of all the models considered. The
partial effect of income is significant but has the ‘wrong’ sign.
Another concern is income outliers at the top-end of the distribution. Some of
these extreme values may be due to typing errors – possibly adding one too many
digits. The estimates in row twelve use the subsample that drops all observations
where income is in excess of 100,000 dollars (in 1999 prices). The result is that,
compared to the baseline model, the partial effect of relative deprivation on the
probability of migration is higher.
Recall, when we compute relative deprivation for an individual, we use CPS
data on the earnings of individuals in the same state and year as that individual.
For smaller states the CPS sample size is small and possibly too small for reliable
estimation of relative deprivation. In row thirteen we restrict the sample to those
observations where the individual resides in one of the 25 most populous U.S.
states. Again the effect of relative deprivation is positive and significant. The
effect of average income is now significant but has the ‘wrong’ sign.
In row fourteen we exclude the self-employed from the sample. One may
think that the self-employed have different behavioural characteristics to those
who work for someone else – and, consequently, may have different slope co-
efficients. Dropping the self-employed increases the estimated average partial
effect of relative deprivation. The partial effect of individual income remains
statistically insignificant.
The remaining two rows of table 1.11 present estimates that attempt to do
more in terms of achieving consistent estimation of causal effects. Row fifteen
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presents estimates from the logit conditional fixed-effects model of equation (1.17)
(see Chamberlain (1980)). The reason we do this is because, for the logit model,
Chamberlain (1980) showed that a sufficient statistic for the fixed effect (αi) exists.
Indeed, conditioning the likelihood of observing our data on ∑t mit eliminates αi
from the conditional likelihood function (see Greene and Hensher (2010)). There-
fore, we do not have to rely on Mundlak’s (1978) specification assumption for αi.
Unfortunately this comes at a cost since the resulting fixed effects model can only
be estimated for the subsample of movers.93 Therefore, in order to use the condi-
tional fixed effects estimates to say something about the whole population, one
needs to take a leap of faith and assume that the in-sample movers are not that
different from the stayers. The estimates displayed in row fourteen are partial ef-
fects evaluated at the mean of the regressors and not the average partial effect.94
The estimated partial effect for relative deprivation is positive and significant.
Of course we should still be concerned that the regressors are correlated with
past unobserved idiosyncratic disturbances. For example, this would occur if
a shock to the migration decision today affects future income. More generally,
any variable that is directly or indirectly chosen by an individual may not be
strictly exogenous. The literature on the estimation of non-linear fixed effects
panel data models without strict exogeneity is tiny. For consistent estimation when
the regressors are predetermined, Wooldridge (1997) extends the work of Cham-
berlain (1992) and proposes a quasi-differencing transformation and then Gen-
eralised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation of the resulting orthogonality
conditions.95
93The reason is that, for those who do not migrate in-sample, the value of the dependent vari-
able is equal to zero in every period, which is perfectly explained by conditioning on ∑t mit.
94The conditional logit model will not give us estimates of the fixed effects that we require to
calculate the partial effects of the regressors. We follow the method proposed in Greene and Hen-
sher (2010) to estimate the average fixed effect for the estimation sample and use this to calculate
the partial effect at the means. For our sample the estimated partial effect at the means is less than
the average partial effect.
95To remove the fixed effect for a binary model, we need to assume a particular variant of
equation (1.17) such that the probability of migration can be factored into the product of a term
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We assume that the predetermined regressors are individual income, pre-
dicted migrant income, relative deprivation, and the unemployed and college
degree dummies. The GMM estimation uses all the available lags of the pre-
determined regressors as instruments in a given year. We treat the remaining
regressors as strictly exogenous since these either can be considered determin-
istic (such as age) or they are state-level.96 We assume a logistic distribution for
the idiosyncratic error term. The estimates in row sixteen of table 1.11 display the
coefficient (not the partial effect) estimates from Wooldridge’s (1997) estimator.
The coefficient estimate on relative deprivation is positive and statistically signif-
icant. The coefficient estimate on individual income is negative but statistically
insignificant.
In summary, from studying interstate migration in the U.S., we have amassed
evidence in favour of Stark’s relative deprivation theory of migration. We find
little support for the absolute income theory that dominates the migration litera-
ture and the thinking of policy makers.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has examined whether absolute income or relative income (to others
in some comparison group) provides the main motivation for migration. Almost
all models of migration – both theoretical and empirical – assume that absolute
income determines migration. Indeed, the most popular model of migration,
George Borjas’ (1987) selection theory, is built on the assumption that absolute
income differentials between the source and destination provide the incentive
that depends only on the fixed effect and a term that depends on the regressors. More specifically,
rather than including the fixed effect αi in the expression for m?it, we instead add the condition
that migration occurs if the fixed effect is greater than some threshold (see Wooldridge (1997)).
This may not be too restrictive since only certain types of people would even consider migration.
There are some people that will never consider moving, no matter how large the income gain from
migration.
96An individual-level shock has a negligible effect on a state-level variable.
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for migration. The model is so popular that a whole literature is devoted to
testing the migrant quality (or selection-on-skills) predictions of Borjas’ model,
and none of these papers control for relative income. All this is at odds with the
mounting evidence that suggests utility is driven by relative income (or relative
deprivation) as well as absolute income, particularly after a threshold level of
income – needed for the essentials in life – is exceeded.
We show that, under some conditions, the two main theories (absolute in-
come and relative deprivation) predict the same aggregate relationship between
income inequality and the quality (or selection-on-skills) of migrants. We argue
that in order to distinguish between the two theories, one needs individual-level
data. Moreover, one needs individual-level panel data on before and after mi-
gration outcomes. The reason is that, since migration and non-migration are
mutually exclusive, one has to estimate the (counterfactual) migrant earnings
of non-migrants using the subsample of migrant earnings. If migrants are se-
lected on unobservables, then cross-sectional estimates will systematically bias
the predicted migrant earnings of non-migrants. Importantly, we show that the
estimates are biased in favour of the finding that relative deprivation is impor-
tant precisely when migrants are positively selected-on-unobservables, which is
difficult to reconcile with the relative deprivation theory. Hence the need for
individual-level panel data to correct for selection-on-unobservables. Since the
current literature either fails to control for relative deprivation or fails to control
for selection-on-unobservables (or both), we undertake some empirical analysis
of our own.
The chapter estimates the relative importance of the two main theories in
explaining interstate migration in the United States. The data is a panel of indi-
viduals from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We assume that the reference
group to which income comparisons are made is the population of the U.S. state
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of residence. First we find that for the subsample of migrants, their income and
relative deprivation both improve post-migration. Second, we jointly estimate
the effects of individual income and relative deprivation on the propensity to
migrate out of the source state. We find strong and robust evidence that an in-
crease in relative deprivation increases the probability of migration. In contrast,
our estimates suggest individual income has no significant effect on migration
propensity. This is true even after controlling for the estimated gain in income
from migration.
In studying U.S. interstate migration, we are looking at the migratory be-
haviour of people that – generally speaking – have enough income to buy the
‘essentials in life’, and hence are more likely to care about relative income than
those on very low incomes. Therefore, whether our findings have wider applica-
bility to regional migration in low-income countries, or international migration
(particularly between low- and high-income countries), should be the subject of
future research. Since in many cases of international migration the ‘essentials in
life’ are not satisfied, we would expect absolute income to be more important for
international migration.
On the one hand, our results are surprising given that the migration litera-
ture (and migration policy) is dominated by considerations of absolute income
differentials between the source and destination. On the other hand, our results
support the recent survey evidence that happiness is determined by relative in-
come (or deprivation), particularly when the average level of income is high.
There are several other promising avenues for future research. If, as we sug-
gest, relative deprivation is the correct theory of migration, then a big question
concerns how the reference group is chosen. Here we briefly discuss two aspects:
(1) what is the correct size (persons) of the reference group; and (2) how does the
reference group change in response to actions, including migration. Regarding
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(1), we assume the reference group coincides with the population of a U.S. state,
but one may think that the true reference group is much narrower than this, par-
ticularly for the larger states.97 If the true reference group is narrower than the
state, then our estimate of the effect of relative deprivation on migration can be
seen as an underestimate. To see this, consider a state that contains a rich and
a poor neighbourhood. Assume that the inhabitants follow the relative depriva-
tion hypothesis. If the true reference group is the neighbourhood, then the rela-
tively deprived within each neighbourhood are more likely to migrate – either to
another neighbourhood within the same state or to another state. If, however, the
true reference group is the state, then the inhabitants of the poor neighbourhood
are more likely to migrate. Therefore, if the reference group is wrongly taken
to be the state rather than the neighbourhood, it works against our finding that
relative deprivation matters – the relatively deprived in the rich neighbourhood
are not deprived at the state level.
The second aspect concerns the endogeneity of the reference group. If rela-
tive deprivation matters, as we suggest, then an individual that migrates from a
poor to a rich region will surely do all he can to prevent reference substitution.
For example, this may require the migrant to avoid mixing with destination na-
tives and instead form social ties with earlier migrants from the same source.
If so, then one can expect enclaves and segregation. An interesting question is
whether leaving some family members behind in the source helps to prevent
reference group substitution? If so, it may provide a new explanation for remit-
tances, since it is a mechanism through which migrants avoid reference substi-
tution. Another question of interest is how the mere passing of time spent in the
destination affects the likelihood of reference substitution? If the probability of
reference substitution increases with time spent in the destination, then migrants
97Using population figures from the 2000 Census, one may be sceptical that a Californian com-
pares himself to around 34 million other California residents, whereas a resident of Wyoming
compares himself to half a million.
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may circle from source-to-destination-to-source and so on. Conversely, a migrant
from a rich source region will want to encourage reference substitution to that of
a lower-income destination. Migrants may then bring their families with them
and set up ties with natives in the destination. Furthermore, there are interest-
ing equilibrium aspects to be thought through. Clearly, the location decision of
one person changes the well-being of all persons in the source and destination
reference groups.
It is natural to question the unconventional. Many readers will ask, if rela-
tive income is so important for migration choice, why do we not see an exodus
from (high-income) New York to, say, (low-income) Louisiana? In response we
would say that our question is why we do not see the reverse flow. A Louisiana
janitor will probably earn more doing the same job in New York, but he or she
will likely be relatively more deprived in comparison to the high-income New
Yorkers. People trade-off the change in relative deprivation with the change in
income from migration and, on average, they tend to counter-balance each other.
One final comment. The existing evidence that finds well-being is determined
by relative income (or deprivation) – as well as absolute income – is from self-
reported happiness and life satisfaction. In contrast, we have revealed prefer-
ences that support the relative deprivation theory using the actual migration ac-
tions of individuals and, not subjective survey responses.98 Indeed, migration
provides excellent natural variation to assess relative deprivation. This is be-
cause relative deprivation can change substantially upon migration, particularly
when reference substitution occurs.99 More research needs to be done to assess
98Naturally one may be sceptical as to whether survey respondents report their true feelings
when the question is subjective. Indeed, often a reordering of questions or a slight change in ques-
tion wording can lead to a different answer (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). Nonetheless, Frey
and Stutzer (2002) present evidence to suggest that self-reported happiness is a reliable indicator
of well-being.
99Furthermore, the criticism that using migration data in this way is problematic since one
cannot know the true reference group and how it changes after migration can equally be directed
at the happiness literature.
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the wider applicability of our result and, if our findings are confirmed, then an
evaluation of current migration and redistributive policy may be in order.
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Appendix
Appendix 1.A Sample and Variable Construction for the
Empirical Analysis
This appendix describes the construction of the sample and the variables used in
the empirical analysis of section 1.4.
The Sample
The sample is from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID con-
tains two separate data sets: an individual file with longitudinal data on every
individual that has ever appeared in the PSID; and a family file for each cross-
sectional year that contains information on the head, “wife” and family unit for
all family units sampled in that year. The family files contain the vast major-
ity of survey information, while the individual file is needed to keep track of a
specific individual because of moves into and out of different family units. Im-
portantly, both the individual file and family file contain the year, family-unit,
and relationship-to-head identifiers, which combined permit us to link the two
data sets.100
We merge the files in the following way. First, we reshape the individual file
into long format; that is, each row now contains a unique individual-year iden-
tifier. Second, we download the family files for all survey years into a single
100Note that when we say relationship-to-head we do not mean that we directly use the variable
“Relationship to head” as given in the PSID individual file. Indeed, the PSID variable “Relation-
ship to head” is not sufficient to identify the current head because any last year’s head (or wife)
that moved out is also recorded as the head (wife) in this variable. As the PSID documentation
explains, the current head is identified by yearly values for “Sequence Number” in the range 1-20
and a value for “Relationship to head” of either 1 or 10. The current “wife” is identified by yearly
values for “Sequence Number” in the range 1-20 and a value for “Relationship to head” of either
2, 20, or 22. In 1968 we can safely identify the head with “Relationship to head”=1 and wife with
“Relationship to head”=2 because, trivially, there are no movers in the first year of the sample.
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file and reshape it into long-long format so that each row is either a head-year,
“wife”-year or family-year observation. We then merge the family file with the
individual file in three steps. First, we merge based on year-family-head and
year-family-wife for all head and wife observations, respectively. Secondly, we
merge based on year-family for all current period family unit variables. Finally,
we merge based on year–family–non-split-off–non-mover for all family unit vari-
ables that are lagged one period; for example, the survey question on family
income asks retrospectively what family income was in the prior period. A prob-
lem arises when the head, for example, moved families between the prior and
current period, since merging based on year-family-head will incorrectly allocate
family income to the wrong head. Hence, we merge the lagged family-level data
only for those family members who did not change families between the prior
and current period. These are non-split-off families and non-mover individuals.
Our working sample includes people that meet all of the following four cri-
teria:
1. The head of household is typically the adult male head (the husband if
married) unless an adult male is not present or is severely disabled. The current
head is identified jointly by yearly values for “Sequence Number” in the range
1-20 (PSID variable ER30021 in 1969) and a “Relationship to head” value of 1
or 10 (PSID variable ER30003 in 1968). The sequence number is used to ensure
that only the current head is included and not the head in the previous wave in
the event that the previous head moved out of the household. In 1968 we can
safely identify the head with a “Relationship to head” value 1 because there are
no movers in the first period.
2. Of working age is defined as those persons aged between 16 and 64.
3. In the labour force is determined by looking at the employment status
of the head from the family files. Prior to 1976, employment status was coded
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using six values (PSID variable V196 in 1968), where the labour force are those
with values 1 or 2. Between 1976 and 1996 there were eight values, where the
labour force are those with values 1-3. Since 1996 respondents were offered more
than one mention to describe their employment status. We use the first mention
(PSID variable ER10081 in 1997).
4. Non-institutionalised individuals are people that are not in either the
armed forces, prison, a health care or educational facility. We drop those in the
armed forces using occupation. Members of the armed forces have occupation
code 55 in the 2-digit classification (variable V4459 in 1976), code 600 in the 1970
Census Occupation Codes (COC) (PSID variable V7712 in 1981), and code 984
in the 2000 COC (PSID variable ER21145 in 2003). We also use type of institu-
tion for the family unit (variable V11124 in 1985) to determine when a family is
institutionalised, which includes those in the armed forces living off base.
The Dependent Variables
End-of-period migration is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the in-
dividual changes state between the current and next survey, and zero otherwise.
The state of residence is recorded in the PSID family file. Prior to 1985, states
were coded according to the GSA classification (variable V93 in 1968) and from
1985 classified using the FIPS system (variable V12380 in 1985). We converted
the FIPS codes to the GSA classification. There are instances where an individual
has a gap between records because of non-response or missing values. When the
gap is more than two years we set the end-of-year migration decision to missing
(which is the case for 1.5 percent of observations).
End-of-period return migration is a dummy that takes the value one if the
individual returns to a state he previously resided in between the current and
next survey, and zero otherwise. We keep track of all states an individual has
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previously resided in within sample and, in addition, the PSID records the state
the individual grew-up (defined as where the individual spent most of his years
between the ages of 6 and 16). Prior to 1994 the grew-up state was coded using
the GSA classification (variable V311 in 1968) and since 1997 using the FIPS code
(variable ER11842 in 1997).
The Regressors
Individual income includes wages, bonuses, overtime, commissions and the labour
part of business and farm income (PSID variable V74 in 1968) and refers to to-
tal annual income before tax in the previous year to the survey. In the years
1994-1996 and 2001, labour income was reported excluding the labour part of
business and farm income. For these years we construct total labour income by
summing labour income excluding business and farm income (variable ER4140
in 1994), farm income (ER4117 in 1994) and the labour portion of business income
(ER4119 in 1994). Labour income is expressed in constant 1999 dollars using the
CPI-U. Survey respondents are asked about their labour income in the previous
year. We lag labour income by one survey wave to account for this although it is,
of course, imperfect for the biennial surveys post-1997.
Average income is the sample mean income from the Current Population Sur-
vey in a given state-year, where the sample is restricted to those in the labour
force. The income series includes wages and salaries and is expressed in 1999
dollars.
Unemployed is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the individual
is unemployed at the time of the PSID survey, and zero otherwise. From the
employment status variable (PSID variable V196 in 1968), the unemployed have
code 2 for years prior to 1976 and code 3 since 1976.
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Own home is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the individual
owns their home and zero otherwise. This is determined by looking at the value
of the house (PSID variable V5 in 1968), which is coded zero if the individual is
not a home owner.
Age of an individual is reported in the PSID in each survey (PSID variable
ER30004 in 1968). We take the first recorded age of the individual and apply the
gap in survey years to fill in age over time. We do this to avoid the sporadic
two-year jumps or no change in reported age between surveys that sometimes
occur due to changes in the date of the survey within a year.
College degree is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the individual
has a Bachelor’s degree (1968-1974 we use PSID variable with name V313 in 1968;
1975-2009 we use PSID variable with name V4099 in 1975).
Married is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the individual is
married at the time of the PSID survey and zero otherwise. We use the married
pairs indicator from the individual file (PSID variable ER30005 in 1968).
Children is the number of children under 18 living in the family unit at the
time of the PSID survey (PSID variable V398 in 1968).
Borders is the number of contiguous U.S. states for the state that the individ-
ual resides.
Land area of a state is obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau and is measured
in square kilometres.
Sampling weights
Sampling weights are inverse (ex-ante) sampling probability weights supplied
by the PSID. From 1968 to 1989 we use the “Core Individual Weight” (vari-
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able ER30019 in 1968); 1990-1992 the “Combined Core-Latino Weight” (ER30688
in 1990); 1993-1995 the “Combined Core-Latino Sample Longitudinal Weight”
(ER30866 in 1993); 1996 we use the “Core Sample Individual Longitudinal Weight”
(ER33318) and post-1996 we use the “Combined Core-Immigrant Sample Indi-
vidual Longitudinal Weight” (ER33430 in 1997).
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Chapter 2
Wealth, Intertemporal Choice and
Return Migration
2.1 Introduction
It is well-known that many migrants eventually return to their source.1 The phe-
nomenon is known as return migration.2 To take an example from the 2000 U.S.
Census, between 1995 and 2000 a total of 107,961 people moved to Puerto Rico
from the United States (U.S.) mainland. Of these, 66 percent were born in Puerto
Rico and, of the remainder, 56 percent reported Puerto Rican origin.3 The cross-
sectional Census does not allow us to determine the proportion of migrants that
return; however, we know that – between 1995 and 2000 – for every two people
that moved from Puerto Rico to the US mainland, roughly one person moved in
the opposite direction, which is suggestive that return migration is very large.
1Throughout this chapter we will use ‘source’ to refer to the region that an individual grew up
in and, ‘host’ to refer to any region other than the source.
2Return migration is the flow from the ‘host’ to the ‘source’ region.
3More precisely, 107,961 people resided on the U.S. mainland in 1995 and lived in Puerto Rico
in 2000. Therefore, this is a lower bound for those that moved from the mainland to Puerto Rico
between 1995 and 2000.
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Return migration is neither specific to nor unusually large in Puerto Rico.
Looking at all interstate migration between 1995 and 2000 (again from the 2000
Census), roughly 20 percent of all interstate migrants are returning to their state
of birth. Nor is it specific to internal migration, evidence abounds for the return
of international migrants.4 Several theories have been proposed to explain this.
However, it has not been shown analytically that these hypotheses can actually
generate return migration. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to show that,
under some conditions, a number of these theories can generate optimal return
migration.
Why is it important? Migration generally commands much public and po-
litical attention and return migration accounts for a large slice of two-way mi-
gration. At the most basic level, understanding the causes of return migration
can help forecast population totals and their characteristics in the source and
host. Indeed, we do not yet have a good grasp of the determinants of migration
and, even less so, return migration. Consequently, whilst natural increase can be
planned for, migration is often seen as a shock. Return migrants – by definition –
stay in the host temporarily as opposed to permanently and, therefore, it is likely
that their impact on the source and host region will differ from that of perma-
nent migrants. Indeed, we will show that the actions of return migrants in the
host and source will depend critically on the reason for return migration. In or-
der to understand return migration, a first step is to show analytically that some
of the theories that have been proposed to explain migration can actually gen-
erate return migration by optimising individuals. An analytical model will also
help to build intuition for the result and characterise the conditions needed for
return migration as well as the consumption, saving, and hours worked choices
of return migrants.
4See, for example, Dustmann (1996) on the large-scale post-war temporary migrations to Cen-
tral Europe.
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At least six hypotheses have been proposed to explain the return migration
phenomenon. The first five of these all require that the (expected) nominal wage
is higher in the host region than the source region. In addition, one or more
of the following should hold: (1) location-specific marginal utility and a higher
marginal utility of consumption in the source (Hill, 1987, Djajic and Milbourne,
1988, Raffelhschen, 1992, Yang, 2006); (2) a cheaper cost of living in the source
than the host (or a higher purchasing power of the host country currency in the
source country) (Djajic, 1989, Dustmann, 1995, 1997, 2003, Stark et al., 1997, Dust-
mann and Weiss, 2007); (3) relative deprivation and a lower average income (or
consumption) in the source (Stark, 1991); (4) uncertainty and ‘mistakes’ about
economic conditions in the host region (Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996); and (5) im-
perfect capital markets in the source may encourage temporary migration to ac-
cumulate savings for setting up a business upon return (Ilahi, 1999, Mesnard,
2004, Yang, 2006). The final explanation, which does not require a higher wage in
the host, is (6) spending time in the host region increases human capital (through
education or experience) which raises wages upon returning home (Dustmann,
1995, 1997, Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996, Dustmann and Weiss, 2007). There is very
little empirical evidence to suggest which, if any, of these theories is correct.5
We build a tractable, two region model of migration that can embody the
first three of these hypotheses. That is, migrants have location-specific marginal
utility of consumption, price levels in the source and host may differ, and a differ-
ence in average consumption between the source and host can also be captured.
In the model, consumers decide whether to never migrate, permanently migrate,
5Mesnard (2004) did not find much evidence of human capital accumulation for Tunisian re-
turn migrants (20% of return migrants accumulated education whilst abroad and only 8% used it
upon return to Tunisia). Ilahi (1999) finds that Pakistani return migrants were able to enter self-
employment upon return facilitated by their accumulated savings from their time spent abroad
(see also McCormick and Wahba (2000) for Egypt, and Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) for Mexico).
Yang (2006) tests the prediction that migrants return when they have reached a certain amount of
savings by looking at the effect of movements in the exchange rate. Yang concludes that migrants
tend to stay longer when the source currency weakens, suggesting a life-cycle model rather than
migration to accumulate a certain amount of money.
109
or return migrate. The model explains return migration from an ex-ante expec-
tation (or intention) to return to the source, it is not based on ‘mistakes’ or bad
luck post-migration.6 Most theoretical models of migration are static and, there-
fore, assume migration is permanent (see, for example, Borjas (1987)). Those that
have modelled return migration have sought to derive the optimal duration in
the host conditional on returning at some point (Dustmann, 2003). In contrast,
we will show that, under some conditions, return migration is optimal compared
to the corner solutions of never migrating and permanently migrating.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model
and shows analytically that, under some conditions, return migration is optimal.
Section 2.3 concludes. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
2.2 The Model
We make the following assumptions. An individual lives for finite T periods.
There are two regions: North (N) and South (S). Let j ∈ {N, S} index the current
region of residence. Individual nominal income in region j, yj, is assumed to be
constant. The period utility function, u(c, j), is a function of consumption (c > 0)
and the region of current residence (j). We assume utility is homogeneous of de-
gree (1− γ) in consumption, where γ > 0. The marginal utility of consumption
is positive but diminishing: uc > 0, ucc < 0. We assume the individual has a
non-pecuniary preference for one region over the other; more specifically,
u(c, S) = κu(c, N); ∀c, (2.1)
6In a survey of the return migration literature, Gmelch (1980) notes that few studies advance
unfavourable economic conditions in the host region as the trigger for return migration.
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where κ > 0 is the non-pecuniary cost of residing in the North region. The cost
is positive when κ > 1 and negative (a benefit) when κ < 1.7,8 Under the ho-
mogeneity of the utility function, κ
1
1−γ can be thought of as the gross percentage
change in consumption required to leave the individual indifferent between re-
siding in the North and the South. Notice that the non-pecuniary cost of residing
in the North is incurred each period.
The non-pecuniary cost, κ, is a modelling tool that can capture a number of
different preferences. First, κ can capture relative attachment to the South that
may arise because the individual was born and raised in the South, has a famil-
iarity with the South and the existence of social networks in the South, or simply
likes the amenities available in the South. Second, κ can proxy for preferences
that exhibit a relative consumption (or ‘keeping up with the Joneses’) motive
where the Joneses in the North and South differ in their consumption level.9
Third, κ can represent preferences for a particular climate; a desire for the warm
Southern climate could be modelled by specifying κ > 1. It is likely that κ is het-
erogeneous and time-varying as a result of the individual’s actions. For example,
the length of time spent in a region and whether, say, the individual gets married
to a native in the host region will likely impact κ. However, for tractability we
will assume κ is time-invariant.
7This assumption is similar to that made in Raffelhschen (1992) and Dustmann and Weiss
(2007), although Raffelhschen interprets κ as capturing all possible costs of migration – tangible
and intangible. Since κ is incurred each period spent in the North rather than a one-off cost,
we view it as an non-pecuniary (intangible) cost rather than a (tangible) monetary moving cost.
In contrast to Raffelhschen (1992) we allow for spending some time in each location rather than
permanency. We differ from Dustmann and Weiss (2007) in that we model the choice between
switching (an interior solution) and permanent migration (a corner solution) explicitly.
8It is important that κ enters multiplicatively with u(c, N) rather than additively because we
want κ to affect the marginal utility of consumption. One could assume that κ is consumption-
augmenting such that the non-pecuniary cost is measured in terms of compensating consumption.
However, then, in order for κ > 1 to lower the utility of any given consumption in the North we
would have to constrain γ ∈ (0, 1), which means the substitution effect dominates the income
effect and this is a restriction we do not want.
9For example, for the constant relative risk-aversion utility function u(c, j) = φ
1(j=S)
Cj
c1−γ/(1−
γ) where 1(.) is the indicator function, φ measures attachment to the South and Cj is average
consumption in region j; then κ = φCNCS .
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It is a key assumption of the model that κ enters multiplicatively with the
utility function in equation (2.1). Consequently, the marginal utility of consump-
tion is higher in the non-pecuniary preferred region for all levels of consumption.
We assume perfect capital markets, no time-discounting and a zero net interest
rate.10,11,12 Finally, there is no uncertainty, no legal restrictions to migration and
no monetary costs of moving (or one can think of income in the host as net of
moving costs).13
Let Pj denote the (constant) aggregate price level in region j = N, S. The
individual flow budget constraint in period τ is
ωτ+1 =
 ωτ − PScτ + yS if j = Sωτ − PNcτ + yN if j = N ,
where ω is cash-in-hand (or wealth).
2.2.1 Location strategies
With discrete choice models such as migration, we need to impose substantial
structure (constraints) on location choice to keep things tractable.14
10Hence, there is no liquidity constraint motive for migration.
11Since we are primarily concerned with how migration affects the consumption choice around
trend we assume perfect capital markets and a flat consumption path in the absence of migration.
12Notice that, even though markets are complete, the presence of κ means that maximizing
utility is not equivalent to first maximizing income and then smoothing consumption. Indeed,
when yN > yS and κ > 1, the individual faces a trade off between income maximisation and the
non-pecuniary cost of residing in the North. We abstract from incomplete markets to keep the
model tractable, although clearly this is a deficiency.
13The lack of uncertainty does not imply that uncertainty is not relevant, rather it is our wish to
show that switching can occur even in the absence of uncertainty. It would seem that uncertainty
would reduce outmigration for risk-averse agents but, conditional on migration, it may increase
return migration when a bad outcome is realized. Migration flows, income differentials and un-
employment rates across regions are highly persistent, which suggests uncertainty cannot be the
main factor. In a survey of the return migration literature, Gmelch (1980) notes that few studies
advance unfavourable economic conditions in the host region as the trigger for return migration.
14If any timing of migration were permitted then one quickly finds that having to rank a num-
ber of alternatives makes the problem intractable.
112
The assumptions we have made mean that the choice of the individual is
simply a choice between three location strategies: (1) permanently reside in the
South; (2) permanently reside in the North; and (3) spend a fraction σ ∈ (0, T− 1)
of one’s lifetime in the North and a fraction T−σ in the South, where σ is endoge-
nous. The reason is that, under our assumptions, the individual is indifferent be-
tween any combination of moves that adds up to a fraction σ of the individual’s
lifetime spent in the North. This indifference occurs because, by assumption, the
key variables yN , yS and κ are constant, there is no physical cost of migration and
we have perfect capital markets. In the switching case, neither the timing nor the
number of moves is pinned down. That said, for the purposes of comparing per-
manent migration to return migration, it will be useful to impose that migrants
move immediately upon turning adult at time 0 and then the switchers in our
model are akin to return migrants.15
The existing theoretical literature has not classified the parameter space over
which an individual would ex-ante choose to switch rather than permanently
reside in a particular region. Instead, the literature has focused on the optimal
time to return migrate (or switch) conditional on returning. In what follows we
look to characterize the location decision as a function of initial wealth, κ and the
income differential. The aim is to show that the switching (or return) migration
strategy is optimal for some of the parameter space.
Consider the value to the individual of either permanently residing in the
North or the South. The value of an individual that resides in region j from
period 0 until death in period T − 1 (T periods) is the solution to
Vj(ω0) = max
{cτ}T−1τ=0
{
u(cτ, j)− λ
[
Pj
T−1
∑
τ=0
cτ − Tyj −ω0
]}
,
15An interesting extension would be to allow κ to depend on σ. This would endogenise κ by,
say, letting the source bias depreciate with time spent in the host region and/or for the external
habit reference group to be a weighted average of mean consumption in the two regions where
the weights are σ and T − σ.
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where λ is the marginal value of income and the term in square brackets is the
lifetime budget constraint. Clearly the individual chooses to perfectly smooth
consumption over time, cτ = 1Pj
[
yj + ω0T
]
, ∀τ ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1}. Then, the value
of permanently residing in the North is
VN(ω0) = Tu
(
1
PN
[
yN +
ω0
T
]
, N
)
, (2.2)
and the value of permanently residing in the South is
VS(ω0) = Tu
(
1
PS
[
yS +
ω0
T
]
, S
)
= κTu
(
1
PS
[
yS +
ω0
T
]
, N
)
, (2.3)
where the second equality uses equation (2.1) to express VS(ω0) in terms of utility
from (counterfactually) residing in the North.
Consider now the value of an individual in period 0 conditional on spending
a fraction σ ∈ (0, T − 1) of the individual’s life in the North and a fraction T − σ
in the South, where σ is endogenous. The value function is given by
VR(ω0) = max
σ,{cτ}T−1τ=0
[
σ−1
∑
τ=0
u(cτ, N) +
T−1
∑
τ=σ
u(cτ, S)
−λ
(
PN
σ−1
∑
τ=0
cτ + PS
T−1
∑
τ=σ
cτ − σyN − (T − σ)yS −ω0
)]
.
As written, the time index in the above formulation implies that the switching
individual resides in the North for the first σ periods of his life and then resides
in the South for the remaining T − σ periods. The first-order-conditions equate
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the marginal utility of consumption across time; that is,
 cτ = cτ+1 if τ ∈ {0, 1, ..., σ− 2, σ, σ+ 1, ..., T − 2}uc(cτ, N) = PNPS uc(cτ+1, S) if τ = σ− 1 .
(2.4)
From (2.1), the homogeneity of degree (1− γ) and ucc < 0 it follows that cσ =(
PN
PS
κ
) 1
γ cσ−1. From the intertemporal budget constraint, we find the consump-
tion function
cτ =

1
PN
(
ω0+σyN+(T−σ)yS
σ+(T−σ)κˆ
)
if τ ∈ {0, 1, ..., σ− 1}
1
PS
κˆ
(
ω0+σyN+(T−σ)yS
σ+(T−σ)κˆ
)
if τ ∈ {σ, σ+ 1, ..., T − 1}
, (2.5)
where κˆ ≡
(
PN
PS
) 1−γ
γ
κ
1
γ . Let cN and cS denote consumption of a switcher while
in the North and South, respectively. The following proposition follows imme-
diately from equation (2.5).
Proposition 2.2.1 When PNPS κ > 1, switchers consume less each period while residing
in the North than while residing in the South, and vice versa. If PNPS κ > 1 and γ < 1,
switchers have lower expenditure and higher saving when in the North than in the South.
If PNPS κ > 1 and γ > 1, the difference in the expenditure and saving of switchers between
the North and South is ambiguous.
The ambiguity arises due to γ, the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution. When γ < 1, the substitution effect dominates the income effect of a price
change, expenditure will be lower and saving higher in the North compared to
the South when PNPS κ > 1. When γ > 1 there is a high willingness to smooth con-
sumption, the income effect of a price change dominates and the difference in a
switcher’s expenditure and saving between the North and South is ambiguous.
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Later we will show that switching itself requires a high elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, and hence it is likely that switchers will save while in the host.
It is well-known that there is a strong positive correlation between prices and
income (the Penn effect). Therefore, conditional on return migration to a low-
income low-price region, return migrants are likely to save while in the host and
dissave upon returning home. Many authors have shown that price differentials
and a source bias individually entice saving in the host region and dissaving
upon return to the source region. This fits in well with anecdotal evidence that
return migrants save whilst in the host and spend after returning to their source
region (Gmelch, 1980).
The following proposition is trivial yet necessary for completeness.
Proposition 2.2.2 ∀κˆ ∈ (0, 1] and yN > yS, VN(ω0) > VR(ω0) > VS(ω0); and
∀κˆ ∈ [1,∞) and yN < yS, VN(ω0) < VR(ω0) < VS(ω0).
Proposition 2.2.2 simply says that an individual optimally chooses to reside
permanently in the North when both nominal income is higher in the North than
the South and there exists a non-pecuniary benefit or price differential favouring
the North, and vice versa. Clearly then, if switching is optimal, there must be a
trade-off between the income differential and the non-pecuniary cost.
For switchers, the first-order condition with respect to σ equates the loss of
utility from extending the stay in the North by one period with the gain in utility
from the additional consumption that can be afforded by staying in the North an
extra period; that is,
u(cS, S)− u(cN , N) = σuc(cN , N)∂cN
∂σ
+ (T − σ)uc(cS, S)∂cS
∂σ
. (2.6)
Proposition 2.2.3 Conditional on switching being optimal, the fraction of lifetime spent
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in the North region is
σ =
[
(1− γ)κˆyN − (κˆ − γ)yS − γ(κˆ − 1)ω0T
(yN − yS)(κˆ − 1)
]
T, (2.7)
where κˆ ≡
(
PN
PS
) 1−γ
γ
κ
1
γ .
As expected, σ is decreasing in initial wealth ω0 when yN > yS, and vice
versa. The reason is that a necessary condition for switching is κˆ > 1 (a prefer-
ence for the South) when yN > yS, and higher wealth is better spent in the South
where there is a higher marginal utility of consumption. The effect of an increase
in PNPS is to unambiguously reduce σ; similarly a rise in κ reduces σ if γ < 1.
16
We will show later that for switching to be optimal, γ – the inverse elasticity of
intertemporal substitution – has to be low. The effect of a change in yN and yS on
σ is a little more complex. Consider the case κˆ > 1 and yN > yS. Then, σ is de-
creasing in yS because the income and substitution effects of the income change
work in the same direction. In contrast, the effect of a rise in yN on σ is ambigu-
ous because the substitution effect is positive and the income effect is negative
(see Djajic and Milbourne (1988), Dustmann (2003) and appendix B of Mesnard
(2004)).17 That said, given yN > yS, an increase in yN will reduce σ unless initial
wealth is very negative (ω0 < −TyS).18
2.2.2 Location decision rule
We return now to the question of which of the three location strategies – per-
manently reside in the South, permanently reside in the North, or switch – is
optimal. From proposition 2.2.2 it remains for us to consider the two cases
16 ∂σ
∂κˆ = − T(1−γ)(κˆ−1)2 , ∂σ∂ PNPS
= (1−γ)κˆ
γ
PN
PS
∂σ
∂κˆ ,
∂σ
∂κ =
κˆ
γκ
∂σ
∂κˆ .
17In the case when yN > yS, we can sign the partials ∂σ∂yS = −
γ
(yN−yS)2 [TyN + ω0] < 0; and
∂σ
∂yN
= Tκˆ(1−γ)−(κˆ−1)σ
(yN−yS)(κˆ−1) =
γ
(yN−yS)2 [TyS +ω0] ≷ 0.
18The terminal condition ensures initial wealth ω0 > −[σyN + (T − σ)yS].
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{κˆ > 1, yN > yS} and {κˆ < 1, yN < yS}. In what follows, we focus on the
case {κˆ > 1, yN > yS}, the converse can be obtained via a simple change of vari-
ables. The following proposition establishes a unique crossing point for any pair
of conditional value functions.
Proposition 2.2.4 The partial derivatives of the conditional value functions with re-
spect to ω0 are ranked as
∂VS(ω0)
∂ω0
>
∂VR(ω0)
∂ω0
>
∂VN(ω0)
∂ω0
> 0,
for all κˆ > 1, yN > yS, and for any admissible ω0.
The ranking of partial derivatives of the conditional value functions with re-
spect to wealth emits a 3-tuple of unique cut-off values for initial wealth such that
the individual is indifferent between any two of the three location strategies. Let
z1 denote initial wealth such that VS(z1) = VN(z1). Similarly, let VS(z2) = VR(z2)
and VN(z3) = VR(z3). The following proposition provides a ranking of the cut-
offs for initial wealth.
Proposition 2.2.5 z3 < z1 if and only if z2 > z1; and z3 > z1 if and only if z2 < z1.19
19Burdett (1978) proves this in the context of job search.
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It is straightforward to show the cut-off values are,
z1 =
T(yN − κˆ
γ
1−γ yS)
κˆ
γ
1−γ − 1
, (2.8)
z2 =
[σ(z2) + (T − σ(z2))κˆ]
γ
1−γ [σ(z2)yN + (T − σ(z2))yS]− T
1
1−γ κˆ
γ
1−γ yS
T
γ
1−γ κˆ
γ
1−γ − [σ(z2) + (T − σ(z2))κˆ]
γ
1−γ
,
(2.9)
z3 =
T
1
1−γ yN − [σ(z3) + (T − σ(z3))κˆ]
γ
1−γ [σ(z3)yN + (T − σ(z3))yS]
[σ(z3) + (T − σ(z3))κˆ]
γ
1−γ − T γ1−γ
,
(2.10)
where z2 and z3 are implicit functions and σ(z) denotes the value of σ evaluated
at ω0 = z. An explicit solution for z2 and z3 can be derived (see appendix) for
the special case γ = 0.5,
z2 = T
[
κˆ(yN − yS)
κˆ − 1 − yS
]
, (2.11)
z3 = −T
[
yN − yN − yS
κˆ − 1
]
. (2.12)
A corollary of propositions 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 is that the switching strategy is
admissible only when z2 > z1. Proposition 2.2.6 states that this is always the
case when the inverse elasticity of substitution is sufficiently low.
Proposition 2.2.6 z2 > z1 for all κˆ > 1, yN > yS, γ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, for any given
κˆ > 1, yN > yS and γ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a ω0 such that the switching strategy is
optimal.
Figure 2.1 presents an illustration of the conditional value functions under
propositions 2.2.4 - 2.2.6. We see that individuals with low initial wealth (ω0 <
z3) migrate permanently to the North, and those with a high initial wealth (ω0 >
z2) never migrate away from the South, all else equal. Return migrants (or
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switchers) have an initial wealth in the middle range (z3 < ω0 < z2).
FIGURE 2.1
CONDITIONAL VALUE FUNCTIONS
ω0
z3 z2z1
VS(ω0)
VR(ω0)
VN(ω0)
Notes: The figure illustrates the value to an individual
of permanently residing in the South, VS(ω0), perma-
nently residing in the North, VN(ω0), or return migrat-
ing, VR(ω0), as a function of initial wealth ω0. The
model assumes that the individual earns a higher income
in the North than the South and the individual has a non-
pecuniary preference for the South.
The following proposition characterises the parameter space over which switch-
ing is optimal.
Proposition 2.2.7 For any given initial wealth ω0, switching occurs when both κˆ and
yN
yS
are individually large and
∣∣∣ yNyS − κˆ − x∗∣∣∣ small, where x∗ = (κˆ−1)ω0TyS .
Figure 2.2 graphs the optimal location strategy given ω0 = 0 and γ = 0.5 as a
function of κˆ and yN/yS. We see that return migration (or switching) is optimal
when there is jointly a large income differential and a high non-pecuniary pref-
erence for the region with the lower income (or, alternatively, lower prices in the
region with the lower income).
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FIGURE 2.2
OPTIMAL LOCATION DECISION RULE
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
κ
yN/yS
Switching −
Strategy
South
North
Notes: The figure plots the individual migration decision
space. On the vertical axis is the non-pecuniary cost
of residing in the North (κˆ) and on the horizontal axis
is the North-South income ratio. The shaded area la-
belled ‘South’ refers to permanently residing in the South,
‘North’ refers to permanently residing in the North, and
the ‘Switching strategy’ is akin to return migration. The
figure assumes the individual has zero initial wealth and
an elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to two.
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It is clear that, given a North-South income differential and a non-pecuniary
preference for the South, return migration is optimal if the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution (EIS) is sufficiently high. In the limit as the EIS tends to infinity,
return migration is always optimal.
Proposition 2.2.8 For any given initial wealth, switching becomes more prevalent when
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/γ, increases. In the limit as γ tends to zero,
switching is optimal for all κˆ > 1, yN > yS.
2.3 Conclusion
This chapter has examined some of the proposed explanations for return migra-
tion. In particular, we present an analytical model of migration choice in the
presence of location-dependent marginal utility of consumption, an income dif-
ferential and a difference in the cost of living between the source and host region.
In propositions 2.2.4 - 2.2.7 we derive the optimal location decision rule from a
restricted set of strategies: permanently reside in the South, permanently reside
in the North, or migrate and subsequently return to the source. We mapped the
parameter space under which return migration (or switching) is optimal. For re-
turn migration to occur a necessary condition is that there exists a non-pecuniary
preference for (or lower prices in) the region with the lower nominal income. We
find that return migration is more prevalent when the non-pecuniary preference
and the income differential are jointly large. If either one of these is small while
the other is large then one tends to get either permanent migration or no migra-
tion at all. Also, initial wealth is a key factor. Those individuals turning adult
with few assets are more likely to migrate and high-asset individuals are likely to
stay in the region they grew up in. Conditional on migration, those with higher
assets are more likely to return to the region they grew up in. These are novel
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predictions which can be tested empirically.
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Appendix
Appendix 2.A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.2.2 We show that permanently residing in the North is preferred to the
switching strategy for all κˆ ≤ 1, yN > yS. To do this, rewrite VR as
VR(ω0) = σu(cN , N) + (T − σ)u(cS, S)
= σu(cN , N) + (T − σ)κu
((
PN
PS
κ
) 1
γ
cN , N
)
= σu(cN , N) + (T − σ)κˆu(cN , N)
= [σ+ (T − σ)κˆ] u(cN , N)
< Tu
(
1
PN
[
yN +
ω0
T
]
, N
)
= VN(ω0).
where the inequality arises because [σ+ (T − σ)κˆ] < T and cN < 1PN
[
yN +
ω0
T
]
. A symmetric
argument can be used to show that permanently residing in the South is preferred to the switching
strategy for all κˆ ≥ 1, yN < yS.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.3 From (2.6) we have
u(cS, S)− u(cN , N) = σuc(cN , N) ∂cN∂σ
+ (T − σ)uc(cS, S) ∂cS∂σ
⇔ [uc(cS, S)cS − uc(cN , N)cN ]
1− γ = σuc(cN , N)
∂cN
∂σ
+ (T − σ)uc(cS, S) ∂cS∂σ (2.13)
⇔ [cS −
PN
PS cN ]
1− γ = σ
PN
PS
∂cN
∂σ
+ (T − σ) ∂cS
∂σ
(2.14)
⇔ cN
1− γ [
(
PN
PS
) 1−γ
γ
κ
1
γ − 1] = ∂cN
∂σ
[σ+ (T − σ)
(
PN
PS
) 1−γ
γ
κ
1
γ ]
=
(
yN − yS
PN
)
− (1−
(
PN
PS
) 1−γ
γ
κ
1
γ )cN (2.15)
⇔ cN

γ
((
PN
PS
) 1−γ
γ
κ
1
γ − 1
)
1− γ
 =
(
yN − yS
PN
)
where (2.13) follows from homogeneity of degree 1− γ of the utility function, (2.14) follows from
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the first order condition for consumption in (2.4), and (2.15) follows from the consumption func-
tion in (2.5). After substituting for cN using (2.5) and rearranging it follows
σ =
[
(1− γ)κˆyN − (κˆ − γ)yS
(yN − yS)(κˆ − 1)
]
T − γ
(yN − yS)ω0,
where κˆ ≡
(
PN
PS
) 1−γ
γ
κ
1
γ .
Proof of Proposition 2.2.4
∂VS(ω0)
∂ω0
=
κ
PS
uc
(
1
PS
[
yS +
ω0
T
]
, N
)
=
1
PN
uc
(
κˆ−1 1
PN
[
yS +
ω0
T
]
, N
)
,
∂VR(ω0)
∂ω0
=
1
PN
uc(cN , N) +
∂VR(ω0)
∂σ
∂σ
∂ω0
=
1
PN
uc(cN , N) (2.16)
∂VN(ω0)
∂ω0
=
1
PN
uc
(
1
PN
[
yN +
ω0
T
]
, N
)
,
where equation (2.16) follows from the first-order condition ∂VR(ω0)∂σ = 0. The arguments of the
marginal utility functions above are ranked
κˆ−1 1
PN
[
yS +
ω0
T
]
=
1
PN
(
ω0 + TyS
Tκˆ
)
<
1
PN
(
ω0 + TyS
σ+ (T − σ)κˆ
)
, ∀κˆ > 1 (2.17)
<
1
PN
(
ω0 + σyN + (T − σ)yS
σ+ (T − σ)κˆ
)
, ∀yN > yS
≡ cN
<
1
PN
(
ω0 + TyN
σ+ (T − σ)
)
, ∀κˆ > 1, yN > yS (2.18)
=
1
PN
[
yN +
ω0
T
]
.
Proposition 2.2.4 follows from ucc < 0. To be precise, we need a restriction on ω0 for the inequal-
ities to hold. The inequality in (2.17) requires ω0 > −TyS and the inequality in (2.18) requires
ω0 > − T(κˆyN−yS)κˆ−1 < −TyN . Since lifetime income cannot exceed TyS in the South and TyN in the
North, the constraint on initial wealth is implied by the terminal condition ωT = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.5 If z2 > z1, from Proposition 2.2.4 this implies VR(z1) > VS(z1) ⇒
VR(z1) > VN(z1) ⇒ z1 > z3. If z3 < z1, from Proposition 2.2.4 this implies VN(z1) < VR(z1) ⇒
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VS(z1) < VR(z1) ⇒ z2 > z1. The last statement of Proposition 2.2.5 follows from similar reason-
ing.
Derivation of z2 and z3 when γ = 0.5 Substituting for σ in (2.9) using (2.7) and setting γ = 0.5 it
follows
0.25(κˆ− 1)2z22−T(0.5yS + 0.5κˆyN− κˆyS)(κˆ− 1)z2 = T2
[
κˆyS(yN − yS)(κˆ − 1)− 0.25(κˆyN − yS)2
]
.
Complete the square to obtain
(
z2 − T(0.5yS + 0.5κˆyN − κˆyS)0.5(κˆ − 1)
)2
= T2
[
κˆyS(yN − yS)(κˆ − 1)− 0.25(κˆyN − yS)2
0.25(κˆ − 1)2
]
+ T2
[
(0.5yS + 0.5κˆyN − κˆyS)2
0.25(κˆ − 1)2
]
= 0.
Therefore z2 = T
[
κˆ(yN−yS)
κˆ−1 − yS
]
. Similarly, substituting for σ in (2.10) using (2.7) and setting
γ = 0.5 it follows
0.25(κˆ− 1)2z23 +T(0.5yS +(0.5κˆ− 1)yN)(κˆ− 1)z3 = T2
[
yN(yN − yS)(κˆ − 1)− 0.25(κˆyN − yS)2
]
.
Complete the square to obtain
(
z3 +
T[0.5yS + (0.5κˆ − 1)yN ]
0.5(κˆ − 1)
)2
= T2
[
yN(yN − yS)(κˆ − 1)− 0.25(κˆyN − yS)2
0.25(κˆ − 1)2
]
+ T2
[
[0.5yS + (0.5κˆ − 1)yN ]2
0.25(κˆ − 1)2
]
= 0.
Therefore z3 = −T
[
yN − yN−ySκˆ−1
]
.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.6 It is easiest to show z2 > z1 in the special case γ = 0.5. From (2.8) and
(2.11), z2 > z1 if and only if
(κˆ − 1)(yN − yS) > 0,
which holds for all κˆ > 1, yN > yS. In the general case where γ ∈ (0, 1), z2 > z1 if
[σ+ (T − σ)κˆ] γ1−γ [σ(κˆ γ1−γ − 1) + T]− T 11−γ κˆ γ1−γ > 0.
The last part of Proposition 2.2.6 follows from Proposition 2.2.5.
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Proof of Proposition 2.2.7 Again it is easiest to show this for the special case γ = 0.5. The switch-
ing location strategy is optimal if and only if z2 > ω0 and z3 < ω0, which from (2.11) and (2.12)
requires
max
{(
2− yN
yS
)
κˆ − 1+ (κˆ − 1)ω0
TyS
, (2− κˆ) yN
yS
− 1− (κˆ − 1)ω0
TyS
}
< 0.
To see what this implies for κˆ and yNyS , set the two arguments of the max function equal to get:
yN
yS − κˆ =
(κˆ−1)ω0
TyS ≡ x∗. Notice x∗ is increasing in ω0. Consider now three cases depending on
ω0. First, when ω0 = 0, the two arguments of the max function are mirror images in
yN
yS and
κˆ. Therefore, for switching to take place, yNyS and κˆ need to be close enough, that is
(
yN
yS − κˆ
)
close to x∗ = 0. Substituting yNyS = κˆ into the max function shows that the function is negative
and, hence, switching is optimal for all κˆ > 1, yN > yS. If
yN
yS < κˆ, then the first argument of
the max function dominates and switching requires
(
2− yNyS
)
κˆ < 1, that is yNyS large enough and
κˆ − yNyS small enough. If yN/yS > κˆ, then the second argument of the max function dominates
and switching requires (2− κˆ) yNyS < 1, that is κˆ large enough and
yN
yS − κˆ small enough. Second,
when ω0 > 0, then x∗ is positive and
yN
yS − κˆ must not get too far away from this positive x∗ for
switching to occur. Third, when ω0 < 0, then x∗ is negative and
yN
yS − κˆ must not get too far away
from this negative x∗ for switching to occur.
For the general case γ ∈ (0, 1), numerical solution suggests the proposition still holds.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.8 We will show that limγ→0 z2 = +∞ and limγ→0 z3 = −TyN . From
equation (2.7) divide the numerator and denominator by κˆ and take the limit to get
lim
γ→0
σ = lim
γ→0
[
(1− γ)yN − (1− γκˆ )yS − γ(1− 1κˆ )ω0T
]
T
(yN − yS)(1− 1κˆ )
= T,
because limγ→0 κˆ = +∞. This is not a surprising result, when γ = 0 utility is linear in consump-
tion so the individual optimally spends almost all his time in the North where income is higher,
he saves and only consumes when in the South, which is just one period. Now we want to find
the limit of the term [σ+ (T − σ)κˆ] γ1−γ . Using equation (2.7) we have
[σ+ (T − σ)κˆ] γ1−γ =
[
Tγ
(
κˆyN − yS + (κˆ − 1)ω0T
)
(yN − yS)
] γ
1−γ
.
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The limit of the term in square brackets is determined by
lim
γ→0
[
κˆyN − yS + (κˆ − 1)ω0T
]
1/γ
=
+∞
+∞
= lim
γ→0
− 1γ2 (yN + ω0T ) κˆ log
(
PN
PS κ
)
− 1
γ2

= +∞,
where the second equality applies L’Hoˆpital’s rule. Using this result we can show limγ→0 [σ+ (T − σ)κˆ]
γ
1−γ =
PN
PS κ by taking the logarithm and applying L’Hoˆpital’s rule as follows
lim
γ→0
log
[
σ+ (T − σ)κ 1−γγ
]
1−γ
γ
=
+∞
+∞
= lim
γ→0
[
1
γ +
(yN+
ω0
T )κˆ log
(
PN
PS
κ
)(
− 1
γ2
)
[κˆyN−yS+(κˆ−1) ω0T ]
]
(
− 1
γ2
)
= lim
γ→0
−γ+ log
(
PN
PS κ
)
1−
[
yS+
ω0
T
(yN+
ω0
T )κˆ
]

= log
(
PN
PS
κ
)
.
Now the limits of z2 and z3 follow immediately
lim
γ→0
z2 =
T PNPS κ(yN − yS)
PN
PS κ − PNPS κ
= +∞
lim
γ→0
z3 = −
TyN(
PN
PS κ − 1)
PN
PS κ − 1
= −TyN
For completeness, it is easy to show that limγ→0 z3 < limγ→0 z1 < limγ→0 z2, ∀yN > yS, κˆ > 1
since 20
lim
γ→0
z1 =
T
(
yN − PNPS κyS
)
PN
PS κ − 1
.
Finally, from the homogeneity of degree 1− γ in consumption assumption of the utility function,
we have uccc = −γuc, so the utility function exhibits constant relative risk-aversion − ucccuc = γ
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals 1/γ.
20Note that κˆ > 1⇒ PNPS κ > 1 for γ = 0.
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Chapter 3
Place Attachment, Job Search and
Migration: a Structural
Estimation
“There is for virtually everyone a deep association with and con-
sciousness of the places where we were born and grew up, where we
live now, or where we have had particularly moving experiences.”
- Edward Relph (1976, p.43) “Place and Placelessness”
3.1 Introduction
The emotional attachment a person feels towards the place (or area) he or she
inhabits is often mentioned as an important obstacle to migration; however, it
has rarely been studied empirically.1,2 The term ‘place attachment’ originates
1We define migration as a change in the place of his or her main residence for a period of at
least a year. This is consistent with the United Nation’s definition of a migrant.
2A number of theoretical papers on the determinants of migration assume utility depends on
place attachment in some form. Most of these study return migration (see, for example, Hill (1987),
Djajic and Milbourne (1988), Raffelhschen (1992), Dustmann (2003), Mesnard (2004), Yang (2006),
Dustmann and Weiss (2007)). To generate an incentive for return migration, these papers assume
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from psychology. It refers to the emotional bonds and feelings one has with an
area. These bonds typically form and develop through spending time in a place,
and are directly related to practical considerations such as social networks, a
familiarity with surroundings and amenities. A number of papers have found
distance-to-destination to have a large negative effect on the probability of mi-
gration to that destination (see, for example, Sjaastad (1962)). The consensus is
that the monetary costs of moving would have to be implausibly large to ex-
plain this. Therefore, the literature has tended to attribute the adverse effect of
distance on migration to either increasing (with distance) information costs or
increasing (with distance) ‘psychic’ costs (Schwartz, 1973). In addition to the
costs associated with distance, it seems likely that there is a fixed cost (indepen-
dent of distance) of leaving the place that one currently resides. That is, place
attachment determines the number of persons at risk of migration as well as the
choice among potential destinations, where the latter is conditional on migration.
Since place attachment is – by its psychological nature – largely unobservable, we
know very little about its level and variation across individuals and time. The
purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to examine how the component of place
attachment that is independent of distance-to-destination is formed and, to es-
timate its variation in the population of the United States using panel data on
interstate migration.
Economically, it is crucial that we understand and quantify place attachment
if we are to better forecast the volume and timing of migration. Indeed, the num-
ber of people at risk of migration critically depends on place attachment. Data
from the U.S. Current Population Survey, 1999-2011, shows that the numbers
that migrate each year are significant. The first row of Table 3.1 displays the
percent of persons that moved in the last year, by type of migration. On aver-
utility is non-separable in consumption and place attachment, implying place attachment affects
the marginal utility of consumption (and possibly leisure too). In contrast, we assume utility is
linear and separable in income and place attachment.
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age, each year around seven percent move within a county, two percent move
across county borders within a state, two percent move across state boundaries,
and 0.4 percent move from abroad. There are several other reasons why policy
makers would want to quantify place attachment. First, proponents of migration
point to migration as a valve for the labour market: in bad times – when there
is unemployment – migrants tend to leave and in good times – when labour de-
mand exceeds supply – there tends to be immigration. Place attachment is an
obstacle to this. Clearly then we would like to know the distribution of place at-
tachment in the population. In particular, what percentage are at risk of moving
for a given change in economic conditions? Second, we would like to know the
time (or duration) dependence of place attachment. Conditional on migration,
theoretically it is unclear whether place attachment will increase or decrease with
duration in the destination. Intuitively there is a trade-off between homesickness
(from leaving the source) on the one hand and assimilation (into the destination)
on the other. Ultimately it is an empirical question. Estimates of the duration-
dependence of place attachment will help to determine how long immigrants are
expected to stay. A related point is that the well-known negative relationship be-
tween age and the probability of migration may in fact be proxying for the effect
of length of stay on place attachment.3 Indeed, since age and duration (or length
of stay) are highly correlated, it is likely that the estimates of the effect of age on
migration are partially capturing the effect of place attachment too. Third, it is of-
ten suggested that migration is the best way to reduce poverty. This may be true,
but reducing poverty through migration may not increase welfare if place attach-
ment is strong. Therefore, if place attachment is found to be high, governments
3It is well-known that the probability of migration falls with age (Greenwood, 1975). The ex-
planation of this from the human capital theory of migration is that migration is an investment and
the young have a longer expected remaining life to yield the higher annual returns that migration
may bring (Becker, 1964). Furthermore, as Becker (1964) points out, the early years are discounted
less so it pays to not delay. However, there are many ways of theoretically getting the result that
migration decreases with age. One could argue that the costs (both psychic and transport costs)
increase with age because family size, home ownership and non-transferable experience tend to
increase with age (Gallaway, 1969).
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may want to consider policies that encourage the movement of jobs-to-workers
rather than the movement of workers-to-jobs.
This chapter can broadly be split into two parts. The first part is theoretical.
We present a structural model of optimal migration where the incentive to mi-
grate comes from the desire for higher income. More specifically, each period
individuals search potential destinations for jobs. Accepting a job offer from
a destination necessarily implies migration to that destination. One of the main
contributions of this chapter is to extend the standard economic job search model
to allow for search in many destinations.4 To extend the model to J ≥ 2 destina-
tions we use extreme value theory to pin down the distribution of the maximum
value from migration and the probability that each destination offers the highest
value. In each period, individuals search all destinations simultaneously. Search
results in an income offer from each destination (which is drawn from the known
destination-specific income offer distribution) and he or she optimally decides
whether to accept the highest offer (net of migration costs). Rejecting the highest
offer (net of migration costs) requires staying in the source for another period;
accepting the highest offer requires migration to the destination that made the
offer. We consider two costs of migration: (1) the costs of relinquishing the com-
ponent of place attachment that is independent of distance, and (2) the costs of
moving that are dependent on distance-to-destination. In this way we capture
the idea that there is a cost of not living in the place one is attached to, and there
is also a cost that depends on how far away one is from that place. Hereafter, we
will use ‘place attachment’ to refer to the cost that is independent of distance-to-
destination; and ‘moving costs’ to refer to the distance dependent costs.
The optimal strategy of the individual is a reservation rule; that is, the highest
income offer (net of migration costs) is accepted if it exceeds that individual’s
4The canonical search models assume search within a single labour market and most models
of migration assume just two regions – a source and a destination.
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reservation income. The reservation income is shown to be a function of current
and future values of place attachment, income and regional economic conditions.
The model yields a structural equation for the destination-specific probability
of migration. A key feature of sequential search models is the option value of
waiting for a better income offer. In our model, waiting affects place attachment
too.
It seems natural to use a job search framework to study migration for several
reasons. First, a number of papers have proposed job search as the primary rea-
son for migration.5 Second, the migration decision is characterised by imperfect
information and uncertainty.6 Third, the migration decision is sequential.7 More-
over, a sequential model is key to estimating the effect of duration-dependent
place attachment on the probability of migration. Our model makes two addi-
tional assumptions. First, job search is the (only) reason for migration. Second,
job search precedes migration; that is, migration is a by-product of accepting a
job offer from a destination region.
Importantly, these two assumptions are not removed from reality. Since 1999
the U.S. Current Population Survey has asked respondents their primary reason
for moving if they changed their place of residence in the last year. Table 3.1 dis-
plays the reason for moving by type of migration for all years 1999-2011. Since
our empirical estimation is for interstate migration, we will concentrate on the
fourth column. For interstate migration, more than 40 percent gave job-related
reasons. Of these, a mere 11 percent said they were looking for work while 76
percent had a job in-hand prior to migration; that is, job search precedes migra-
5See, for example, Schwartz (1976), McCall and McCall (1987), Herzog Jr et al. (1993), Ortega
(2000), Basker (2003).
6The seminal contributions of Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) realised the impor-
tance of uncertainty in their studies of rural-urban migration in developing countries.
7Search models were developed to deal with situations where income-maximising agents
make sequential, discrete choices under imperfect information. Indeed, it is imperfect informa-
tion and, hence, the probabilistic formulation that keeps the standard sequential job search model
tractable.
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TABLE 3.1
REASON FOR MIGRATION, BY MIGRATION TYPE, 1999-2011
Moved within Moved within state, Moved between Moved from
county different county states abroad
Percent of population 7.1 2.1 2.2 0.4
Reason for moving (percent of movers)
Job-related: 8.3 26.5 40.7 46.4
New job 2.2 13.8 28.6 24.9
Looking for work 0.8 2.7 4.4 11.8
Easier commute 3.8 7.0 2.5 1.2
Retired 0.3 0.7 1.5 0.7
Other job-related 1.2 2.3 3.7 7.8
Housing-related 59.4 35.1 20.0 6.9
Family-related 26.8 27.3 25.7 25.4
Other 5.7 11.2 13.7 21.2
Source: Author’s calculations from IPUMS-CPS data.
Notes: The sample includes all individuals aged 18 and over. The data is pooled for the
survey years 1999-2011. CPS sampling weights are not used. Rows may not sum to 100
percent due to rounding.
tion.8
In the second half of the chapter we estimate the structural model for individual-
level panel data on the length of time (or duration) spent without interruption
in a U.S. state. The individual duration data is from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics. The length of stay in a particular U.S. state ends if interstate migra-
tion takes place.9 The structural model is parameterised in the following way.
We specify place attachment as a function of two components: an innate (that is,
independent of duration) component which takes on a distribution with K ≥ 2
mass points of support representing individual heterogeneity; and a duration-
dependent component that is common to all individuals. The cost of moving is
8A job in-hand is the sum of the ‘new job’ and ‘easier commute’ fields.
9Our choice to study interstate migration rather than any other geographic identifier requires
some justification. First, place attachment in our structural model of job search makes sense only
if accepting a job in a destination requires migration and, more specifically, rules out commuting.
The distances between U.S. states largely prevent commuting, whereas any finer level of geo-
graphic identifiers (for example, counties) may not. Second, our need for panel data on individual
location choices prohibits an analysis of international migration. Furthermore, international mi-
gration is heavily regulated (with some notable exceptions such as the European Union) and so
place attachment is not the only obstacle and in some cases not even the most important. Finally,
the U.S. state appears to strike the right balance between a clear identity (and hence, place attach-
ment) and sample size.
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assumed to be a function of a constant term and the distance-to-destination.
Paying close attention to how our sample is generated, we estimate the search
model for the unknown parameters of interest using maximum likelihood. In
order to mitigate omitted variable bias, we control for a number of variables that
have been found to affect migration in the literature, including age, gender, race,
marital status and education. The estimation is a nested problem: the inner loop
of the optimisation routine solves – for given parameter values – the differential
equation for the reservation income; the outer loop uses the reservation income
to compute the likelihood of observing our sample of durations and updates the
parameter values. The algorithm stops when the likelihood of observing the data
is maximised.
The structural approach to estimating place attachment has a number of ben-
efits. First, the estimates are grounded in economic search theory, of which one
of the key insights is that the current reservation value for migration is directly
influenced by future values of the reservation value. For example, if place at-
tachment is expected to rise with duration spent in the current state, then this
will increase the future reservation value and, in turn, the current reservation
value for migration. Second, in the structural model place attachment is mea-
sured in the same units as income. This helps with interpreting the parameter
estimates because they are income-equivalent. For comparison, we also present
reduced-form estimates.
Our results are rather surprising. While our reduced-form estimates suggest
that place attachment is increasing in the length of stay in a U.S. state, our struc-
tural estimates suggest the opposite. Furthermore, this is true for both the sample
of individuals that reside in the state they grew-up in as well as the sample of in-
dividuals that live in a state other than the one they grew-up in. More research
is needed to verify whether the structural estimates can be relied upon.
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This chapter is most closely related to the literature on job search and mi-
gration. The findings from early studies of spatial job search are that personal
unemployment significantly increases the probability of outmigration and, in
addition, there is some evidence to suggest regional unemployment encourages
outmigration too (see Herzog Jr et al. (1993) for a survey). Rogerson and MacKin-
non (1981), Pickles and Rogerson (1984) and McCall and McCall (1987) were the
first papers to apply formal job search theory to the study of migration.10 These
papers assume a stationary wage offer distribution in a destination, whereas we
allow this to vary over time. Moreover, they do not estimate their models. Ken-
nan and Walker (2003) is similar to our work in the sense that their focus is on the
estimation of a structural model of migration where the incentive for migration
is expected income. However, they are interested in quantitatively showing that
regional income differentials matter for migration decisions, which they find is
the case. In contrast, we are concerned with estimating place attachment.11,12
This chapter is also related to the huge literature on the theory and estimation
of job search models.13 Finally, our work also belongs to the literature on the
estimation of dynamic structural discrete choice models.14
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In section 3.2 we present
a sequential search model of migration choice under uncertainty. The section
10For other related theoretical contributions see Miron (1978) for an early attempt to apply job
search theory to migration; Coulson et al. (2001) who study job search for rural-urban migration
when commuting is permitted; and Ortega (2000) who uses a job search framework to identify a
mechanism through which natives gain from immigration.
11Kennan and Walker (2003) assume migration precedes job search. We, however, assume that
job search precedes migration. Also their methodology is different. They estimate a dynamic
discrete choice model via solving the dynamic programming problem directly with the computer.
In order to do this for 5o U.S. states they have to heavily discretise the wage distribution, which
we do not.
12See also Topel (1986), Fahr and Sunde (2002) and Basker (2003) for empirical studies of job
search and migration.
13See Lippman and McCall (1976) and Rogerson et al. (2005) for surveys of job search and, for
the estimation of search models using duration of unemployment data, see Lancaster (1979), Flinn
and Heckman (1982), Van Den Berg (1990).
14See Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), Rust (1994), Keane and Wolpin (2009) and Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2010) for excellent surveys.
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culminates in a structural equation for the migration (or hazard) rate and its as-
sociated distribution for length of stay (or duration) as a function of place attach-
ment, personal circumstances and regional labour market conditions. Section 3.3
describes the data, details the estimation of the model and explains the results.
Finally Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The Model
The model has its foundations in job search theory. Time is continuous and in-
dexed by t. We define a ‘spell’ for an individual to be the time during which he
or she is continuously resident in a particular region.15 We use ‘spell duration’
to refer to the length of time spent in a spell. For ease of exposition we assume
the spell start date is t = 1 such that time and spell duration coincide.16 Individ-
uals work until (exogenous) time T < ∞, at which point the individual retires
yielding zero utility.17 Individuals are subject to a possibility of death that fol-
lows a Poisson process with death rate parameter φ.18 The economy consists of
J + 1 < ∞ regions indexed by j.
Individuals inelastically supply one unit of labour in a short time interval δt
in return for income. Let i denote the current region. At time t an individual in
region i has (labour) income yit ≥ 0. This income evolves over time in response to
changing labour market conditions in region i and individual circumstances. We
take the evolution of individual income in region i as exogenous.19 In addition,
15Hence, migration from the source region and subsequent return migration to the source are
treated as two distinct spells in the source.
16Our working definition of a migrant is a person who changes his or her region of residence
for a period of at least a year; hence, a spell starts at d = 1.
17Therefore, we do not consider the migration choices of retired individuals.
18Therefore, in a small time interval δt, the probability of death is φδt. Death yields zero utility.
19In other words, we do not allow the individual to have any influence on his income in region
i. If, for example, an individual is observed changing jobs within region i then this is assumed
to be down to nature and not the result of an additional optimality condition by the individual.
Although job search within a region is clearly important, we justify its omission here through our
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at time t the individual is assumed to receive utility from place attachment to the
current region equal to κt.20 We think of place attachment, κt, as capturing the
non-pecuniary value of residence in the current region and is typically positive
when the individual has family ties, established social networks and a familiarity
with surroundings in the region.
Individuals may search for income offers in other regions j 6= i. Search is
assumed to be costless so every individual continuously searches the J possible
destination regions – in other words, all individuals would migrate to region
j 6= i if the income offer in region j is high enough.21 It is expected that search
returns a set of J destination income offers – exactly one from each of the J po-
tential destination regions – per unit of time.22 An income offer at time t expires
at time t + δt; that is, there is no recall of offers and, hence, an income offer from
destination j 6= i reflects current labour market conditions in region j. Individu-
als have imperfect information concerning the offer they will receive from region
j 6= i prior to search. We assume that an individual only knows the distribution
of income offers in region j at time t, FYjt(x) = Pr(Yjt < x), where Yjt is the (non-
negative) continuous random variable for the income offer in region j at time t.23
Income draws from destination j are independent over time. The income offer
distribution in region j at time t, FYjt , includes the probability of an offer of un-
employment and receipt of unemployment insurance. The individual optimally
chooses whether to stay in region i or accept an offer from a destination region
desire to focus on migration.
20Notice that we allow for κ to be time (or duration) dependent. κ is only received in region i
so it does not need a subscript i.
21This assumption is convenient since it allows us to focus on the migration decision. If, how-
ever, search was costly then not everyone may find it worthwhile to search and we would need
another optimality condition for search in addition to the optimality condition for migration.
22The number of full sets of income offers that are received is assumed to follow a Poisson
process with unitary rate parameter, such that one full set of income offers is expected per unit of
time.
23In the empirical analysis in section 3.3 we estimate the distribution of income in region j at
time t conditional on age and educational attainment.
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j 6= i and, if the latter, chooses among destination offers.24 Migration occurs if
the individual accepts an income offer from any destination j 6= i.
Let Vit denote the present discounted value of being resident in region i at
time t, and Vijt the random variable for the present discounted value of migration
from region i to region j at time t.25 Individuals take as given the time paths of the
key exogenous variables {yit, κt, FYjt ; ∀t, j 6= i}; or, alternatively, the individual
is assumed to correctly predict the future values of these exogenous variables.
In a short time interval δt, an individual in region i at time t with income yit
receives utility (yit + κt)δt.26 With probability (1− φδt) the individual survives
to time t+ δt where, with probability 1.δt, the individual chooses to either accept
or reject the highest destination offer and, with probability (1− 1.δt), no set of
offers arrive. Therefore, the value of being resident in region i at time t is given
by the Bellman equation
Vit = (yit + κt)δt +
(1− φδt)
(1+ rδt)
[
δtE max
{
max
j 6=i
{Vij,t+δt}, Vi,t+δt
}
+ (1− δt)Vi,t+δt
]
, (3.1)
where r > 0 is the rate of time preference and E is the mathematical expectation.
Multiplying by 1+rδtδt and taking the limit as δt tends to zero yields
(r + φ)Vit = yit + κt + E max
{
max
j 6=i
{Vijt} −Vit, 0
}
+ V˙it, (3.2)
where V˙it ≡ ∂Vit∂t .
24That is, the regions are mutually exclusive.
25Vijt is a random variable because it will be a function of the income offer distribution in
destination j from which the individual draws.
26The assumption that utility is linear in income y and place attachment κ requires some ex-
planation. Assuming there exists complete (Arrow-Debreu) markets, maximising utility – for a
risk-averse individual – is equivalent to maximising the sum of income and place attachment and
then smoothing per-period utility.
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3.2.1 The Migration Decision
Now consider the individual’s choice whether to migrate or not at time t. To this
end, we need to write the value of migration from region i to j at time t, Vijt. We
assume a fraction ĉij > 0 of the income offer in destination j covers the (distance-
dependent) moving costs from region i to j.27 In the empirical section, ĉij will be
a function of the distance between i and j.28 Finally, we assume that migration is
an absorbing state; that is, there is no opportunity to move again post-migration
from region i.29 Then,
Vijt =
Yjt
Rjt
− ĉijYjt
≡ Yjt
Rjtcijt
, (3.3)
27Note that ĉij does not include the cost of relinquishing place attachment, which is captured by
κ. A moving cost that is proportional to the income offer helps with tractability; more specifically, it
yields a closed-form solution for the probability of choosing destination j conditional on migration
(see equation 3.10). Its analogy in trade theory is an iceberg cost of moving goods between trade
partners. However, in our migration context (and since later we will take the model to the data) it
needs some justification why moving costs are proportional to the income offer. The assumption
requires two leaps of faith. First, for a given individual, regions with (on average) lower income
offers also have lower moving costs – holding distance constant. In support of this one may argue
along the lines of different regional price levels (although, if so, then clearly it would be better to
make ĉij a function of the price level in destination j instead of assuming proportionality to the
income offer). Second, within a destination region, a person that draws a low income offer has a
lower cost of moving than an otherwise identical person that draws a high income offer. One may
argue that high earners tend to spend more on moving but then one may expect them to yield
some utility from this higher expenditure. Nonetheless, among others Borjas (1987) makes the
assumption that migration costs are proportional to income.
28We could allow cij to be individual-specific. In particular, we could control for whether the
individual owned his or her own house in region i as well as controlling for individual-specific in-
formation frictions. Information frictions may be eased by social networks (for example, relatives
residing in destination j) and whether the individual has previously resided in the region. Our
empirical estimation could be extended in this direction.
29This additional assumption is perhaps not as restrictive as first may seem. In the empirical
section, at time t, future income in current region i is forecast out to age 64 conditional on individ-
ual experience and education. Conditional on migration to destination j, the future income stream
in destination j is forecast out to age 64 by applying the (region-specific) growth rate and return to
experience to the income draw at time t. Any subsequent migration due to unforecastable events
will not affect the migration decision at time t. We should, however, be concerned about the effect
of additional migration beyond time t on the value of migration at time t that is both forecastable
and not captured by the region-specific return to experience.
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where 1/Rjt ≡
∫ T
t e
−(r+φ−gjt)(τ−t)dτ = 1−exp[−(r+φ−gjt)(T−t)]r+φ−gjt is the expected present
discounted value of one dollar of income in destination j at time t; gjt is the ex-
pected (constant) growth rate of income in destination j from time t to time T
(which combines the effects of regional growth and the regional return to expe-
rience); and cijt ≡ 11−ĉijRjt . Notice that the present value factor 1/Rjt captures
precisely the human capital theory explanation for why migration rates fall with
age; that is, the young experience a longer period of returns from migration and
the one-off moving costs are spread over a larger number of years (Becker, 1964).
In deciding whether to migrate or not, the individual only considers the high-
est present value income offer – net of the cost of moving – from the set of J des-
tination offers. Let Vi−,t ≡ maxj 6=i{Vijt} denote the random variable for the max-
imum present value income offer. Since the value of migration to region j, Vijt,
is increasing in the income offer in region j, and staying an additional instant of
time in region i at time t, Vit, is independent of the income draw in region j, the
solution to the individual maximisation problem is a unique reservation value
for Vi−,t, call it v∗i−,t, satisfying
v∗i−,t = Vit,
such that the individual migrates from region i if she receives an income offer
with present value that exceeds v∗i−,t and stays in region i otherwise. Substituting
this reservation value into equation (3.2) yields the following non-linear first-
order differential equation for the reservation value (or present value of income
net of moving cost) at time t,30
∂v∗i−,t
∂t
= (r + φ)v∗i−,t − yit − κt − E max
{
max
j 6=i
{
Yjt
Rjtcijt
}
− v∗i−,t, 0
}
, (3.4)
30See Van Den Berg (1990) for a proof that this non-stationary case has a unique solution for the
reservation value.
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where recall that Yjt is the random variable for the income offer in region j at time
t.
3.2.2 The Choice Between Destinations
The random variable for the value of migration from region i to region j at time
t, Vijt, has distribution function
FVijt(v) ≡ Pr(Vijt ≤ v)
= Pr(Yjt ≤ vRjtcijt)
= FYjt(vRjtcijt). (3.5)
The maximum offer value Vi−,t has distribution function
FVi−,t(v) = 1− Pr(Vi−,t > v)
= 1− [1−∏
j 6=i
FVijt(v)], (3.6)
where the second equality uses the fact that Pr(Vi−,t > v) is one minus the prob-
ability that all {Vijt; j 6= i} are less than or equal to v and {Yjt; j = 1, ..., J} are
assumed independent across j for all t. It is common to assume that the dis-
tribution of income in region j at time t, FYjt , is Lognormal. However, under a
Lognormal distribution the expression for FVi−,t is complicated. There is, how-
ever, a distribution for Yjt that leads to a tractable expression: the Fre´chet (or
type II extreme value) distribution,
FYjt(x) = exp(−Ajtx−α), (3.7)
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where Ajt > 0 is a location parameter specific to region j at time t and α > 1
is a shape parameter common to all regions.31,32 Since ultimately we will take
the model to the data, the reader may be worried about the appropriateness of
the Fre´chet distribution for income. Figure 3.1 plots the Fre´chet density (dashed
line) and the Lognormal density (solid line) for two different sets of parame-
ter values.33 Casual eye-balling of the two densities reveals that they look very
similar – both are bell-shaped. The main difference is that the Fre´chet has a fat-
ter right-tail than the lognormal, but they are close.34 Moreover, it is unclear
how much individuals know or care about the tail of the distribution – perhaps
the tails need to be fat but their precise shape may not be important. Figure
3.2 plots synthetic data drawn from a Fre´chet distribution and fits a Lognormal
to the synthetic Fre´chet, first by maximum likelihood and then by minimising
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic.35 Both the fitted Lognormal distributions are
close to the Fre´chet and, minimising the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic provides
31Note the support of the distribution is [0,∞). We restrict α to be greater than one so that the
first moment is finite. The expectation is,
E(Yjt) =
∫ ∞
0
xαAjtx−α−1 exp(−Ajtx−α)dx
= A1/αjt
∫ ∞
0
z−1/α exp(−z)dz
= A1/αjt Γ
(
α− 1
α
)
, (3.8)
where Γ is the Gamma function Γ(x) =
∫ ∞
0 u
x−1 exp(−u)du. Recall α > 1, hence α−1α ∈ (0, 1).
Note limα→∞ Γ
(
α−1
α
)
= 1 and limα→1 Γ
(
α−1
α
)
= ∞. Clearly the expected income is increasing in
Aj.
32Only the Fre´chet distribution leads to an extreme value distribution for the value of migration
to the best alternative region (see Eaton and Kortum (2002) for an analogous use of the Fre´chet
distribution in the trade of goods).
33Both distributions have two parameters: a location and scale parameter. To construct Figure
3.1, we first fitted a Fre´chet to a simulated Lognormal by maximum likelihood; however, maxi-
mum likelihood tended to be sensitive to the tails and so visually it did not give a good fit. In the
end we simply chose parameter values by trial and error using the graphs and our eyes to judge.
34Kleiber and Kotz (2003) survey the literature on the distribution of income and find that
although there is some evidence in support of log-normality, it is by no means perfect and in some
cases other distributions achieve a better fit. However, the Fre´chet is not considered.
35Minimising the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for fitting an empirical distribution to a theo-
retical one is arguably better (for our purposes) than maximum likelihood because Kolmogorov-
Smirnov looks at the difference between the cumulative distribution functions and as such ‘over-
fits’ the middle of the distribution. We discuss this issue in the empirical section.
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a better visual fit than maximum likelihood since the former ‘over-fits’ the mid-
dle of the distribution.
FIGURE 3.1
DENSITY OF A FRE´CHET AND LOGNORMAL
DISTRIBUTION
FIGURE 3.2
FITTING A LOGNORMAL TO A FRE´CHET: MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD VERSUS
KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV DISTANCE MINIMISATION
a) PLOT OF CDF b) PLOT OF PDF
Using (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7), we get the following neat expression for FVi−,t ,
FVi−,t(v) = exp
(
−∑
j 6=i
Ajt(vRjtcijt)−α
)
. (3.9)
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As the cost of migration (cijt) tends to infinity for all j, the probability of migration
tends to zero.36 Conditional on exit from region i at time t, the probability of
choosing destination region j is
pijt = Pr[Vijt > max{Vimt; ∀m 6= i, j}]
=
∫ ∞
0
∏
m 6=i,j
FVimt(v)dFVijt(v)
= Ajt(Rjtcijt)−α
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
− ∑
m 6=i
Amt(vRmtcimt)−α
]
αv−α−1dv
=
Ajt(Rjtcijt)−α
∑m 6=i Amt(Rmtcimt)−α
∫ ∞
0
d
dv
exp
[
− ∑
m 6=i
Amt(vRmtcimt)−α
]
dv
=
Ajt(Rjtcijt)−α
∑m 6=i Amt(Rmtcimt)−α
, (3.10)
where the second equality is by independence and the third equality substitutes
the expression for FVijt from equation (3.5).
3.2.3 The Reservation Value
Using the derived distribution of the maximum in (3.9), the reservation value in
equation (3.4) can be written as
∂v∗i−,t
∂t
= (r + φ)v∗i−,t − yit − κt −
∫ ∞
v∗i−,t
[v− v∗i−,t]dFVi−,t(v). (3.11)
36The expected value of migration from region i at time t is
E(Vi−,t) =
∑
j 6=i
Ajt(Rjtcijt)−α
1/α Γ(α− 1
α
)
.
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The integral on the right-hand-side of (3.11) can be expressed as
∫ ∞
v∗i−,t
[v− v∗i−,t]dFVi−,t(v) =
[
∑
j 6=i
Ajt(Rjtcijt)−α
]1/α
×
× γ
(
α− 1
α
,∑
j 6=i
Ajt(v∗i−,tRjtcijt)
−α
)
− v∗i−,t[1− FVi−,t(v∗i−,t)],
where γ(s, x) =
∫ x
0 t
s−1e−tdt is the lower incomplete gamma function.
The key exogenous variables in the model – income in the current region, yit,
place attachment κt and the distribution of income offers in region j 6= i, Fjt(x) –
are all time (or duration) dependent. Therefore, the reservation value – given by
the non-linear first-order differential equation in (3.11) – is also time dependent.
At time t the individual makes forecasts for these exogenous variables over his
remaining working life (T − t). At time T (retirement age 65) we impose the
boundary condition ViT = 0. Most importantly, at time t, individual expectations
of the future impact on the reservation value at time t. For example, if place
attachment, κt, is expected to increase with duration beyond time t, then this will
increase the reservation value at time t all else equal. Using numerical methods,
the differential equation in (3.11) can be solved recursively from time t = T for
the reservation value v∗i−,t.
3.2.4 The Conditional Migration Rate and Distribution of Duration
In section 3.3 we will estimate our structural model of migration for a sample of
individual spell durations. Before we do this, we need to derive the implied mi-
gration (or hazard) rate conditional on duration and – in turn – the correspond-
ing distribution for spell duration. Define hij(t) as the migration (or hazard) rate
from region i to region j at time t, conditional on spending at least t periods in
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region i. Given the reservation value at time t, v∗i−,t, the destination-j hazard rate
is
hij(t) = pijt[1− FVi−,t(v∗i−,t)]. (3.12)
Let Dij denote the continuous random variable for duration in region i if it were
only possible to migrate to destination j. It has the well-known distribution func-
tion
FDij(d) = 1− exp
(
−
∫ d
0
hij(z)dz
)
, (3.13)
which is the foundation of the maximum likelihood estimation in the next sec-
tion. The overall hazard rate for migration from region i at time t to any desti-
nation j 6= i is simply the sum of the destination-specific hazard rates (they are
mutually exclusive events)
hi(t) =∑
j 6=i
hij(t) = [1− FVi−,t(v∗i−,t)]. (3.14)
Let Di denote the continuous random variable for spell duration in region i. It
has the distribution function
FDi(d) = 1− exp
(
−
∫ d
0
hi(u)du
)
. (3.15)
3.3 Empirical Analysis
We now estimate the above search model using panel data on individual inter-
state migration in the United States (U.S.). The theory outlined above yields
an expression for the migration (or hazard) rate to destination j and, hence, the
probability distribution of spell duration. Our sample of individual spell du-
148
rations in U.S. states comes from the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). We maximise the likelihood of observing our sample
while imposing the restrictions implied by the structural model. In doing so, we
pay careful attention to the specific way our duration sample was generated.37
For comparison with the structural model, we present reduced-form estimates
of the unknown parameters. In what follows we describe the data, outline the
empirical strategy and present the results of the estimation for the unknown pa-
rameters of interest.
3.3.1 The Data
Recall that to test the theory we require data on the following variables: spell du-
ration, d; individual income in the current region i at time t, yit; place attachment
at time t, κit; the distribution of income offers in state j at time t, FYjt ; and the cost
of migration from region i to j, cij. Here we discuss the source of the data (see
Appendix 3.A for a description of each variable used in the analysis).
Our data on individual location choices comes from the PSID. The PSID is a
longitudinal survey that follows 4,802 original families (and all their subsequent
split-offs) residing in the U.S. annually from 1968 to 1997 and biennially from
1997 to 2009.38 At the time of the most recent survey in 2009, the PSID followed
37See Jenkins (2005) for an introductory survey on the techniques of duration analysis.
38This includes the 1,872 low-income families in the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO)
subsample. We apply the PSID sampling weights to make our estimates representative of the U.S.
population. Becketti et al. (1988) compares the empirical distributions of cross-sections of the PSID
with the large-sample Current Population Survey (CPS) for a number of demographics including
age, sex, race, years of education, labour income, marital status, census region and employment
status. These authors also looked at various subsamples including heads of households, which is
our unit of analysis. The authors found that – once the sampling weights are accounted for – the
differences between the PSID and CPS are negligible. Looking at the more recent period 1993-2005,
Gouskova et al. (2008) also finds that the differences between the weighted distributions of the
PSID and CPS are small (with the possible exception of race). Thus it seems that – despite the initial
over-sampling of low-income (and black) SEO families, differential attrition across survey waves
(the longitudinal PSID suffers from non-response and mortality) and an increase in the proportion
of young families in later waves (due to split-offs) in the PSID sample – the PSID sample remains
representative of the U.S. population once the sampling weights are applied. The PSID individual
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8,690 families. Importantly for our purposes, the study records the U.S. state of
residence for an individual in each survey year and from this we compute (in-
sample) duration in a particular state, which constitutes our measure of d.39,40 A
‘region’ in the above theoretical model now refers to a U.S. state and migration
(or hazard) pertains to interstate migration.
The PSID also contains detailed information on the personal circumstances of
the respondents in each survey year, including income. We measure yit as pre-tax
labour income; that is, the sum of wages, bonuses and the amount of business
income attributable to labour. We express income in constant 1999 dollars using
the U.S. Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers (CPI-U). The PSID also
records age, gender, race, marital status and education, which serve as controls
in the maximum likelihood estimation.
The distribution of income offers for an individual in potential destination
state j at time t, FYjt , is assumed to be given by the empirical distribution of in-
come in state j at time t. We use the March Supplement of the Current Population
Survey (CPS), 1968-2011, to estimate the empirical income distribution for each
state-year.41,42 In addition to income, the CPS records the individual’s state of
residence, age and education. We fit the Fre´chet distribution – separately for each
sampling weights are updated over successive survey waves precisely to account for differential
attrition. Non-sample persons (individuals who enter the sample through marriage or living with
a sample person) are assigned a zero weight. Non-sample persons are much more likely to leave
the sample – the PSID does not follow non-sample persons when they leave a sample household.
39We assume it is infeasible to migrate interstate more than once within a two-year time span
and, hence, we can track duration over this 42-year period. This is consistent with the United
Nation’s definition of migration based on length of stay, which requires a change in the place of
primary residence for a period of at least a year. People moving for shorter durations are termed
visitors, not migrants. Nonetheless, the results do not significantly change if we drop the biennial
observations.
40The PSID is the longest running panel dataset and, hence, is particularly suited to our dura-
tion analysis where we must track individuals sequentially. We are able to follow some individuals
for 42 years.
41We obtained the CPS data from the Minnesota Population Center’s Integrated Public Use
Microdata (see King et al. (2010)).
42We chose to use the CPS (rather than the PSID) to estimate the income distribution because of
its much larger sample. The geographic coverage of the CPS is the 50 U.S. states and the District
of Columbia, which coincides with the coverage of the PSID.
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state-year – to the empirical income distribution by minimising the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic for the distance between the empirical income distribution and
the theoretical Fre´chet distribution. We allow the distribution of income offers in
destination j at time t to depend on individual experience and education. More
specifically, the parameter estimate of Ajt is allowed to depend on a quadratic
polynomial in experience (= age - max{years of schooling,12} - 6) and whether
the individual has a college degree or not. In contrast, the parameter estimate of
α is forced to be equal across all individuals and all j, t.43 The parameter estimates
of Ajt are linked to a PSID individual based on the PSID individual’s experience
and whether he or she has a college degree. The CPS records two measures of
individual income: wage and salary income; and total personal income. Unfor-
tunately, for our purposes, both measures are somewhat imperfect. Wages and
salaries are an incomplete measure of individual labour income because they do
not include the income of the self-employed (and transfers to the unemployed).
In contrast, total personal income includes ‘too much’ because it covers asset in-
come in addition to labour income.44 We perform the analysis with both income
measures and find no significant difference in the results. For reasons of brevity,
the results presented herein use the wages and salaries series. We refer the reader
to Appendix 3.B for the specific details of the sample, estimation and goodness
of fit of the Fre´chet distribution to the empirical CPS income distribution.
The cost of migration from state i to state j, cij, is assumed to be a func-
tion of the distance between them. Our data on the distance between the 1,225
43This is an assumption that the structural model invoked for tractability reasons. A test of the
null hypothesis that α is equal for all j, t is not rejected at typical significance levels. This may be
because both A and α affect the variance of the Fre´chet distribution, so to some extent the estimate
of A moves to adjust for the equality restriction.
44Total personal income consists of annual wage and salary income of employees, business
income of the self-employed and income from all other sources. Income from all other sources
includes interest, dividends and rental income. Clearly we do not want to include asset income
because it depends heavily on individual wealth (which, of course, will not be captured by looking
at the distribution of wealth across individuals in another state) and even the return on wealth –
perhaps with the possible exception of rents – is unlikely to be state-dependent.
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(= 50(50− 1)/2) pairs of states comes from Google Maps and is measured as the
crow flies in kilometres. Finally, place attachment at duration d, κ(d), is unob-
servable. We will specify later how it is parameterised.
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Our PSID sample of duration spells suffer from three forms of censoring. First,
interval-censoring occurs when the spell start date is known and the end date is
known to lie within an interval. Recall the structural model presented in section
3.2 assumed duration choice is a continuous process; that is, an individual can
choose to migrate from the current state of residence at any point in continuous
time. In contrast, in our PSID sample we only observe an individual’s state of
residence at the time of interview. Therefore, our duration data is intrinsically
grouped (or interval-censored). In our sample, a spell is interval-censored when
an individual is followed regularly (at least biennially) from the spell start date
until, between two interviews one or more years apart, the individual is recorded
as migrating from the state.45 The start date of a spell is assumed known if an
individual is followed from age 17 or it is a spell commencing immediately (two
years or less) post-migration.46 Interval-censored spells represent the most de-
tailed data we have on spell duration.
Second, right-censoring occurs when we do not observe the end date of a
duration spell. This happens either when an individual attrits from the sample
(due to non-response or mortality) or their spell remains incomplete at the time
of the 2009 PSID survey – the last available.47 Attrition is unlikely to be random.
45The length of the interval at the time of censoring varies across spells due to the survey design
(annual prior to 1997 and biennial since), non-response and missing values for the current state
around the time of migration and – because we will limit the analysis to heads of households –
changes out of and into head status. Missing values are very rare.
46The PSID definition of where an individual grew up refers to ‘most of the years age 6 to 16’;
so if we observe the state of an individual at age 17, we treat this as the spell start date.
47The 1968-2009 PSID Death File records the precise year of death if known. Therefore, we use
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For our purposes this is only a concern if attrition is related to the determinants of
spell duration.48 The individuals that leave the survey represent a huge amount
of data and, in many cases, have a long stream of continuous response prior to
exit that we do not want to discard. Becketti et al. (1988) found that attrition
in the PSID due to non-response is much higher in the first year of entry but
shows no subsequent duration dependence. We take this seriously and drop all
individuals that respond to just a single survey.49,50 If spell i is right-censored
then we know that duration exceeds some level.
Third, and finally, left-censoring is when we do not know the start date of the
duration spell. Predominantly this occurs when an individual enters the sample
above age 17 since we do not know the migration history of individuals at entry.
Hence, with left-censored spells we simply do not know duration at any point
during the spell. This is problematic for our analysis because place attachment,
κ(d), is a function of duration. Therefore, in addition to the full sample, we
present the results for the subsample that drops left-censored spells.
When there is a gap between state records of more than two years, we split
the spell into two, imposing right-censoring on the spell prior to the split and
left-censoring on the spell after.51 In our data, all spells are censored and some
this information rather than the survey year when the gap between interviews is more than a year.
48In theory one could model the attrition process as a function of spell duration and solve for
spell duration as the solution to two simultaneous equations. This is, however, a considerable
complication in a model that is already computationally demanding.
49Individuals that respond to just a single survey fall out of the sample anyway when we lag
labour income to reflect the fact that respondents are asked about their income in the previous
year.
50In other, less supportive evidence, Zabel (1998) finds that the chances of attrition in the PSID
are related to sample duration (although weaker than in the SIPP) and mobility. If – despite the
exhaustive efforts of PSID staff to follow sample members – individuals are more likely to drop
out of the sample post-migration then this is a concern.
51As already mentioned, due to missing observations and changes out of and into Head status,
the length of the interval between state records varies. When no change in state is recorded within
an interval of more than two years then we cannot be sure that migration did not take place during
this period. If instead we observe that migration did take place, then admittedly it is less clear that
one would want to censor this. Clearly the larger the interval the less information it conveys,
particularly when we consider time-varying covariates later (the maximum likelihood estimation
will assume covariates are constant within the interval and, naturally, the longer the interval the
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are doubly censored in the sense that they are left- and right-censored.52 In what
follows, we refer to left and right-censored spells simply as censored spells when
the distinction is not important; that is, when we only use the information that
in both cases duration exceeds some level. Interval-censored spells – which con-
tain more precise information on duration – are referred to explicitly as interval-
censored.53
We restrict the PSID sample to heads of households since we feel that – of all
family members – the head is most likely to make migration decisions.54 Since
our model of migration is based on job search, we drop those observations when
an individual is aged 65 or over. This leaves us with data on 19,712 spells by
13,481 individuals. Of these, 1,568 spells (or 8 percent) are interval-censored and
the vast majority (16,065 or 81 percent) are left-censored. On average – combining
interval-censored and censored spells – duration in a state is roughly 7 years.
Nearly 40 percent of spells are in a host state (that is, a state other than the state
the individual grew up in) and 81 percent of our interval-censored spells are in a
host state.
Table 3.2 presents the empirical frequency distribution of duration in our
sample. The second column of the table lists the number of spells – interval-
censored and censored combined – by spell duration. Almost 24 percent of spells
last just a year, 51.7 percent four years or less and 77.4 percent ten years or less.
Generally speaking then, the number of spells fall exponentially with duration.
less likely this assumption is reasonable). For this reason, we chose to impose right-censoring on
the few cases where the interval-censoring is more than two years.
52To be clear, interval-censored spells are – by definition – neither left nor right-censored.
53The duration literature (on grouped-data) often refers to completed and incomplete spells for
interval-censored and right-censored spells, respectively. However, since some of our observa-
tions are left-censored, a distinction based on completed and incomplete spells is not useful – a
completed spell can be left-censored.
54In reality migration is likely to be a joint decision between the head and “wife” (if present)
but including both would be double-counting. Naturally a better model would treat the family
as the decision maker and optimise subject to the bargaining weights of each family member and
their personal circumstances, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. Note that the PSID survey
records far more information about the head than any other family member.
154
Columns three to six document the number of spells that are interval-censored,
left-censored, in a host state and belong to an individual with multiple spells, re-
spectively. Interval-censored spells, host spells and multiple spells become much
less frequent as duration increases. This is to be expected given that these spells
are either likely to or have to involve migration and, hence, short spells. Just
over half of all spells are those of individuals with multiple spells, although the
number of individuals with multiple spells is substantially less than half.
Table 3.3 presents the frequency distribution of the number of spells per in-
dividual. Roughly 73 percent of individuals have just one spell and 89 percent
have two or fewer spells.55 The prevalence of multiple spells implies the need to
account for dependence across spell durations of the same individual.56
Table 3.4 lists the frequency distribution for the subsample that drops left-
censored spells. The sample size is substantially reduced to 3,647 spells and
the key (for identification) interval-censored spells make up 43 percent of these
spells. Compared to the full sample, in the subsample a much larger fraction
(70 percent) of spells take place in a host state and a much larger proportion (69
percent) are spells of individuals with multiple spells.
Our theory of duration laid out in Section 3.2 relates most closely to the haz-
ard function; that is, the probability of exiting a state conditional on duration.
The (Kaplan-Meier) empirical hazard rate (for the full sample) is shown in Fig-
ure 3.3.57 We grouped durations into two-year intervals to be consistent with the
highest interval length of our interval-censored observations. Let t index two-
55On the one hand, because our sample does not follow individuals throughout their whole life
this table underestimates the number of spells per individual; on the other hand, the splitting of
spells where missing values occur overestimates the number of spells per individual.
56Although imperfect, we will cluster the standard errors at the individual level to allow this
within-individual, across-spell dependence to affect the precision of our parameter estimates.
57Note that there is no problem with including left-censored spells here since to compute the
Kaplan-Meier hazard we only need to know that duration exceeds some level for left-censored
observations. Also note that the Kaplan-Meier estimates are non-parametric.
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TABLE 3.2
DISTRIBUTION OF DURATION
Duration Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Percent Cumulative
in Years All Spells Interval-censored Spells Left-censored Spells Host Spells Multiple Spells All Spells Percent
1 4,707 682 3,483 2,267 2,981 23.9 23.9
2 1,819 249 1,392 897 1,053 9.2 33.1
3 2,494 187 2,030 1,049 1,356 12.7 45.8
4 1,165 107 951 523 548 5.9 51.7
5 2,064 95 1,826 932 726 10.5 62.1
6 581 56 464 211 341 2.9 65.1
7 965 40 808 320 476 4.9 70.0
8 406 31 326 122 212 2.1 72.0
9 745 20 634 253 339 3.8 75.8
10 317 11 265 83 156 1.6 77.4
11 1,194 20 1,116 444 651 6.1 83.5
12 246 17 203 81 117 1.2 84.7
13 216 12 187 55 90 1.1 85.8
14 288 7 263 58 101 1.5 87.3
15 248 7 206 65 100 1.3 88.6
16 215 3 176 59 85 1.1 89.6
17 216 7 186 48 81 1.1 90.7
18 180 5 144 45 81 0.9 91.6
19 163 3 144 34 55 0.8 92.5
20 135 1 108 38 50 0.7 93.2
21 133 1 111 35 39 0.7 93.8
22 111 2 92 24 37 0.6 94.4
23 112 2 91 25 38 0.6 95.0
24 113 1 92 17 41 0.6 95.5
25 114 1 99 22 32 0.6 96.1
26 107 0 93 22 25 0.5 96.7
27 76 0 70 18 15 0.4 97.0
28 152 0 146 36 7 0.8 97.8
29 65 0 53 16 14 0.3 98.1
30 44 0 34 8 13 0.2 98.4
31 35 1 24 9 14 0.2 98.5
32 48 0 41 11 10 0.2 98.8
33 37 0 35 4 3 0.2 99.0
34 40 0 31 7 8 0.2 99.2
35 37 0 29 10 8 0.2 99.4
36 45 0 38 7 8 0.2 99.6
37 11 0 10 1 1 0.1 99.7
38 28 0 28 4 0 0.1 99.8
39 10 0 7 2 2 0.1 99.8
40 30 0 29 1 0 0.2 100.0
Total 19,712 1,568 16,065 7,863 9,914 100.0
Note: The sample consists of interval-censored, left and right-censored durations of heads of house-
holds. A host spell is defined as a spell that takes place in a state other than the state the individual
grew up. For 219 spells the state the individual grew up is unknown and so the numbers in col-
umn 5 are out of a total of 19,493 spells. The column indicating multiple spells denotes spells of
individuals for which we observe more than one spell.
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TABLE 3.3
DISTRIBUTION OF THE NUMBER OF SPELLS
PER INDIVIDUAL
Number of spells Frequency Percent Cumulative
per Individual Percent
1 9,798 72.7 72.7
2 2,242 16.6 89.3
3 846 6.3 95.6
4 313 2.3 97.9
5 150 1.1 99.0
6 71 0.5 99.5
7 36 0.3 99.8
8 18 0.1 99.9
9 4 0.0 100.0
10 1 0.0 100.0
11 2 0.0 100.0
Total 13,481 100.0
year intervals of time. Let nict denote the number of interval-censored spells in
interval t and nct the number of censored spells in interval t (that is, the lower
bound for duration of the censored spell falls within interval t). The hazard rate
in interval t is 58
h(t) =
S(t)− S(t + 1)
S(t) + S(t + 1)
,
where the survivor function S(t) = ∏tx=1
(
1− nicx
nicx
2 +n
c
x
)
. The hazard estimates
make an adjustment for censored observations because they only affect the num-
ber at risk of exit and not the number that actually exit in interval t. From Figure
3.3 we see that the two-year interval hazard declines exponentially with dura-
tion. The probability of exit is highest in the first two years yet is still only 1.2
percent.59
Figure 3.4 plots separately the hazard rates for two subgroups: spells where
58An adjustment is made to account for the (2-year) grouping of the data. The adjustment is
that those at risk of exiting in interval t is nct +
nict
2 because we assume half of the interval-censored
observations have failed by the mid-point of the interval. Hence, strictly speaking, this is a life-
table estimator (and not a Kaplan-Meier estimator).
59The hazard rate does not fall monotonically as duration increases; this lack of smoothness is
likely due to the very low numbers of interval-censored spells at higher durations.
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TABLE 3.4
DISTRIBUTION OF DURATION IN SUBSAMPLE THAT DROPS LEFT-CENSORED
SPELLS
Duration Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Percent Cumulative
in Years All Spells Interval-censored Spells Host Spells Multiple Spells All Spells Percent
1 1,224 682 930 887 33.6 33.6
2 427 249 338 325 11.7 45.3
3 464 187 330 319 12.7 58.0
4 214 107 153 166 5.9 63.9
5 238 95 158 167 6.5 70.4
6 117 56 84 86 3.2 73.6
7 157 40 95 88 4.3 77.9
8 80 31 51 50 2.2 80.1
9 111 20 70 67 3.0 83.1
10 52 11 25 39 1.4 84.6
11 78 20 51 45 2.1 86.7
12 43 17 28 30 1.2 87.9
13 29 12 18 15 0.8 88.7
14 25 7 18 15 0.7 89.4
15 42 7 20 21 1.2 90.5
16 39 3 20 25 1.1 91.6
17 30 7 14 17 0.8 92.4
18 36 5 20 21 1.0 93.4
19 19 3 10 14 0.5 93.9
20 27 1 20 17 0.7 94.7
21 22 1 14 11 0.6 95.3
22 19 2 8 10 0.5 95.8
23 21 2 11 11 0.6 96.4
24 21 1 10 10 0.6 96.9
25 15 1 8 5 0.4 97.3
26 14 0 7 4 0.4 97.7
27 6 0 4 2 0.2 97.9
28 6 0 3 4 0.2 98.1
29 12 0 7 7 0.3 98.4
30 10 0 2 6 0.3 98.7
31 11 1 6 5 0.3 99.0
32 7 0 4 4 0.2 99.1
33 2 0 2 0 0.1 99.2
34 9 0 2 1 0.2 99.5
35 8 0 5 4 0.2 99.7
36 7 0 2 3 0.2 99.9
37 1 0 1 0 0.0 99.9
39 3 0 1 0 0.1 100.0
40 1 0 0 0 0.0 100.0
Total 3,647 1,568 2,550 2,501 100.0
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FIGURE 3.3
INTERVAL HAZARD RATE
Note: A bar represents the hazard rate for a
two-year interval of time.
FIGURE 3.4
HAZARD RATE FOR STATE GREW-UP
AND HOST SUBGROUPS
Note: The line graph is drawn from the mid-
points of the two-year intervals.
the individual resides in the state he or she grew-up and spells where the indi-
vidual resides in a host state. Again, for both subgroups, the hazard rate declines
as duration increases. The hazard rate is much higher for an individual in a host
state than the state he or she grew-up in. The difference between the two hazard
rates declines with duration.
It is well-known, however, that the time-dependence of the hazard function –
in our case downward sloping – may in fact reflect individual heterogeneity (se-
lection) – both observed and unobserved – rather than time-dependence (Gins-
berg, 1973, Lancaster, 1979, Elbers and Ridder, 1982, Heckman and Singer, 1984).
If individuals have individually constant (time-invariant) hazard rates but these
levels vary across individuals, then those with low exit rates will become more
prominent in the sample as duration increases and, hence, in aggregate this indi-
vidual heterogeneity looks like time-dependence when it is not. Without control-
ling for individual heterogeneity, time-dependence and individual heterogene-
ity are observationally equivalent (see Elbers and Ridder (1982), Heckman and
Singer (1984)). Furthermore, controlling for covariates is useful because, clearly,
we would like to know the reasons for changes in the hazard rate other than the
159
passage of time.
3.3.3 Empirical Model
As in the model of section 3.2, we use i to denote the current state such that i
indexes duration spells. To account for the grouped (or interval-censored) na-
ture of our duration data we need to introduce further notation. Let s index
the set of survey dates. We use s¯(i) to denote the survey when an individual
was last seen in spell i. Let di denote actual duration for spell i and dis denote
(in-sample) observed duration for spell i at survey s. Then, dis¯(i) is (in-sample)
observed duration when an individual was last seen in spell i. We use di,s¯(i)+1
to denote duration of spell i if the individual had continued the spell until the
next available survey following s¯(i). If duration for spell i is interval-censored
then {di,s¯(i) ≤ di < di,s¯(i)+1}. If spell i is left or right-censored then we know that
duration exceeds some level, {di > di,s¯(i)}.
We want to make use of all available information. If an individual migrates
in our sample then we know which state he or she has chosen to migrate to and
we want to account for this in our estimation.60 To this end, define χij to be an
indicator variable that takes the value one if the spell is interval-censored and
migration to region j is observed, and zero otherwise (exit to a state other than j
or censored). These are mutually exclusive events (death is treated as censored).
Although migration can occur to at most one destination at any one time,
with grouped data it is possible that, by the time of the next survey, other destination-
specific hazards may have been triggered. Therefore, in writing down the like-
lihood of observing an interval-censored duration and migration to destination
60The duration literature on this is called ‘competing risks’. Each individual has a latent haz-
ard rate for migration to each state. We assume these latent hazard rates are independent, which
follows from the assumption in the structural model that the income offer distributions are inde-
pendent across destinations.
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j 6= i, one has to account for the fact that – within the interval – migration oc-
curred to j before any other destination m 6= j, i. To simplify matters, we assume
that migration can only occur at the boundaries of intervals.61 Therefore, for an
interval-censored duration with migration to destination j, we assume that mi-
gration to all other destinations (m 6= j, i) are censored at the time of migration
to j, di,s¯(i)+1. The contribution of spell i to the overall likelihood is
Li =
[
∏
j 6=i
([
FDij(di,s¯(i)+1)− FDij(dis¯(i))
]
∏
m 6=j,i
[
1− FDim(di,s¯(i)+1)
])χij ]
×
×
[
∏
j 6=i
[
1− FDij(di,s¯(i)+1)
]]1−∑j 6=i χij
= ∏
j 6=i
[
FDij(di,s¯(i)+1)− FDij(dis¯(i))
1− FDij(di,s¯(i)+1)
]χij [
1− FDij(di,s¯(i)+1)
]
, (3.16)
where FDij is the distribution function for duration if it was only possible to mi-
grate to destination j, which is given by equation (3.13). In words, the first term
of the first equation is the product of the likelihoods of migration to each des-
tination j 6= i in the interval (dis¯(i), di,s¯(i)+1], where the likelihood of migration
to destination j is the probability of migration to destination j, [FDij(di,s¯(i)+1) −
FDij(dis¯(i))], and not to any other destination m 6= j, ∏m 6=j,i[1− FDim(di,s¯(i)+1)].62
The second term of the first line is the likelihood of a censored observation.
We assume the time-varying covariates, {yi(d), κ(d), FYj(y; d)}, can change
only at the survey dates and, hence, are constant between surveys.63 Therefore,
the hazard hij(d) is constant within the intervals (or episodes) between two con-
secutive surveys. Substituting (3.13) into (3.16), spell i’s contribution to the log-
61Narandranathan and Stewart (1993) make this assumption in their analysis of unemployment
duration.
62By independence the probability of not going to any state m 6= j, i is given by the product of
not going to each sate m 6= j, i. We invoked the independence (of the random variable {Yjt; j =
1, ..., J}) assumption to derive equations (3.6) and (3.10).
63This is a standard assumption in duration analysis with time-varying covariates. It allows us
to factor out the covariates from the integrated hazard (see Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) for the
grouped data version of the proportional hazards model).
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likelihood writes as
`i = ∑
j 6=i
(
χij log
[
exp
(∫ di,s¯(i)+1
dis¯(i)
hij(ν)dν
)
− 1
]
−
∫ di,s¯(i)+1
0
hij(ν)dν
)
(3.17)
= ∑
j 6=i
(
χij log
[
exp
(
hij(dis¯(i))[di,s¯(i)+1 − dis¯(i)]
)
− 1
]
−
s¯(i)
∑
s=0
hij(dis)[di,s+1 − dis]
)
(3.18)
= ∑
j 6=i
s¯(i)
∑
s=0
(
χij,s+1 log
[
exp
(
hij(dis¯(i))[di,s¯(i)+1 − dis¯(i)]
)
− 1
]
− hij(dis)[di,s+1 − dis]
)
, (3.19)
where χijs is an indicator variable that takes the value one if migration to state j
occurs before survey s and zero otherwise. The last term in equation (3.18) breaks
the integrated hazard with support [0, ds¯(i)+1] into a sum of integrated hazards
with support equal to the intervals (or episodes) between surveys [ds, ds+1]. We
then use our assumption that the hazard hij(d) is constant between surveys (or
within episodes) to take it outside the integral. This is known as episode splitting
and is necessary to account for the time-varying covariates.64 Equation (3.19)
follows because χijs = 0, ∀s ≤ s¯(i), and χij,s¯(i)+1 = 1 if χi = 1 and zero otherwise.
This final form of the log-likelihood is convenient since the joint likelihood for a
set of duration observations (where an observation is an episode within a spell)
is simply the sum of each observation’s contribution to the log-likelihood.65
64Episode splitting has a major benefit over simply using the last period an individual is ob-
served in a spell. Indeed, although the final period of a spell is when the action happens (migration
if interval-censored), the individual is continuously making a choice whether to move of not dur-
ing the spell and this is useful information. Although by definition no migration takes place within
the spell, it is because we observe the time-varying explanatory variables (personal circumstances
and regional conditions) at each survey within the spell that these episodes serve as vital (within
individual-spell) variation to help us explain why – for interval-censored spells – migration occurs
in the last period (or episode) and (for censored spells) it greatly increases the sample size.
65There is a problem with applying the log-likelihood in equation (3.19) to left-censored spells
because, by definition, we do not know the spell start date and, hence, we do not know duration
at any survey preceding completion or right-censoring. We present results for the subsample that
drops all left-censored spells.
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Recall that we have multiple-spell data; that is, for some individuals we ob-
serve more than one spell (see Table 3.3).66 Let n index individuals and i(n)
denote the total number of spells for individual n. An individual may have an
unobserved propensity to migrate not captured by our model which will lead
to dependence in duration across spells of the same individual. In order to con-
trol for this we cluster standard errors at the individual-level. The log-likelihood
function for the sample is not the sum of the individual spell log-likelihood con-
tributions (due to the within-individual spell correlation and sampling weights)
but we assume that the solution to the pseudo-log likelihood
βˆ = arg maxβ∑
n
i(n)
∑
i
wi`i(β; data), (3.20)
is a reasonable estimate of the true parameter estimates β. In the above equation
wi is the PSID-supplied sampling weight for spell i and `i is given in equation
(3.19).67
We impose the restrictions implied by the structural model; that is, the haz-
ard hij(d) is given by equation (3.12), which is a function of the reservation in-
come given by the differential equation in (3.11). The differential equation for
the reservation income – net of moving costs – is solved recursively from time
T = 65 (retirement age in the U.S.) using numerical methods. Naturally we need
to generalise the model to make it applicable to empirical analysis. In particular,
we do not observe place attachment κ, the cost of moving cij, or counterfactual
income in spell i in the event that migration had not taken place. We now discuss
the parameterisation of κ and cij, and the prediction of post-migration counter-
factual income in spell i.
66An individual will have more than one duration spell if (in-sample) she migrates interstate
or, due to missing values, we are forced to split a duration (where no change in state is reported
either side of missing values) into two censored spells.
67Actually the PSID sampling weight varies across survey years s within spell i (individual
sampling weights are updated in later survey waves to account for differential attrition) so it
should have a subscript s and be written inside the sum over s in `i.
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The unknown κ’s are parameterised as follows. The initial value of κ, κ(1),
has a probability of taking on one of K values (or types). Since we do not know
which type the individual in spell i is, spell i’s contribution to the likelihood
becomes a mixture distribution over the K types
Li =
K
∑
k=1
pikLi(κk), (3.21)
where pik is the probability of type κk and ∑Kk=1 pik = 1.
68 Both the parameter
vector of mass points {κk}Kk=1 and their corresponding probabilities {pik}Kk=1 are
to be estimated.69 For simplicity we assume K = 2 (low and high initial κ). In
addition, we assume that κ evolves with duration according to κ(d) = κkdβκ−1,
where βκ is common to all and is to be estimated.70 If βκ is greater (less) than one
then place attachment is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in duration.
The cost of moving from region i to j, cij ≥ 0, is assumed to be a linear func-
tion of distance, cij = c + βclij, where lij is the distance in kilometres between i
and j and (c, βc) are parameters to be estimated.
We predict counterfactual individual income in spell i at time t for the post-
migration period until retirement (age T = 65) based on (in-sample) estimates
of the labour income process. We estimate a model of individual labour income
using the full PSID sample of heads of households aged 16 to 64. We assume that
the log of labour income for individual n in spell i at time t follows
ln ynit = si + z′itθ + (si ∗ zit)′ϑ+ g1(si ∗ tt) + τt + un + eit,
where si is the state of residence for spell i, zit is a vector of covariates, tt is a time
68This is analogous to studies of unemployment duration in the presence of worker hetero-
geneity in non-market productivity (see, for example, Eckstein and Wolpin (1990)).
69This is identical to the Heckman and Singer (1984) non-parametric method of controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity in duration analysis.
70Notice we assume duration starts from d=1, this is consistent with the definition of migration
as a change in location of primary residence for at least a year.
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trend, τt is a year dummy, un is an individual fixed effect, and eit is an AR(1)
disturbance. The vector of covariates zit consists of a quadratic polynomial in
experience and a dummy for four or more years of college education. A prob-
lem with estimating this log-linear model is the presence of zeros in the labour
income series. The relevant literature on this typically advocates either recod-
ing the zeros to ones and use OLS, dropping the problem zero observations and
use OLS, or use the PPML estimator of Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2010).
We adopt the latter approach. The value of gjt in the present value factor Rjt in
equation (3.3) is estimated from the derivative of the log income process above
with respect to (linear) experience and the time trend. It is critical that the esti-
mates capture the growth in earnings with experience since, if not, then it will
confound our estimate of the duration-dependence of place attachment.
Clearly there are many covariates in addition to those that constitute the par-
simonious structural model of section 3.2 which one might expect to influence
the migration decision. Not only are we interested to know if and how these
additional covariates affect migration, failure to control for them will lead to
omitted variable bias. Further, since we will estimate κ(d) as unobserved (time-
varying) heterogeneity, it is paramount that we control for an exhaustive set of
observable explanatory variables. We control for a bunch of (time-varying) co-
variates including age, gender, race, marital status and whether the individual
has a college degree. Let these additional controls be stacked in the column vec-
tor xi(d).71 Since our search theory has nothing to say about these additional
covariates, we assume that the hazard function follows the proportional hazard
71Age, gender and race are ‘strictly exogenous’ with respect to migration; the ‘weak exogeneity’
of education and marriage is due to them being predetermined – that is, measured at the start of
the interval or episode and so prior to the migration decision. Note xi(d) does not include a
constant term because the constant term in the model is the initial value of κ, which is contained
within hij(d).
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(PH) model of Cox (1972) in respect to the control vector xi(d); that is,
hij(d, xi) = hij(d) exp[xi(d)′βx], (3.22)
where βx is a column vector of coefficients to be estimated. To be clear, xi(d)
contains neither a constant nor duration time dummies. We assume the con-
trol vector xi(d) can only change at survey dates and not between surveys for
the reason given above. To summarise, the maximum likelihood will estimate
the parameters {{κk}Kk=1, {pik}Kk=1, βκ, βc, βx}. We calibrate the sum of the rate
of time preference and the probability of death (r + φ) to 4 percent a year.72 The
maximum likelihood estimation does not identify these parameters (it would op-
timally set them to zero) since – in the model – death is indistinguishable from a
right-censored observation.
To provide a benchmark for the structural estimation we also present esti-
mates from a reduced-form model. The reduced-form model assumes a propor-
tional hazard
hr fij (d, zij) = ξd
ξ−1 exp[zij(d)′βz], (3.23)
where ξdξ−1 is the baseline hazard function, zij(d) is a vector of covariates for
spell i and destination j at duration d, and (ξ, βz) is a vector of parameters to
be estimated. The baseline hazard here implies a Weibull distribution for dura-
tion if the covariate vector zij(d) is time-invariant. If ξ is greater than one, then
the baseline hazard is increasing with duration; conversely if ξ is less than one,
then the baseline hazard is decreasing in duration. The covariate vector zij(d)
includes a constant term which can take on one of K = 2 values. The probability
72Estimates of the subjective rate of time preference vary widely across studies (see Frederick
et al. (2002) for a survey) and typically are much higher than the market interest rate. Nonethe-
less, 4 percent is consistent with the lower end of estimates of the rate of time preference from
the macroeconomic literature (see, for example, Carroll and Samwick (1997) and Gourinchas and
Parker (2001)). It is also comparable to the post-tax return on capital in the U.S. of around 5 percent.
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of these K = 2 values sum to one. This captures unobserved heterogeneity in a
manner analogous to that of κ(1) in the structural model and generates a mixed
distribution.73 The covariate vector zij(d) also includes the location parameter
of the destination-j income distribution, Ajt; current income, yit; the distance-to-
destination j, lij; age; and indicator variables for gender, race, marital status and
whether the individual has a college degree. Substituting equation (3.23) into
equation (3.17) and using the assumption that the covariate vector zij(d) is con-
stant within intervals, the contribution to the log-likelihood from spell i writes
as
`
r f
i = ∑
j 6=i
[
χij log
(
exp
[
exp
(
log[dξi,s¯(i)+1 − dξis¯(i)] + zij(dis¯(i))′βz
)]
− 1
)
−
s¯(i)
∑
s=0
exp
(
log[dξi,s+1 − dξis] + zij(dis)′βz
) ]
= ∑
j 6=i
s¯(i)
∑
s=0
[
χij,s+1 log
(
exp
[
exp
(
log[dξi,s¯(i)+1 − dξis¯(i)] + zij(dis¯(i))′βz
)]
− 1
)
− exp
(
log[dξi,s+1 − dξis] + zij(dis)′βz
) ]
. (3.24)
Our Matlab code for the maximum likelihood estimation of the structural and
reduced-form models is given in Appendix 3.C.74,75 As a check to see whether
we have found a global or local maximum, we run the code for widely different
starting values and reassuringly all converged to the same solution.
73See Heckman and Singer (1984).
74We used Matlab’s ‘fminsearch’ algorithm to find the minimum of (the neg-
ative of) the log-likelihood. The parameter estimates are accurate to 1E-6. Our
code for the computation of clustered standard errors borrows heavily from Michael
Rockinger’s code for White sandwiched standard errors within his ‘Max lik’ program (see
http://www.hec.unil.ch/matlabcodes/econometrics.html), which we have extended to account
for clustering.
75As a rough check that our Matlab code does what it is supposed to, we estimated the reduced-
form model when there is just a single risk of migration (as opposed to the J destination competing
risks of migration) and compared this with the output of the same model using Stata’s ml com-
mand. The parameter estimates and the clustered standard errors are identical. The output – not
presented here for brevity – is available on request.
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3.3.4 Results
Table 3.5 presents the parameter estimates for the reduced-form model in equa-
tion (3.24). Clustered standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Consider the
estimates from the first column – it uses the full sample. The estimate of ξ is
close to zero and statistically significant, implying that the baseline hazard ex-
hibits strong negative duration-dependence. In other words, the migration rate
decreases as the length of time spent in a state increases, all else equal. This is
consistent with the Kaplan-Meier empirical hazard rate we presented in Figure
3.3. Recall that all the other covariates enter the hazard function in proportion to
the baseline hazard. Therefore, to isolate the effect of a change in a covariate we
look at the ratio of two hazards with different values for the covariate of interest,
while keeping the values of all other covariates the same. For example, if we
want to look at the effect of a change in z1 on the hazard in equation (3.23) then
we compute the hazard ratio
hr fij (d,z|z1=a+µ)
hr fij (d,z|z1=a)
= exp(βz1µ), where µ is a constant
measured in the units of z1. If, however, z1 is log-transformed, then we look at
the hazard ratio
hr fij (d,z| log(z1)=log(µa))
hr fij (d,z| log(z1)=log(a))
= exp(βz1 log(µ)) where µ is a multiple of
z1. The two destination-specific variables (distance-to-destination, lij, and the lo-
cation parameter of the estimated Fre´chet income distribution in the destination,
Ajt) and income yit are log-transformed in order to help with convergence of the
solver.76 Generally speaking, the remaining parameter estimates are consistent
with the empirical literature on the determinants of migration. The probability
of migration to a destination falls as the distance to that destination increases.
The coefficient estimate on distance of -0.65 implies that – when comparing two
destination states where the first is 10 percent nearer than the second – the indi-
vidual is 7 percent more likely to migrate to the first than the second destination,
all else equal.77 Therefore, the distance between the current state and a potential
76It is well-known that convergence is aided if the variables are of similar scale.
77The ratio of the two hazards is exp(−0.65 log(0.9)) = 1.07.
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destination is a substantial deterrent to migration. The coefficient estimate on
log Ajt is positive and significant. That is, the effect of an increase in the location
parameter of a destination’s income distribution is to increase the probability of
migration to that destination. The remaining covariates pertain to personal cir-
cumstances. The estimate on current labour income is not statistically different
from zero. The migration rate is decreasing in age: an increase in age of 10 years
reduces the migration rate by 7 percent, ceteris paribus. A female is 47 percent
less likely to migrate than a male. A black individual is 48 percent less likely to
migrate than a non-black. Marriage and a college degree are – surprisingly – not
statistically significant. Finally, there is no evidence for unobserved heterogene-
ity in the constant term since, the estimates of the two constant terms are almost
identical.78
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.5 divide the sample into those spells that took
place in the state the individual grew-up and those spells that took place in some
other (host) state, respectively.79 One might expect the reasons for migration and
their relative importance to differ depending on whether the individual resides
in the state he or she grew-up or a host state. In particular, theoretically it is un-
clear whether the migration rate in a host state would increase or decrease with
duration. A positive dependence would arise if, for example, the longer an indi-
vidual stays in the host state the higher is the cost of being away from the state
he or she grew-up.80 Here one would argue that the psychic cost of being away
78Note the estimation forces the probability of a type 1 individual to lie between zero and
one by setting the probability of a type 1 individual equal to exp(b)/(1 + exp(b)), where b is the
estimate given in Table 3.5 with the label ‘prob type 1’. Therefore the estimate of -2.97E-2 equates
to a probability of a type 1 individual of 49 percent. One could use the delta method to provide
the corresponding standard error but we know the estimate is not statistically different from 50
percent.
79For 219 spells (629 observations) we do not know the state the individual grew up in and,
hence, the number of observations for the grew-up and host subsamples do not sum to the number
of observations in the full sample.
80In an early theoretical contribution, Hill (1987) assumes the probability of returning home is
increasing in the period of time spent away.
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TABLE 3.5
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE REDUCED-FORM
MODEL
All states Grew-up states Host states
ξ 1.09E-5 2.87E-7 7.50E-2
(5.78E-9) (3.11E-9) (4.95E-2)
log(lij) -0.650 -0.760 -0.676
(3.93E-2) (7.88E-2) (4.02E-2)
log(Ajt) 0.186 3.30E-2 0.198
(3.49E-2) (6.80E-2) (5.64E-2)
log(yit + 1) 4.57E-4 3.29E-3 -2.74E-2
(1.20E-2) (2.17E-2) (1.27E-2)
age -7.18E-3 -6.50E-3 -2.32E-2
(2.88E-3) (5.65E-3) (3.65E-3)
female -0.641 -0.261E-1 -0.747
(0.116) (0.247) (0.120)
black -0.663 -0.244 -0.560
(0.136) (0.174) (0.135)
married -9.37E-2 0.229 -6.57E-2
(9.36E-2) (0.236) (8.68E-2)
degree 4.81E-2 0.663 0.320
(0.122) (0.196) (7.78E-2)
type 1 cons 7.762 11.942 0.479
(9.65E-2) (0.463) (0.185)
type 2 cons 7.756 11.939 0.479
(9.63E-2) (0.464) (0.184)
prob type 1 -2.97E-2 -1.03E-2 -2.88E-2
(0.160) (0.433) (0.236)
observations 149,084 100,750 47,705
log-likelihood -369,840.8 -74,694.5 -274,560.2
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust and clustered at the
individual level to allow for correlation across duration spells for the
same individual.
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from family and friends is increasing in the time spent away from them. On the
other hand, a negative duration dependence can arise if, for example, a famil-
iarity with surroundings and the establishment of social networks grows with
time spent in the host state. It is ultimately an empirical question. We find that
– although our estimate of ξ is higher in the host than the grew-up subsample –
it remains comfortably less than one, implying the migration rate exhibits nega-
tive duration-dependence in both the grew-up and host subsamples. Therefore,
the reduced-form estimates suggest that assimilation dominates and that place
attachment increases with duration. There are other notable differences between
the grew-up and host subsamples. Distance appears to have slightly less of a
negative effect on migration for someone residing in a host state. This would
make sense if migrants build-up an ability to absorb the extra costs associated
with migrating longer distances as a result of earlier migrations. The location
parameter of the destination income distribution is statistically insignificant for
the grew-up subsample and positive for the host subsample.81 This may imply
that former migrants are much more sensitive to the opportunities in potential
destinations and they target states with higher income. The coefficient estimate
of labour income in the host subsample is significant and negative whereas it is
insignificant in the grew-up sample. This might suggest that former migrants
are sensitive to current income and a bad income shock increases the migration
rate. Age is a bigger deterrent to migration in the host subsample. There is a
big difference in the effect of gender on migration across the two subsamples.
In the grew-up subsample gender has no significant effect whereas in the host
subsample females are much less likely to migrate. One has to be careful when
interpreting this result because we restricted our sample to heads of households
and in the PSID the household head is – by convention – the male head unless
81Recall that 81 percent of the interval-censored spells (which are crucial for identification) take
place in a host state; hence, it is unsurprising that the estimates from the grew-up subsample lack
significance.
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no obvious male head is present. Finally, a college degree is significant and pos-
itively effects the migration rate for both the grew-up and host subsamples.
As mentioned, for left-censored spells we do not know true duration at any
point during the spell and therefore our estimates in Table 3.5 are based on in-
sample duration for left-censored spells (and, hence, underestimate true dura-
tion), which account for a substantial 86 percent of all observations. Of particular
concern is our estimate of ξ which is directly a function of duration. Therefore,
Table 3.6 presents the output for the reduced-form model using the subsample
that drops all left-censored spells. As expected, the estimates for ξ are higher,
although they remain substantially less than one.82 Therefore, our earlier find-
ing holds, the estimate of the baseline hazard suggest that place attachment is
increasing with duration in a U.S. state. Of course, this assumes that the baseline
hazard captures place attachment and not some other (time-dependent) unob-
servable.
Table 3.7 presents the output of the structural estimation for the subsample
that drops left-censored spells. Again we present estimates for the combined
sample of grew-up and host states (in column 1) and the disaggregated esti-
mates for the grew-up and host subsamples (in columns 2 and 3 respectively).
The Matlab code scales some of the parameters to help with convergence of
the solver. More specifically, the estimate of κ1 in Table 3.7 needs to be multi-
plied by 10,000; and the estimate of the probability of κ1 (denoted pi) is equal to
exp(b)/(1 + exp(b)) where b is the estimate reported in Table 3.7 under pi. We
82The intuition for why the removal of left-censored spells increases ξ is as follows. Left (and
right) censored spells impact the hazard through their effect on the numbers at risk of migration
at each level of duration. They, of course, do not contribute to the numbers that actually migrate
at any level of duration. Therefore, left (and right) censored spells simply scale the hazard. Given
that in-sample duration of left-censored spells underestimates true duration and that the number
at risk of migration is necessarily lower for higher durations, they tend to scale the lower tail of
duration too lightly (they are scaling low durations with a low number that should be used to
scale higher durations) and consequently this results in a lower estimate of ξ (or higher convexity
of the baseline hazard).
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TABLE 3.6
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE REDUCED-FORM
MODEL FOR SUBSAMPLE THAT DROPS LEFT-CENSORED
SPELLS
All states Grew-up states Host states
ξ 0.126 0.143 0.224
(4.10E-2) (9.44E-2) (4.90E-2)
log(distij) -0.683 -0.827 -0.668
(3.75E-2) (9.51E-2) (3.97E-2)
log(Ajt) 0.145 -0.416 0.354
(3.81E-2) 0.694 (5.09E-2)
log(yit + 1) -0.009 0.034 -0.035
(0.011) (0.027) (0.012)
age -1.75E-2 -1.40E-2 -2.67E-2
(3.07E-3) (7.63E-3) (3.75E-3)
female -0.264 -0.208 -0.284
(0.088) (0.203) (0.097)
black -0.256 -0.146 -0.235
(0.096) (0.207) (0.112)
married -0.194 -0.254 -0.205
(6.80E-2) (0.166) (7.41E-2)
degree 0.059 0.155 -0.034
(5.99E-2) (0.155) (6.65E-2)
type 1 cons 0.894 6.412 -1.270
(0.246) (7.571) (0.542)
type 2 cons 0.894 6.412 -1.270
(0.246) (7.569) (0.542)
prob type 1 0.002 0.121 -0.021
(0.219) (0.491) (0.188)
observations 20593 7840 12666
log-likelihood -304532.8 -58056.3 -242893.2
Note: The sample excludes all left-censored spells. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are robust and clustered at the individual level.
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first turn to the parameter estimates of initial place attachment: κ1 and κ2. The
estimate of κ1 in the first column implies that the value of place attachment for
a type 1 individual has an income-equivalent of 142,800 dollars in 1999 prices.
The estimate of κ1 in the grew-up subsample is even higher at 223,320 dollars
and, in the host subsample it is lower but still a massive 106,170 dollars. Such
a value of place attachment means migration is prohibitively costly. In contrast,
the estimates of κ2 are close to zero in all three samples. The estimates of κ2
are just 4.5, 10.3 and 2.3 dollars in the combined, grew-up and host samples, re-
spectively. Therefore, the estimates imply that initial place attachment is either
extremely high or approximately zero. The estimates of pi are not statistically
different from 0.5 in all three samples. Therefore, around half of the popula-
tion has an initial place attachment that prohibits migration, and the other half
have no initial attachment at all. We next turn to the estimate of the duration-
dependence of place attachment. We find that βκ is positive and greater than one
in the combined sample (column 1). This implies place attachment is increasing
with duration, which is consistent with the reduced-form estimates. However,
the estimates for the grew-up and host subsamples are wildly different. In both
the grew-up and host subsamples, place attachment is decreasing in duration.
Moreover, place attachment falls away much more strongly in the host subsam-
ple than in the grew-up subsample. It suggests that migrants get itchy feet to
move again, possibly to return to a state that they previously resided in. The
remaining estimates suggest that the cost of moving is increasing in distance-to-
destination. Also, the probability of migration is decreasing in age and higher
for someone with a college degree. Finally, the coefficient estimates on the indi-
cator variables for gender, marriage and race have the opposite sign to both the
reduced-form estimates and prior expectations.
In summary, the reduced-form estimates strongly suggest that place attach-
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TABLE 3.7
STRUCTURAL MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES FOR
SUBSAMPLE THAT DROPS LEFT-CENSORED SPELLS
All states Grew-up states Host states
κ1 14.280 22.332 10.617
(6.17E-5) (5.17E-6) (5.47E-6)
κ2 4.554 10.300 2.288
(8.29E-4) (3.44E-5) (2.26E-3)
pi 4.44E-4 -9.79E-4 -5.80E-4
(0.783) (0.405) (0.257)
βκ 2.439 0.930 -3.358
(6.61E-5) (1.40E-5) (8.23E-6)
log(lij) 4.40E-4 2.50E-4 1.22E-3
(2.54E-4) (4.72E-5) (9.59E-5)
c 1.03E-3 5.39E-3 1.12E-2
(2.07E-4) (2.62E-5) (2.07E-5)
age -1.48E-2 -1.70E-2 -1.69E-2
(3.30E-3) (5.56E-3) (3.85E-3)
female 1.083 0.611 1.347
(0.177) (0.306) (0.218)
black 0.376 0.340 0.383
(0.142) (0.255) (0.179)
married 0.970 0.308 1.242
(0.165) (0.271) (0.201)
degree 0.564 0.542 0.537
(9.34E-2) (0.196) (0.108)
observations 20,593 7,840 12,666
log-likelihood -499,920.3 -92,969.7 -403,737.2
Note: The sample excludes all left-censored spells. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are robust and clustered at the individual level.
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ment is increasing with the length of stay in a region. This is true for the sub-
sample of individuals that reside in a host state as well as the subsample that
live in the state they grew-up in. In stark contrast, the structural estimates of
place attachment suggest the opposite; that is, place attachment falls with du-
ration both in a host state and the state that an individual grew-up in. Further,
around half the population have an initial value for place attachment that im-
plies migration is prohibitively costly. It is unclear how much weight one should
attach to our structural estimates given that they differ so wildly from those of
the reduced-form model. Nonetheless, it suggests more work is needed on what
is an important and under-researched topic.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter is motivated by a desire to quantify unobserved place attachment;
that is, the emotional bonds and feelings one has with the region of residence.
While a number of studies on the determinants of migration have found that
distance-to-destination has a strong negative effect on migration, little is known
about the costs associated with leaving the current region of residence that are
independent of distance. More specifically, in order to determine the numbers
of people that are at risk of migration, one would like to know how place at-
tachment is distributed, both across individuals and time spent in a particular
area.
We present a model of migration where spatial job search determines the
propensity to migrate to a particular destination. An important contribution
is that we extend the standard job search model to a situation where multiple
labour markets are searched. Using extreme value theory we derive a structural
equation for the destination-specific migration (or hazard) rate. This is expressed
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as a function of current and future income, place attachment and the distribution
of income offers in each destination.
We then estimate the structural model for a sample of individual durations in
a U.S. state. The duration data is from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The
findings are surprising. While the reduced-form estimates suggest that place at-
tachment is increasing in the length of stay in a U.S. state, the structural estimates
suggest the opposite. More research is needed to verify this relationship.
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Appendix
Appendix 3.A Data
The variables from the PSID used in the empirical analysis of section 3.3 are:
Age is reported in the PSID for an individual in each survey (PSID variable
name ER30004 in 1968). We take the first recorded age of the individual and
apply the gap in survey years to fill in age over time. We do this to avoid the
sporadic two-year jumps or no change in reported age between surveys that
sometimes occur due to changes in the date of the survey within a year.
College degree is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the individual
has a Bachelor’s degree (1968-1974 we use PSID variable with name V313 in 1968;
1975-2009 we use PSID variable with name V4099 in 1975).
Head of household is typically the adult male head (the husband if married)
unless an adult male is not present or is severely disabled. The current Head
is identified jointly by yearly values for “Sequence Number” in the range 1-20
(PSID variable name ER30021 in 1969) and a “Relationship to Head” value of 1
or 10 (PSID variable name ER30003 in 1968). The sequence number is used to
ensure that only the current head is included and not the head in the previous
wave in the event that the previous Head moved out of the household. In 1968
we can safely identify the Head with a “Relationship to Head” value 1 because
there are no movers in the first period.
Labour income of head includes wages, bonuses, overtime, commissions and
the labour part of business and farm income (PSID variable V74 in 1968) and
refers to total annual income before tax in the previous year to the survey. In the
years 1994-1996 and 2001, labour income was reported excluding the labour part
of business and farm income. For these years we construct total labour income
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by summing labour income excluding business and farm income (variable name
ER4140 in 1994), farm income (ER4117 in 1994) and the labor portion of business
income (ER4119 in 1994). Labour income is expressed in constant 1999 dollars
using the CPI-U. Survey respondents are asked about their labour income in the
previous year. We forward labour income by one survey wave to account for this
although it is, of course, imperfect for the biennial surveys post-1997.
Sampling weights are inverse (ex-ante) sampling probability weights sup-
plied by the PSID. From 1968 to 1989 we use the “Core Individual Weight”
(variable name ER30019 in 1968); 1990-1992 the “Combined Core-Latino Weight”
(ER30688 in 1990); 1993-1995 the “Combined Core-Latino Sample Longitudinal
Weight” (ER30866 in 1993); 1996 we use the “Core Sample Individual Longitu-
dinal Weight” (ER33318) and post-1996 we use the “Combined Core-Immigrant
Sample Individual Longitudinal Weight” (ER33430 in 1997).
Year of death is available in the PSID Death File (variable name ER32050).
State is recorded in the PSID family files. Prior to 1985, states were coded
according to the GSA classification (variable name V93 in 1968) and from 1985
classified using the FIPS system (variable name V12380 in 1985). We coverted the
FIPS codes to the GSA classification.
State grew up is the state the respondent spent ‘most of the years age 6 to
16’. Prior to 1994 the state was coded using the GSA classification (variable name
V311 in 1968) and since 1997 used the FIPS code (variable name ER11842 in 1997).
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Appendix 3.B Fitting a Fre´chet distribution to the Empiri-
cal Income Distribution
We fit the Fre´chet distribution separately for each state-year to minimise the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic between the theoretical Fre´chet and the empirical
income distribution. The empirical income distribution is estimated using our
sample of individual incomes from the March Current Population Survey (CPS).
In the first run of the minimisations we allow both the location parameter for
state j in year t, Ajt, and the scale parameter, αjt, to depend on the state and year.
However, the theoretical model of section 3.2 assumes that the scale parameter
αjt is the same for all j, t. Therefore, to determine the constant scale parameter
for all states and all years, we simply took the average. The result is α = 1.1136.
This constraint does not appear to be too restrictive because the estimates of αjt
are not very different across states and years. We then re-run the estimations for
the location parameter Ajt for when α is constant. In doing this, we allow Ajt
to depend on experience, experience squared and whether the individual has a
college degree or not.83 The parameter estimates are then used to predict the
destination-specific income distribution that the PSID individual draws from in
each year. These parameter estimates enter directly into the differential equation
for the reservation income in spell i at time t. When an individual does not reach
age 64 (the terminal condition) until after 2010 (the latest year the CPS is avail-
able), we extrapolate linearly using the estimates of Ajt between 2002 and 2010
to predict values for t > 2010.
In estimating the empirical income distribution using the CPS data, we im-
pose some sample selection rules. First, since the domain of the two-parameter
Fre´chet distribution is the set of positive real numbers, we need to deal with the
83Prior to 1992 the CPS reports years of education and not categorical education such as
whether the individual has a Bachelor’s degree. We assume those individuals with four or more
years of college have obtained a college degree.
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existence of non-positive income observations.84 We simply drop the 438,734
observations with non-positive income. Second, we restrict the sample to those
individuals aged between 16 and 64 and drop the 421 observations with negative
CPS sampling weights. This leaves us with 3,841,014 observations for the 51x42
state-year pairs. The IPUMS-CPS does not report whether the CPS income data
has been top-coded and leaves this to the user to determine. We inspected the
upper tail of the empirical income distribution in each year for evidence of top-
coding. We could not find any evidence of top-coding for the wages and salaries
series, which is used for the estimations.85 In addition, between 1968 and 1975
not all U.S. states were identified separately, the CPS only recorded the largest 11
states and the others were grouped by proximity into groups of between 2 and 8
states. We estimated the income distribution for these groups and then assigned
the same parameter values to all constituent states. Finally, income is lagged to
account for the fact that the CPS income data refers to the previous year and,
income is deflated using the CPI-U and expressed in 1999 dollars.
A number of questions suggest themselves. First, is the Fre´chet distribution a
good fit to the empirical state-year income distribution? Is it a better fit than the
Lognormal? Is maximum likelihood or minimising the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
statistic the best tool for fitting the theoretical Fre´chet to the empirical income
distribution? To assess this, Figure 3.5 plots the cumulative distribution func-
tion for wages and salaries in 1990 for California (3.5a) and New York (3.5b),
along with the fitted Fre´chet and Lognormal distribution. For both the Fre´chet
and Lognormal, the graphs display the fitted distribution from maximum likeli-
hood estimation (MLE) and minimising the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic.
Figure 3.6 does the same for total personal income. In summary we note that
84The generalised 3-parameter Fre´chet distribution with the third parameter controlling the
minimum can handle non-positive income observations but – to be consistent with the theoretical
model – we do not follow this path.
85Evidence of top-coding would be a sharp rise in the number of cases at the highest income
recorded. We do not find this.
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minimising the KS statistics visually gives a better fit to the empirical income
distribution than maximum likelihood estimation. Further, there is not much
between the goodness of fit for the Fre´chet and Lognormal distributions.
FIGURE 3.5
FITTING A THEORETICAL DISTRIBUTION TO THE EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTION OF WAGES
AND SALARIES IN CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK, 1990
a) CALIFORNIA, 1990 b) NEW YORK, 1990
FIGURE 3.6
FITTING A THEORETICAL DISTRIBUTION TO THE EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTION OF
PERSONAL INCOME IN CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK, 1990
a) CALIFORNIA, 1990 b) NEW YORK, 1990
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Appendix 3.C Matlab Code for the Structural Estimation
% This is the main program. It returns Maximum Likelihood estimates ...
for the parameters of the structural model.
clear all;
sample = 'sample2'; % sample2 is the dataset that drops all ...
left−censored spells
% maximise likelihood
[b1 se1 N1 logL1 exit1] = ml(sample, 'All');
[b2 se2 N2 logL2 exit2] = ml(sample, 'Grewup');
[b3 se3 N3 logL3 exit3] = ml(sample, 'Host');
out = horzcat(b1,se1, b2,se2, b3,se3);
disp(num2str(out)); % display results
% ml.m is the program that generates Maximum Likelihood estimates ...
and their corresponding standard errors. Standard errors are ...
clustered at the individual level. ml.m is called by the main ...
program.
function [bhat se N logL exit] = ml(sample, state)
% load data
if strcmp(sample,'sample2');
load sample2.dat
load sample2 ext.dat
sample = sample2;
sample ext = sample2 ext;
clearvars sample2 sample2 ext
else
load sample1.dat
load sample1 ext.dat
sample = sample1;
sample ext = sample1 ext;
clearvars sample1 sample1 ext
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end
% define subsample
if strcmp(state,'Host');
disp('Host states');
row = find(sample(:,216)==0 | sample(:,216)==99);
sample(row,:) = [] ; % host subsample
row = find(sample ext(:,158)==0 | sample ext(:,158)==99);
sample ext(row,:) = [] ; % host subsample
elseif strcmp(state,'Grewup')
disp('Grew up states');
row = find(sample(:,216)==1 | sample(:,216)==99);
sample(row,:) = [] ; % grew−up subsample
row = find(sample ext(:,158)==1 | sample ext(:,158)==99);
sample ext(row,:) = [] ; % grew−up subsample
else
disp('All states'); % default is all states
end
% define variables
n = sample(:,1); % individual id, used for clustering ...
standard errors
id = sample(:,2); % spell id
w = sample(:,3); % sampling weight
dl = sample(:,4); % duration, lower limit of interval
du = sample(:,5); % duration, upper limit of interval
age = sample(:,7); % age
X = sample(:,7:11); % additional covariates: age, female, ...
black, married, degree
dist = sample(:,12:62); % distance between states
A = sample(:,63:113); % location parameter estimate of Frechet ...
income distribution in the 51 US states
g = sample(:,114:164); % expected growth rate of income in the 51 ...
US states
chi = sample(:,165:215); % censoring indicator for the 51 US states
clearvars sample
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% drop option of moving to current state
dist1 = zeros(size(dist,1),size(dist,2)−1);
A1 = zeros(size(dist1));
g1 = zeros(size(dist1));
chi1 = zeros(size(dist1));
index = (dist>0); % logical indexing − by definition current state ...
has dist=0
for i=1:size(dist,1)
distrow = dist(i,:);
Arow = A(i,:);
grow = g(i,:);
chirow = chi(i,:);
dist1(i,:) = distrow(index(i,:)); % keeps the cells with dist>0
A1(i,:) = Arow(index(i,:));
g1(i,:) = grow(index(i,:));
chi1(i,:) = chirow(index(i,:));
end
dist=dist1; A=A1; g=g1; chi=chi1;
clearvars dist1 A1 g1 chi1
% define the variables used to solve the differential equation for ...
the reservation income
s = sample ext(:,1); % spell id (= id above but extended ...
to age 64 for each spell)
dt = sample ext(:,2); % duration time (= dl above but ...
extended to age 64 for each spell)
y = sample ext(:,3); % labour income (observed during ...
spell and predicted to age 64)
agee = sample ext(:,4); % age
a = sample ext(:,5:55); % location parameter estimate of ...
Frechet income distribution (extrapolated to age 64)
dist2 = sample ext(:,56:106); % distance between states extended ...
to age 64
ge = sample ext(:,107:157); % expected growth rate of income
clearvars sample ext
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% drop option of moving to current state for differential equation data
dist3 = zeros(size(dist2,1),size(dist2,2)−1);
A3 = zeros(size(dist3));
g3 = zeros(size(dist3));
index = (dist2>0); % logical indexing − by definition current ...
state has dist=0
for i=1:size(dist2,1)
distrow = dist2(i,:);
Arow = a(i,:);
grow = ge(i,:);
dist3(i,:) = distrow(index(i,:)); % keeps the cells with dist>0
A3(i,:) = Arow(index(i,:));
g3(i,:) = grow(index(i,:));
end
dist2=dist3; a=A3; ge=g3;
clearvars dist3 A3 g3
% set array dimensions
[N,J] = size(A); % N= # observations, J= # US states
M = size(y,1); % # observations to age 64
% set parameter values
T = 65; % retirement age in U.S.
alpha = 1.1136; % scale parameter of Frechet income ...
distribution, common to all US states
rho = 0.04; % composite discount rate rho=r+phi
% present value factor
R = (rho − g)./(1−exp(−(rho−g).*(T−repmat(age,1,J))));
Re = (rho − ge)./(1−exp(−(rho−ge).*(T−repmat(agee,1,J))));
% Maximum likelihood estimation
b0 = [1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]; % starting parameter values for [k1 ...
k2 pi bk bc cons c bx]
[bhat,lik,exit] = myproblem(b0,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2,alpha, ...
rho,N,M,s,dt,y,a,R,Re,id,X);
logL = − lik;
disp(num2str([bhat logL])); % display results
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% Compute standard errors
disp('estimation of clustered variance−covariance matrix − Huber ...
Sandwich Estimator − with standard errors clustered at ...
individual level');
hess = hessian(bhat,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2,alpha,rho,N,M,s,dt, ...
y,a,R,Re,id,X); % numerical Hessian
h inv = −hess\eye(size(hess,1)); % inverse of Hessian obtained by ...
Gaussian elimination
g = gradp(bhat,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2,alpha,rho,N,M,s,dt, ...
y,a,R,Re,id,X,n); % vector contains within cluster sum of first ...
partial derivatives of logLi wrt bhat. g is Vxp, where V is the ...
total number of clusters (individuals) and p is the number of ...
parameters in bhat
vc = h inv*(g'*g)*h inv;
se = sqrt(diag(vc)); % standard errors
tstat= bhat'./se; % t−statistic
pvalue = 2*(1−tcdf(abs(tstat), N−size(bhat,1)));
bhat=bhat';
disp(num2str([bhat se tstat pvalue]));
% myproblem.m is called by ml.m
function [bhat,lik,exit] = myproblem(b0,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2, ...
alpha,rho,N,M,s,dt,y,a,R,Re,id,X)
history = [];
opts = optimset ('Display','iter', 'MaxIter',1000, ...
'MaxFunEvals',5000, 'TolX',1e−4, 'TolFun',1e−4, ...
'OutputFcn',@myoutput);
[bhat,lik,exit] = fminsearch(@(b) logpdf(b,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi, ...
J,dist2,alpha,rho,N,M,s,dt,y,a,R,Re,id,X),b0,opts);
function stop = myoutput(bhat,optimvalues,state)
disp(['k1 k2 pi bk bc age female black married degree'])
disp(bhat)
stop = false;
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if state == 'iter'
history = [history; bhat];
end
end
end
% logpdf.m is a function handle for the negative of the sample ...
pseudo−log−likelihood. It is called by myproblem.m
function logL = logpdf(b,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2,alpha,rho,N,M, ...
s,dt,y,a,R,Re,id,X) % b=[k1 k2 pi bk bc cons c bx]
% pseudo− log−likelihood for sample
logL = − sum(logpdfi(b,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2,alpha,rho,N,M,s, ...
dt,y,a,R,Re,id,X)); % the negative sign is because we minimise ...
logpdf in myproblem.m
% logpdfi.m is a function handle for the contribution of each spell ...
to the log−likelihood. It is called by logpdf.m and gradp.m
function logLi = logpdfi(b,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2,alpha,rho,N, ...
M,s,dt,y,a,R,Re,id,X) % b=[k1 k2 pi bk bc cons c bx] such that b(5)=bc
b(1) = b(1)*10000;
bx = [b(7); b(8); b(9); b(10); b(11)];
c = 1./(1−(b(6)+b(5)*log(dist)).*R); % cost of moving matrix
c2= 1./(1−(b(6)+b(5)*log(dist2)).*Re); % cost of moving matrix ...
extended to age 64
for i = 1:N
for j=1:J
if c(i,j)<0
c(i,j) = 100000000; % a large number
end;
end;
end;
for i = 1:M
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for j=1:J
if c2(i,j)<0
c2(i,j) = 100000000; % a large number
end;
end;
end;
k1 = b(1).*(dt.ˆ(b(4)−1)); % Generate time series for kappa type 1
k2 = b(2).*(dt.ˆ(b(4)−1)); % Generate time series for kappa type 2
G = @(y) exp(−(y.ˆ(−alpha)).*sum(A.*((R.*c).ˆ(−alpha)),2)); % ...
handle for distribution function for maximum destination income ...
net of moving costs
% probability of moving to destination−j conditional on migration
pij = ...
(A.*((R.*c).ˆ(−alpha)))./repmat(sum(A.*((R.*c).ˆ(−alpha)),2),1,J);
hijk1 = ...
pij.*repmat((1−G(res(dl,N,M,s,dt,y,k1,a,c2,alpha,rho,Re,id))), ...
1,J).*exp(repmat(X*bx,1,J)); % (continuous time) destination−j ...
hazard function for type 1
hijk2 = ...
pij.*repmat((1−G(res(dl,N,M,s,dt,y,k2,a,c2,alpha,rho,Re,id))), ...
1,J).*exp(repmat(X*bx,1,J)); % (continuous time) destination−j ...
hazard function for type 2
pi = exp(b(3))./(1+exp(b(3))); % prob. type 1
% contribution of spell i to log−likelihood
logLi = pi.*w.*sum(chi.*log(expm1(hijk1.*repmat((du−dl),1,J))) − ...
hijk1.*repmat((du−dl),1,J),2) + ...
(1−pi).*w.*sum(chi.*log(expm1(hijk2.*repmat((du−dl),1,J))) − ...
hijk2.*repmat((du−dl),1,J),2);
% res.m solves the differential equation for the reservation income ...
− net of moving costs. It is called by logpdfi.m.
function ystar = res(dl,N,M,s,dt,y,k,a,c2,alpha,rho,Re,id)
% initialise some values
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m=1; % indexes over the observations
i=s(m); % indexes over the spells
q=1; % indexes over the observations
Ystar = zeros(size(dl)); % this will store the results
while (m≤M && q≤N)
nel = sum(s(:)==i); % number of elements with idspell=i in s ...
vector
dti = dt(m:m+nel−1);
yi = y(m:m+nel−1);
ki = k(m:m+nel−1);
ai = a(m:m+nel−1,:);
ci = c2(m:m+nel−1,:);
Rei = Re(m:m+nel−1,:);
tspan = flipud(dti); % solve recursively using terminal value; ...
report solution only at the specific times listed in tspan
IC = 1; % terminal value y(t=T)
[t r] = ode45(@(t,r) ...
myode(t,r,dti,yi,ki,ai,ci,Rei,alpha,rho),tspan,IC); % Solve ODE
YSTAR = flipud(r); % flip vector s.t. reservation income is ...
stacked from duration d=1 to d {bar{s}}
idnel = sum(id(:)==i); % number of elements with idspell=i in ...
id vector
Ystar(q:q+idnel−1) = YSTAR(1:idnel); % store results
m= m+nel; % update m
if m≤numel(s)
i = s(m); % update i. Note we can't use i = i+1 for ...
(host and grewup) subsamples
end
q = q + idnel; % update q
end
ystar = Ystar; % res returns the Nx1 vector of ...
reservation incomes − net of moving costs
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% myode.m is a function handle for the non−linear first−order ...
differential equation for the reservation income − net of ...
moving costs. It is called by res.m.
function drdt = myode(t,r,dti,yi,ki,ai,ci,Rei,alpha,rho) % t is ...
scalar and r is a column vector. myode returns a column vector
% interpolate to obtain the value of the time−dependent terms at ...
the specified time:
y = interp1(dti,yi,t); % Interpolate the data set (dti,yi) at time t
k = interp1(dti,ki,t); % Interpolate the data set (dti,ki) at time t
a = interp1(dti,ai,t); % Interpolate the data set (dti,ai) at time t
c = interp1(dti,ci,t);
c=c';
R = interp1(dti,Rei,t);
R=R';
F = @(x) exp(−(x.ˆ(−alpha)).*(a*((R.*c).ˆ(−alpha)))); % F is a ...
function handle for the 2−parameter Frechet distribution with ...
zero minimum value
drdt = rho.*r − y − k − ...
((a*((R.*c).ˆ(−alpha))).ˆ(1/alpha)).*gamma((alpha−1)/alpha) ...
.*gammainc(r.ˆ(−alpha).*(a*((R.*c).ˆ(−alpha))),(alpha−1)/alpha) − ...
r.*(1−F(r)); % evaluate ODE at time t
% hessian.m computes the Hessian matrix of logpdf evaluated at ...
bhat. If bhat has K elements then the function returns a KxK ...
matrix. It is called by ml.m.
function H=hessian(bhat,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2,alpha,rho,N, ...
M,s,dt,y,a,R,Re,id,X)
f0=logpdf(bhat,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2,alpha,rho,N,M,s,dt,y,a, ...
R,Re,id,X);
[T,co]=size(f0);
if co>1; error('Error, the function should be a column vector or a ...
scalar'); end
[k,c]=size(bhat);
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if k<c,
bhat=bhat';
end
k=size(bhat,1); % number of parameters wrt which one should compute ...
gradient
h=0.00001; % a small number
H=zeros(k,k); % will contain the Hessian
e=eye(k);
h2=h/2;
for ii=1:k;
if bhat(ii)>100; % if argument is big enough, compute ...
relative number
x0P= bhat.*( ones(k,1) + e(:,ii) *h2 );
x0N= bhat.*( ones(k,1) − e(:,ii) *h2 );
Deltaii = bhat(ii)*h;
else
x0P = bhat + e(:,ii) *h2;
x0N = bhat − e(:,ii) *h2;
Deltaii = h;
end
for jj=1:ii
if bhat(jj)>100; % if argument is big enough, compute ...
relative number
x0PP = x0P .* ( ones(k,1) + e(:,jj) *h2 );
x0PN = x0P .* ( ones(k,1) − e(:,jj) *h2 );
x0NP = x0N .* ( ones(k,1) + e(:,jj) *h2 );
x0NN = x0N .* ( ones(k,1) − e(:,jj) *h2 );
Delta = Deltaii*bhat(jj)*h;
else
x0PP = x0P + e(:,jj) *h2;
x0PN = x0P − e(:,jj) *h2;
x0NP = x0N + e(:,jj) *h2;
x0NN = x0N − e(:,jj) *h2;
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Delta = Deltaii*h;
end
fPP = logpdf(x0PP,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2,alpha,rho, ...
N,M,s,dt,y,a,R,Re,id,X); % forward,forward
fPN = logpdf(x0PN,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2,alpha,rho, ...
N,M,s,dt,y,a,R,Re,id,X); % forward,backward
fNP = logpdf(x0NP,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2,alpha,rho, ...
N,M,s,dt,y,a,R,Re,id,X); % backward,forward
fNN = logpdf(x0NN,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2,alpha,rho, ...
N,M,s,dt,y,a,R,Re,id,X); % backward,backward
H(ii,jj)=(sum(fPP)−sum(fPN)−sum(fNP)+sum(fNN))/Delta;
H(jj,ii)=H(ii,jj);
end
end
% gradp.m computes the gradient of f evaluated at bhat. It uses ...
forward gradients and adjusts for differently scaled x by ...
taking percentage increments. It is called by ml.m.
function g=gradp(bhat,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2,alpha,rho,N, ...
M,s,dt,y,a,R,Re,id,X,n)
f0=logpdfi(bhat,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2,alpha,rho,N,M,s,dt,y,a, ...
R,Re,id,X);
if size(bhat,2)>size(bhat,1)
bhat=bhat'; % bhat needs to be a column vector
end
p=size(bhat,1); % number of parameters wrt which one should compute ...
gradient
h=0.0000001; % some small number
G=zeros(N,p); % will contain the gradient for the N observations
e=eye(p);
for j=1:p;
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if bhat(j)>1; % if argument is big enough, compute relative number
f1=logpdfi(bhat.*(ones(p,1) + e(:,j)*h),w,dl,du,dist, ...
A,chi,J,dist2,alpha,rho,N,M,s,dt,y,a,R,Re,id,X);
G(:,j)=(f1−f0)/(bhat(j)*h);
else
f1=logpdfi(bhat + e(:,j)*h,w,dl,du,dist,A,chi,J,dist2, ...
alpha,rho,N,M,s,dt,y,a,R,Re,id,X);
G(:,j)=(f1−f0)/h;
end
end
V = max(n); % number of clusters (individuals)
g=zeros(V,p); % will contain the gradient for the V clusters
v = 1; % v indexes clusters (individuals)
q = 1;
while v < V;
mel = sum(n(:)==v); % number of spells for individual v
g(v,:) = sum(G(q:q+mel−1,:),1); % sum gradients within cluster
q = q+mel;
v = v+1;
end
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